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Preface
It is increasingly recognized by policymakers as well as academics around the 
world that close direct and indirect interaction between multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) and local firms is absolutely essential if foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is to have deep and lasting positive effects on host countries. Nevertheless, 
the issue of MNC-local firm interaction has been relatively underexplored in the 
academic literature until recently, where we have seen the emergence of a growing 
literature focusing on linkages and spillovers from FDI. 
This book aims at contributing to the emerging literature on MNC-local firm 
interfaces by providing a number of country studies from emerging economies 
of the spillover and linkage effects of multinational corporations on local firms. 
Moreover, the book takes the issue to the policy level by sharing and evaluating 
policy experiences from a number of countries on efforts to promote closer inter-
action between MNCs and local firms. The country studies are placed within a 
framework for analyzing MNC-local firm interfaces that integrates insights from 
the spillover and linkage literature. 
The book’s primary market is postgraduate students and researchers in eco-
nomics, business studies, international relations, political science, development 
studies and area studies. However, because the book has a policy orientation, 
development practitioners and policymakers may also find insights and analyses 
that may inspire efforts to enhance spillover effects of multinational corporations 
in emerging economies.
The book is part of the ongoing work of the Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations of the European Association of Development Research and Train-
ing Institutes (EADI). The idea for the book was launched at the 2008 General 
EADI Conference in Geneva and a call for papers was posted in the fall of 2008. 
The book in hand represents a selection of the best papers responding to this call. 
The book has been edited by the conveners of the EADI Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations Eric Rugraff and Michael W. Hansen. Eric Rugraff 
 Preface
is Associate Professor in International Economics at the University of Strasbourg 
and researcher at the Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) and 
Michael W. Hansen is Associate Professor in International Business at the Co-
penhagen Business School (CBS) and researcher at the Center for Business and 
Development Studies. 
We are grateful for financial support from the EADI Secretariat.
Strasbourg and Copenhagen, September 2010




1 Multinational corporations and local fi rms in 
emerging economies
 An introduction
Eric Rugraff  and Michael W. Hansen
1.1 Introduction
One of the most heated issues within current development debates relates to the 
role played by multinational corporations (MNCs) in economic development. 
On the one hand, MNCs may help emerging economies1 in the modernization of 
their economies and industries by transferring technology, know-how and skills, 
by providing access to export markets, by intensifying competition, or by making 
available goods and services that are better and/or cheaper than those offered 
by local producers (De Mello, 1999; UNCTAD, 1999; JBIC Institute, 2002). On 
the other hand, beneficial effects are not given and MNCs may stifle economic 
development by locking in host economies in low value-added activities and by 
crowding out local investments and jobs. Furthermore, anti-competitive practices 
of MNCs may reduce consumer welfare and MNCs may help build consumption 
patterns that are unsuited for host countries (Caves, 1996; Buckley and Ghaury, 
2002; Cypher and Diez, 2004).
As noted by numerous authors, at the end of the day it must be concluded 
that MNCs obviously are both ‘boon’ and ‘bane’ for emerging economies (Caves, 
1996; Nunnenkamp, 2004; Dicken, 2004; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Endewick, 
2005) and therefore the key issue is when foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
MNCs is beneficial to economic development and when it is not. In this regard, 
the literature has pointed out numerous factors that condition FDI impacts, such 
as government policies (Dunning, 1997), MNC investment motives (Endewick, 
2005), MNC entry strategies (Görg and Greenaway, 2004), absorptive capacity 
of local industry (Narula and Lall, 2004), or the extent to which MNCs link up 
to local firms and industries (Altenburg, 2000; Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2006).
One of the key issues related to MNCs’ role in economic development is the 
way in which MNCs interact with local firms and industries. This issue is in-
creasingly pivotal as MNCs’ role in organizing global economic activity grows 
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and as private sector development becomes a key development priority in more 
and more countries. In this situation, it is crucial to ask whether and how MNCs 
contribute to the development of the local private sector. Are MNCs inciting 
local industries to become more effective by exposing them to competition and 
demonstrating advanced production methods, or are they on the contrary using 
their market power to crowd out local firms? Are MNCs building broad local 
networks of related and supporting industries in host countries or are they rather 
creating enclave economies with few local linkages? And are MNCs investing in 
upgrading competencies of local firms and industries or are they on the contrary 
keeping local firms in low value adding routine functions and activities? In short, 
would indigenous industries and firms be better or worse off without the entry 
of MNCs?
The aim of this book is to provide insights into the nature and dynamics of 
MNC-local firm interaction in the new global context of private sector driven 
economic development and the growing importance of MNC activity in emerg-
ing economies. This will be done by offering evidence from a variety of emerging 
economies on MNC-local firm interaction and on how governments have dealt 
with this issue. It is hoped that this book will assist in developing a better under-
standing of the complexities and variations in MNC-local firm interaction, and 
thereby contribute to better informed policy intervention on MNCs.
In the following we will describe what we have called ‘the new global context’ 
of the MNC-local firm relationship. We will then move on to provide a concep-
tual and theoretical framework for the book, as well as a review of the extant 
literature on MNC-local firm interaction. Finally, we will position the contribu-
tions of the book within the existing literature and assess how we see these stud-
ies contributing to the literature.
1.2 Th e new global context of multinational corporation-local fi rm 
relations
1.2.1 Th e changing map of foreign direct investment
One of the most striking aspects of FDI in recent decades is the growing FDI in 
emerging economies, rising from a level of 20-30 of all FDI fl ows in the early 
1990s to 30-40 in the mid 2000s. While the fi nancial crisis has signifi cantly re-
duced the absolute amount of FDI, in emerging economies it has continued to rise 
relative to total FDI, as growth in these countries is relatively high and as the need 
of Western MNCs to streamline their cost structures and access resources continue 
to drive FDI in these countries. Indeed, it is predicted that FDI fl ows to emerging 
economies will exceed those of developed countries by the early 2010s (UNCTAD, 
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2009). Th e vast majority of FDI in emerging economies is concentrated in a small 
group of Asian countries (in particular China) and in rapidly growing Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. However, while the least developed countries receive negligible 
fl ows of FDI, these fl ows can be just as signifi cant if measured in relation to the size 
of their economies (Nunnenkamp, 2004; UNCTAD, 2009).
The composition of FDI in emerging economies has changed significantly in 
recent years. Where FDI in these countries traditionally was concentrated in ex-
tractive industries or was market-seeking in relation to intermediary and con-
sumer goods, there has recently been a surge in services FDI. Moreover, we have 
witnessed growing efficiency and strategic asset-seeking investments, in particu-
lar in some of the more advanced Asian countries. Much of the FDI is in the form 
of acquisitions, an indication that emerging economies are building advanced lo-
cal industries that are attractive investment targets for MNCs. Finally, the source 
of FDI has changed; the share of FDI originating from emerging economies 
themselves has risen from approximately 10 of global FDI around 2000, to more 
than 20 by the end of the decade (UNCTAD, 2009).
The changing map of FDI is driven by a number of developments, first among 
them the more FDI-conducive environments in many parts of the world with 
reduced formal and informal barriers to investment (Rugraff, 2008); larger, rap-
idly growing, and increasingly sophisticated markets; improved infrastructures; 
improved skill bases and education levels; and the development of vibrant local 
supply industries capable of supporting foreign investors with goods and services 
(see for example Kapur et al., 2001; Jiang et al., 2005). Simultaneously, MNCs 
are making fundamental changes to their strategies: they are increasingly disin-
tegrating their value chains and outsourcing more and more activities globally 
(Porter, 1986; Sturgeon and Lester, 2003). Moreover, MNCs are changing their 
competitive horizons from mainly national and regional arenas to increasingly 
global arenas. The changing strategies of MNCs match the improved conditions 
of emerging economies well and consequently, we see a widening and deepen-
ing of MNC activity in such countries. All this takes place against the backdrop 
of advances in communication technology and decreases in transportation costs, 
which reduce the importance of geographical proximity (Dicken, 2003).
1.2.2 Implications for emerging economies
The changing map of FDI has huge positive and negative implications for in-
dustrial and more broadly, economic development. Apart from offering an injec-
tion of scarce investment capital, FDI comes with a package of technology, skills, 
connections and market opportunities. Moreover, FDI may introduce better and 
cheaper products and sharpen competition, thereby improving consumer welfare. 
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The growing sophistication of MNC activities enhances the potential impact of 
MNCs on host countries’ skills and technology base. On the other hand, foreign 
investors’ market power may suppress competition and subject whole sectors of 
the host countries to the strategies of MNCs (Gereffi, 1999). As MNCs are look-
ing for increasingly advanced and reliable types of assets in the countries they 
are investing in, and as the number of locations offering favorable conditions is 
growing, competition for FDI increases and the danger of competitive bidding 
and deepened divisions grows between countries catching up and falling behind 
(Dunning and Narula, 2004).
FDI is not least a two-edged sword for local firms and industries in emerging 
economies; on the one hand, the arrival of foreign firms introduces discomforting 
and sometimes unfair competition, not only in product markets but also in labor 
and capital markets. Furthermore, MNCs may use their bargaining power to get 
privileges and exemptions from governments not extended to local firms. On the 
other hand, if local firms succeed in linking up to the foreign investors, FDI may 
offer vast opportunities for expanding activities as suppliers and subcontractors 
to the MNCs. Moreover, the local firms may learn from the collaboration, for ex-
ample learn about more advanced standards and organizations, and thus upgrade 
to more advanced activities. With regard to firms unrelated to the MNCs, MNCs 
may demonstrate new production technologies, marketing practices and manage-
rial approaches that may be adopted by the local firms, and former employees of 
MNCs may inject dynamism into local firms if hired there. Finally, MNCs may 
use their financial and organizational strength to push for further development 
of the commercial infrastructure and regulation in the host country, something 
that also may benefit local firms.
This book seeks to improve our understanding of the positive and negative 
aspects of MNC-local firm relations, the conditions under which they occur, and 
how governments, through various policy measures, can promote positive MNC-
local firm interaction.
1.3 Th e main concepts of multinational corporation-local fi rm 
relations: Spillovers and linkages
The literature on MNC-local firm interaction essentially revolves around two 
concepts, spillovers and linkages. The term ‘spillovers’ denotes the impact or ef-
fect of an interaction between the MNC and the local firm and the term ‘linkages’ 
denotes the organizational modality of the interaction. We will clarify these con-
cepts and their relation in the following sections.
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1.3.1 Spillovers
The initial theoretical and empirical literature on effects of FDI focused on the 
direct impacts of the multinationals such as additional capital brought into the 
country, the creation of jobs, the effect on the balance of payment, and so on 
(MacDougall, 1960). Another part of the FDI impact literature that took on a 
real importance at the beginning of the 1990s (UNCTAD, 1992), tried to evalu-
ate the macroeconomic effect of FDI on the growth rate of developing countries, 
some studies detecting positive impacts (see for example Borensztein et al., 1998; 
De Mello, 1999; Chan, 2000) other studies failing to detect such effects (Hein, 
1992; Singh, 1998). One of the most fecund avenues in the FDI study of impacts 
however, was opened by the seminal work of Caves (1974), who considered that 
spillover effects of MNCs on local firms were the crux of the matter. Since then, 
the research on FDI effects has increasingly acknowledged that technological, or-
ganizational and managerial spillovers on local firms probably represent the most 
influential role of MNCs in host country development.
Spillovers from FDI are essentially positive externalities from the presence of 
MNCs on the local economy (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). Spillovers derive 
from the fact that a firm that internationalizes possesses an intrinsic advantage 
over firms in the host country (Dunning, 1988). In foreign countries, a MNC is 
particularly incited to secure its knowledge, management and information assets 
due to the fact that its competitive advantage is directly linked to its capacity 
to limit diffusion to local competitors. But at the same time, a foreign investor 
is not able to, or necessarily interested in, totally hindering its advantages from 
leaking out to the local environment as spillovers. Hence, spillovers take place 
when multinationals are unable to, or uninterested in, extracting the full value 
of the resulting productivity increase of their activity in the host economy. Since 
a MNC often is profoundly different from a (non-internationalized) local firm 
in terms of technology, capital, organizational and managerial capabilities, and 
international market access, there is a potential for significant spillovers on the 
local economy and local firms.
The spillover can happen through indirect means (for example spillovers on 
local competitors) or it can happen through direct means (for example spillovers 
through subcontracting, outsourcing, licensing, franchising, and so on).
The literature typically identifies two main catalyst effects of a multinational 
on local firms: horizontal spillovers on local competitors and vertical spillovers 
on indigenous suppliers, distributors and customers linked to foreign-owned 
firms in the value chain.
Spillovers may take the form of knowledge spillovers or pecuniary spillovers. 
Knowledge externalities represent technology and know-how that may spill over 
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from multinationals to local firms. Pecuniary spillovers take the form of a rent for 
the local industry: multinationals’ activity improves the quality of the local pro-
duction that is only partially incorporated in the prices of the products and ser-
vices delivered by the multinational. The rent may also result from an additional 
demand addressed to the local intermediate goods industry that enables the local 
industry to produce with increasing return to scale and to deliver cheaper prod-
ucts and services to local buyers.
One may consider five main situations regarding the global effect of the mul-
tinationals on the local firms (Table 1.1):
Case 1 is the best option for the local industry. MNCs source locally and have 
a catalyst effect on the local intermediate goods industry. The entry of multi-
nationals also has a positive impact on the local rivals who have increased their 
performances by imitating the multinationals and by reacting to the competitive 
pressure of the newcomers. A positive horizontal effect may result from a moder-
ate technological gap between multinationals and local firms, fostering imitation 
and competitive reaction (Kokko et al., 1996).
In case 2, the total impact remains positive, despite the absence of horizontal 
spillovers. Absence of horizontal spillovers may be due to differences in the secto-
ral specialization between foreign and local firms for example when multination-
als invest in new sectors where there are no local firms yet. It may also be linked 
to the export-orientation of the multinationals, which do not reduce the local 
market share of the local firms (Blyde et al., 2004).
In case 3, multinationals have a negative vertical effect and a negative horizontal 
effect. The latter may result from the difference in efficiency between the foreign 
and the indigenous actors that jeopardizes the development of the local industry 
and crowds out local rivals. Inward-looking multinationals that have invested in 
a country to serve the local market may reduce the number of local firms and/or 
oblige them to specialize in low value-added products and a production based on 
Table 1.1 Spillovers (+) and negative externalities (-) of multinationals on local fi rms
Vertical eff ect Horizontal eff ect Total eff ect
Case 1 + + +
Case 2 + 0 +
Case 3 - - -
Case 4 0 0 0
Case 5 + - ?
Note: 0 = insignifi cant eff ect; ? = undetermined eff ect
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weak economies of scale. A multinational may also displace pre-existing connec-
tions between local firms and their suppliers and have negative vertical effects. 
Multinationals have negative effects when they crowd out local rivals which were 
used to purchasing more abundantly from local suppliers than multinationals do.
In case 4, multinationals have only very few forward relationships with the 
local customers and very limited backward relationships with local suppliers: the 
multinational reveals ‘enclave’ behavior. This kind of behavior may emerge espe-
cially in backward countries in which the human skills and the technological level 
are low and the quality of institutions is weak. The absence of horizontal effects 
may be due to the dominant position that has been granted to a foreign firm (mo-
nopoly) or to a handful of foreign firms (oligopoly) in the privatization process 
of the local industry.
Case 5 is a classical case of the spillover literature in developing countries and 
transition economies. Although the multinationals crowd out local rivals in the 
final goods industry thanks to their ownership advantages, the net gain for the 
local suppliers and/or for the local customers is positive.
1.3.2 Linkages
Local firms may benefit from spillovers from MNCs despite limited direct in-
teraction with the MNCs, for example through competition and demonstration. 
But many authors hold that direct interaction – typically labeled linkages – will 
facilitate spillovers. Thus, a long tradition dating back to Hirschman’s seminal 
work on the role of linkages in economic development (1958) has argued that lack 
of linkages in the developing economy leads to lack of industrial development. 
While Hirschman’s argument did not specifically relate to foreign firms, it has 
inspired much of the later research on MNCs and linkages. The general assump-
tion of this research is that from a development perspective, linkages between 
MNCs and local firms are better than no linkages, and the more and the deeper 
linkages are, the better it is for the host economy (Altenburg, 2000; Scott-Kennel 
and Enderwick, 2005; Hansen et al., 2006).
While some authors prefer a broad definition of MNC linkages that encom-
pass transactions between MNCs and local firms as well as non-business insti-
tutions and organizations (Altenburg, 2000), we will here focus on linkages be-
tween MNCs and local firms. Thus we define linkages as interfirm transactions 
that go beyond arm’s length, one-off transactions and involve some level of col-
laboration between the transacting parties (Hansen et al., 2009). Linkages can 
be long term (for example a long-term strategic partnership on R&D) or they 
can be short term (for instance an intermittent purchase on contract). They can 
be equity-based (a joint venture between the MNC and a local firm) or they 
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can be non-equity based (for example subcontracting, licensing, franchising, or 
outsourcing). Sometimes linkages are ‘backward’ to suppliers and subcontrac-
tors (‘upstream’), sometimes they are ‘forward’ to distributors, agents or franchise 
holders (‘downstream’). To these two forms can be added ‘horizontal’ linkages 
between firms operating within similar activities –for example strategic alliances 
between competitors and/or technology partners (see Table 1.2).
The nature of the linkage between a foreign investor and a local firm obviously 
has implications for the scope and content of spillover effects on host country 
firms.2 One may easily accept that a short-term contractual agreement on a spe-
cific task may create less opportunities for learning and upgrading for the local 
firm than a long-term subcontracting collaboration involving a large resource ex-
change between the MNC and the local firm. It has been argued that with eco-
nomic development, linkages between MNCs and local firms become deeper and 
more reciprocal because the absorptive capacity and skills of the local industrial 
base increases (Scott-Kennel and Enderwick, 2005). The literature also argues 
that it makes a difference where in the value chain the linkage partners are placed. 
Especially backward linkages to suppliers and subcontractors are considered to 
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have large spillover potential whereas horizontal linkages are believed to produce 
less spillover on local firms (UNCTAD, 2001; Nunnenkamp, 2004). The spillo-
ver potential of forward linkages to agents, distributors and franchise holders is 
less researched, but it is argued that also forward linkages may have profound 
spillover potential (Hansen et al., 2006).
1.4 Th e theory of multinational corporation-local fi rm relations
The theory on MNC-local firm relations is mainly informed by three economic 
traditions, namely trade economics, industrial organization and international 
business:
1.4.1 Trade economics
In the original trade theory based on comparative advantages, production factors 
were assumed to be immobile while goods could move freely. Trade Economics 
later included capital movements in the equation by allowing for capital flows be-
tween capital-rich and capital-poor countries. A partial equilibrium comparative-
static approach was developed, aiming to evaluate the distribution of the gain for 
a capital-scarce country of additional investments coming from a capital-abun-
dant country (MacDougall, 1960). Aliber (1971), in a similar way, argued that FDI 
was a consequence of a kind of arbitrage between countries with strong and weak 
currencies. From a welfare perspective, it was implied that the additional foreign 
capital could enhance welfare by increasing production and improving the alloca-
tion of scarce resources. The main disadvantage of these early models was that 
they viewed the multinationals as part of the theory of portfolio capital flows and 
considered the effects of FDI as being equal to those of other forms of capital.
Relaxing the assumptions of the original neoclassical trade economic frame-
work, New Trade Economics allowed for the possibility of economies-of-scale and 
product diff erentiation (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Markusen, 
1984), paving the way for an understanding of MNCs in equilibrium models. Th e 
New Trade Economic theory materialized into two main frameworks, the vertical-
multinational and the horizontal-multinational framework.3 Th e vertical multi-
national separates the stages of production geographically and localizes labor-in-
tensive activities in developing countries to take advantage of relatively abundant 
unskilled labor, whereas the horizontal multinationals duplicate the same prod-
uct or service in diff erent locations (Markusen, 1984). In terms of MNC eff ects, 
New Trade Economics predicted that MNCs produce both crowding-in eff ects 
and crowding-out eff ects (Markusen and Venables, 1999). As MNCs possess some 
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special advantages over the indigenous host-country rivals, such as superior tech-
nology or lower costs due to economies of scale, they may initially produce crowd-
ing-out of local investment. On the other hand, they may in the longer run ‘crowd 
in’ due to high transportation costs that force the MNCs to source locally, thereby 
creating a catalyst impact on local fi rms in the intermediate goods industry. Th e 
catalyst eff ect results from MNCs’ demand for a larger variety of intermediate 
goods and a rise in the quantities supplied which stimulates economies-of-scale. 
Th e equilibrium that will emerge depends on the impact of both opposed eff ects.
While New Trade Economic models abandoned the strict assumptions of the 
original neoclassical theory thus empirically producing more robust predictions, 
they still belong to the neoclassical body, which may be effective in tackling prob-
lems of resource allocation and equilibrium thanks to prize- and/or quantity-
based adjustment mechanisms, but is inadequate in conceptualizing the varia-
tions and complexity in MNC strategy and effects.
1.4.2 Industrial organization
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Trade Economic partial equilibrium models 
were fundamentally challenged from an Industrial Organization perspective. Th e 
Industrial Organization literature on MNCs aimed to study the consequences of 
‘the entry into a national industry of a fi rm established in a foreign market’ (Caves, 
1971, p. 1). Markets are full of imperfections of the structural type – proprietary 
technology, privileged access to inputs, economies of scale, control of distribution 
systems and product diff erentiation (Bain, 1956) – that can be used by fi rms to in-
crease their monopoly power and to internationalize. Th e main idea of this school 
of thought is that the characteristics of the industry fundamentally aff ect the strat-
egy and performance of fi rms, and indeed, the eff ects that MNCs may have on host 
countries. Th us, industry characteristics may impact whether or not MNCs crowd 
in or crowd out local fi rms; whether they transfer technology and knowledge from 
parents to affi  liates; whether they foster linkages to local fi rms; and whether they 
suppress or foster competition in the host country (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2002).
1.4.3 International business
From the mid-1970s, microeconomic literature on MNCs emerged, literature that 
later would provide one of the main pillars of International Business. Inspired by 
Stephen Hymer’s seminal PhD thesis in 1960, early International Business litera-
ture, in line with the Industrial Organization ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance 
paradigm’, argued that multinationals possess special assets in comparison to lo-
cal firms that allow them to overcome the disadvantage of foreigness (Hymer, 
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1960). The firm-specific know-how, its knowledge-capital and its technology as-
sets appear to be key ownership advantages. Internationalization per se reinforces 
the multinational’s advantages by providing opportunities to divide marketing 
risks, by slicing up the value chain on the base of the territories’ comparative 
advantages, and by providing access to new resources and assets. The multina-
tionals’ ownership advantage is often reinforced by the ability they have to access 
finance, internationally and in the host economy, compared to local firms which 
are most of the time financially constrained.
Later, the International Business theory of MNCs directed more attention 
to advantages related to the ability to organize cross-border transactions in the 
face of market imperfections (Buckley and Casson, 1976), the ability to leverage 
resources across borders (Peteraf, 1993) or the advantages related to coordinat-
ing knowledge diffusion and development across borders (Kogut and Zander, 
1993). Dunning (1988; 2001) sought to integrate many of these understandings of 
MNCs in his ‘eclectic’ OLI framework, which has become a dominant framework 
for understanding MNCs within the International Business literature.
International Business is essentially about understanding the existence, con-
duct and performance of firms involved in cross-border business transactions 
and therefore the efficiency or welfare effects of these transactions received little 
attention. Basically, welfare issues remained the domain of trade economists and 
industrial economists and to some extent political scientists analyzing the role 
played by MNCs in policy formulation at the national and international level 
(see for example Spar and Yoffie, 1999; Moran, 2002). Insofar as International 
Business analyzed spillovers, it was mainly in the context of finding effectively 
controlled strategies avoiding spillovers; indeed, to many International Business 
theorists, the very purpose of the MNC was to avoid knowledge and technology 
being spilled over to other firms.4
Nevertheless, as argued by Forsgren (2002), the received International Busi-
ness theory embodies some fairly straightforward assumptions and predictions 
regarding MNC effects on host countries. The early market power current within 
International Business argued that MNCs were essentially extensions of market 
power in foreign locations (Hymer, 1960). As such, MNCs would by implication 
tend to crowd out local investment and reduce consumer welfare by suppress-
ing competition. Moreover, host countries would have great problems matching 
the bargaining power of MNCs and would tend to strike unfavorable deals with 
the MNCs. By the mid-1970s, this critical view was challenged by a number of 
scholars who argued that MNCs existed mainly to bridge market imperfections 
in cross-border markets for intermediary goods, for example transaction costs. 
As such, MNCs were expressions of efficiency and therefore welfare enhanc-
ing (Rugman, 1981). Similarly, more recent resource-based perspectives (Peter-
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af, 1993) and knowledge-based perspectives (Kogut and Zander, 1993) look at 
MNCs as superior vehicles for cross-border knowledge and resource transfer and 
thereby as potentially benefiting host countries. International Business theory 
says little about the extent to which MNCs produce spillovers on local firms. But 
it can be inferred from the market-power view that if MNCs are about extending 
market power to foreign locations, local firms may be harmed. And if MNCs are 
about the effective transfer of superior knowledge and technology to subsidiaries, 
they may have a high potential for producing demonstration and competition ef-
fects. Moreover, as recognized by modern International Business theory, as MNC 
boundaries are becoming increasingly fuzzy (Cantwell and Narula, 2001) and as 
MNCs are increasingly locating the development and exploitation of their own-
ership-specific advantages in business networks and strategic alliances (Ghoshal 
and Bartlett, 1990), new opportunities for acquiring technology, knowledge and 
market access for local firms in emerging economies are provided.
1.5 Research on multinational corporation-local fi rm relations
A great deal of empirical literature on linkages and spillovers has evolved in 
recent years. This literature is theoretically informed by the above-mentioned 
Trade Economic, Industrial Organization and International Business literature. 
The empirical literature essentially studies the multinational-local firm nexus 
through three main methods: formal modeling (see for example Rodriguez-Clare, 
1996; Markusen and Venable, 1999), statistical analysis (for overviews, see for ex-
ample Caves, 1996; Blomström and Kokko, 1997; Nunnenkamp, 2004; Görg and 
Greenaway, 2004; Merlevede and Schoors, 2005), and case studies (Altenburg, 
2000; Hansen and Schaumburg-Müller, 2006; Giroud, 2007). The three meth-
ods are based on different kinds of reasoning regarding fundamental issues such 
as case selection, operationalization of variables and the use of inductive and 
deductive logic. Each method has comparative strengths and limits.
Thematically, the empirical literature focuses on different aspects of the MNC-
local firm nexus. One group of studies treats MNCs as more or less homog-
enous actors producing similar effects on host countries, and little differentiation 
between industries, MNC strategies and countries are made. Another group of 
studies takes its point of departure in the heterogeneity of MNCs and countries 
and differentiates MNC effects based on factors such as industry characteristics, 
MNC strategy, and host country characteristics. Finally, a group of studies looks 
at the effects of MNCs on local firms according to the specificities of the transac-
tion relationship – the linkage – between the MNC and the local firm. The three 
groups of studies and their interrelationship are depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1 An overview of research on spillover eff ects
In the following section, we will organize our review of the literature according 
to this figure.
1.5.1 General eff ects of foreign direct investment (A)
The question of the magnitude of the MNC spillovers on a host-developing coun-
try has been tackled by several generations of economists since the seminal work 
of Caves in 1974. In general, these produce mixed results in regard to the overall 
state of spillover effects in developing countries and transition economies. Some 
find that MNCs have positive spillover effects on local firms in developing coun-
tries and transition economies in terms of productivity (Blomström and Pearson, 
1983; Dobson and Chia, 1997), technology transfer to local industry (Rhee and 
Belot, 1990; JBIC Institute, 2002), wages (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004) or integra-
tion by imitation of international trade (Aitken et al., 1997). As stated by Dun-
ning (1992, p. 456 (quoted in Altenburg, 2000)), ‘the findings of a large number 
of studies over the past 30 years are virtually unanimous that the presence of 
foreign owned firms has helped raise the standards and productivity of many 
domestic suppliers and that this has often had beneficial spillover effects on the 
rest of their operation.’ Others find that these generalized interpretations of FDI 
spillovers rest on shaky empirical foundations. Rodrik (1999, p. 39) argues that 
‘todays policy literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers 
from FDI... [yet]... the hard evidence is sobering.’ Thus, it is questioned whether 
FDI produce statistically significant effects on economic growth (Caves, 1996; 
Nunnenkamp, 2004), total factor-productivity growth (Haddad and Harisson, 
1993; Kokko, 2002; Lispey and Sjöholm, 2005; Ayyagari and Kosova, 2006), wag-
es (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004), competition (Kugler, 2000; Blalock and Gertler, 
2007), or export (Kokko et al., 2001). Indeed, some studies find negative impacts 
of FDI on local firms in developing countries (Aitken and Harisson, 1999) and in 
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Thus, the extensive empirical literature analyzing the multinational-local 
firms nexus neither provides conclusive results on the general impact – positive 
or negative – of multinationals on the productivity of the local firms, nor on the 
magnitude of impact. The lack of firm conclusions in regard to spillovers is of 
course related to the fact that MNCs may produce different amounts of spillo-
vers under different conditions. Thus it has emphatically been argued that the 
spillover literature needs to discriminate better between different factors shaping 
spillovers (Nunnenkamp, 2004; Görg and Greenaway, 2004). In the following 
section, we will review the research on spillovers that qualifies under which con-
ditions MNC spillovers may take place and when not.
1.5.2 Industry factors (B1)
It is commonly argued that much of the variation in the interpretation of MNC 
spillovers depends on whether we are talking about vertical or horizontal spill-
overs (also called inter-industry and intra-industry spillovers). In his seminal 
study of spillovers, Caves (1974) used cross-sectoral data on the correlation be-
tween FDI and local industry productivity. Here significant positive productivity 
effects of FDI were detected. However, one main problem of Caves’ approach was 
that MNCs may be entering high productivity sectors rather than being the cause 
of high productivity. Indeed, later results produced by panel data analysis were 
somewhat more ambiguous with regard to intra-industry spillover effects (Görg 
and Strobl, 2001); some studies showed direct negative effects of FDI (Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999), while others detected no effects (Haddad and Harrison, 
1993; Kugler, 2000). Meyer (2004) concludes that ‘overall evidence does not sup-
port the proposition of positive intra-industry productivity spillovers, with the 
possible exception of special circumstances such as the transition from central 
planning to a market economy.’
In contrast, studies of vertical spillovers produce more robust results. Several 
studies find evidence of productivity spillovers on related industries in Lithu-
ania ( Javorcik, 2004), Indonesia (Blalock and Gertler, 2007), Columbia (Ku-
gler, 2000), Hungary (Schoors and van der Tool, 2002; Halpern and Muraközy, 
2005) and the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia (Damijan et al., 2003). 
Most of these studies focus on effects upstream in the value chain, but there 
are also studies that find positive downstream effects, for example franchise 
holders (Altenburg, 2000) or distributors and agents (Hansen et al., 2006). The 
reason why we tend to find more evidence of vertical spillovers than horizontal 
spillovers is obviously that MNCs are less concerned with sharing technology 
and know-how with firms in other industries as these are less likely to become 
competitors.
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Much of the spillover literature focuses on the effects of manufacturing 
MNCs. However, as pointed out by UNCTAD (2004), services are increasingly 
being internationalized, both service industries proper and service-value-chain 
activities within manufacturing firms. The internationalization of information 
technology (IT) and other business services offers new opportunities for the in-
tegration of firms in emerging economies into the global economy as evidenced 
by the successful growth of Indian IT and business process outsourcing (BPO) 
firms. The empirical material focusing on spillovers in services is still very poor 
and inconclusive. Alfaro (2003) for example, finds that FDI has exerted an am-
biguous effect on economic growth in the service sector of a sample of 47 coun-
tries (including developed and developing countries) over the 1985-1999 period. 
So too does the academic research differentiating the FDI impact on the basis 
of technology intensity of the foreign investor. Bosco (2001) for example, sug-
gests that the Hungarian firms did not benefit from the presence of foreign firms 
in high-technology industries. On the one hand, foreign high-technology indus-
tries have a higher spillover potential than low-technology companies, but on the 
other hand, they particularly want to prevent their technology from leaking over 
to local firms (especially in countries with weak intellectual property rights), and 
local firms in less developed countries might fail to absorb advanced technologies 
and information.
1.5.3 Country factors (B2)
It is increasingly acknowledged that many of the detected FDI spillover effects 
depend on the characteristics of the host economy (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 
2003). Some countries have a higher capacity to absorb effects of MNC activity 
than others. Thus, a recurring theme in the literature on spillovers is that the 
direction and magnitude of the impact are conditioned by a certain threshold of 
development. In particular, it appears that spillovers depend on GDP per capita 
so that the higher the GDP per capita, the larger the spillovers (Blomström et 
al., 1994).
The underlying dynamic here is, of course, that the sophistication of the local 
business environment influences spillovers to a large extent. In particular, the 
technology gap between local firms and MNCs has been seen as an important 
determinant of spillovers. While some have argued that a high-technology gap 
produces more spillovers (Kojima, 1973), most observers argue that a low-tech-
nology gap is conducive of spillovers (De Mello, 1999) as is a high skills level in 
the local labor force (Borensztein et al., 1998). Görg and Greenaway (2004) con-
clude that economic backwardness functions as an impediment to spillovers and 
Nunnenkamp (2004) suggests that spillovers are higher when the technology gap 
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between the foreign investor and the local economy is small. Spillovers depend 
on the extent to which local firms have invested in developing learning and in-
novation capabilities and Kokko et al. (1996) argue that when the difference of 
efficiency between multinationals and local firms is too large, local firms may be 
unable to absorb new technology and know-how, and multinationals may be dis-
suaded from interacting with local firms. Thus, we have a dilemma with regard to 
spillovers: spillovers increase in significance and importance when the differences 
in technology levels are high (Gerschenkron, 1962); however, the ability to absorb 
falls when the technology gap is wide.
The ability of local industry to absorb spillovers has been intensely explored 
in the growing research on absorptive capacity (see for example Cohen and Lev-
inthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Narula and Lall, 2004), where absorptive 
capacity refers to the ability of local firms to identify, integrate and exploit knowl-
edge from MNCs. In countries with low levels of industrial development, typi-
cally the least developed countries, there will be no or few firms that can absorb 
the knowledge and technology of MNCs and thereby few spillovers will occur. As 
an infant local industry emerges, we will see growing arms-length spillovers in the 
form of competition and demonstration effects. As local industry becomes more 
advanced – partly as a consequence of arms-length spillovers from MNCs – we 
will see the evolution of deeper and more reciprocal linkages between MNCs and 
local firms with higher spillover potential (Scott-Kennel and Enderwick, 2004).
 the role of governments
It is broadly acknowledged that government policy plays a pivotal role in pro-
ducing spillovers, although government intervention does not always produce 
the spillover effects intended. A general observation is that open trade regimes 
tend to produce types of spillovers different from those produced by restrictive, 
inward-oriented policies (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; UNCTAD, 1998; Al-
tenburg, 2000; Nunnenkamp, 2004). Open trade regimes may on the one hand 
reduce spillover as they allow for the import of intermediate products and re-
sources as an alternative to local sourcing. On the other hand, open trade re-
gimes may encourage MNCs to transfer more advanced types of production to 
host countries and use them as export platforms thus increasing the likelihood of 
knowledge and technology spillovers. Likewise, intellectual property rights poli-
cies may make a huge difference; if there is lax intellectual property rights protec-
tion, MNCs may be reluctant to share any knowledge or technology with local 
firms, for example in licensing agreements.
Where host governments, a few decades ago, used highly crude discriminatory 
measures to tame and domesticate FDI (for example local ownership requirements 
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or local content requirements), the investment measures in the post-Washington 
consensus era tended to opt for across the board FDI attraction. Today, a broad va-
riety of measures are adopted which are constantly assessed against the constraint 
provided by international trade rules of non-discrimination. Th us, governments 
actively seek to promote spillovers directly through local content regulations, tar-
iff s or subsidies, indirectly through infrastructure programs and education policies 
(Altenburg, 2000; Spar, 2008). Many emerging economies are further promot-
ing FDI spillovers by developing the capabilities of local supply industries to link 
up to MNCs and thereby potentially absorb the technology and knowledge. A 
particular issue concerns subsidies and other incentives which are widely used to 
promote spillover generating FDI. Th e literature intensely debates whether such 
measures are eff ective in achieving spillovers on local industry (Blomström and 
Kokko, 2003; Tavares and Young, 2005). Finally, some countries promote the de-
velopment of clusters as a way to enhance spillovers. Th e idea is that a cluster of 
related and supporting industries may enhance the likelihood of MNC location 
and increase the chances of local fi rms benefi ting from the MNC presence due to 
industrial specialization, higher concentration of specialized labor skills and geo-
graphical proximity (Th ompson, 2002; De Propis and Driffi  eld, 2005).
1.5.4 Th e strategies of multinationals (B3)
Spillovers will also depend on the strategies of MNCs, a fact that is often ignored 
by the more macro-oriented spillover literature. Thus, most spillover research 
employs relatively aggregated FDI data, typically at country or industry level and 
little distinction of spillover impacts based on the specificities of MNC strategies 
are made (Nunnenkamp, 2004). However, literature increasingly emphasizes the 
heterogeneity of MNCs when determining spillover effects, arguing that spillo-
vers depend on MNC specific factors such as ownership configuration ( Javor-
cik and Spatareanu, 2008), export orientation of the subsidiary (Sgard, 2001), 
subsidiary mandate (Tavares and Young, 2005) or corporate governance (Meyer, 
2004). The investment motive of the MNC appears to be a particularly crucial 
determinant of spillovers (Reuber et al., 1973; Pearce and Papanastassiou, 1999; 
Altenburg, 2000; UNCTAD, 2000; Belderbos et al., 2001; Dicken, 2003). Gen-
erally, it is argued that efficiency-seeking investors foster deeper but less exten-
sive spillovers on local firms than market-seeking investors (Nunnenkamp, 2004; 
Hansen et al., 2009). The organization of the MNC also appears to have implica-
tions for the amount and quality of spillover; for instance, Forsgren (2002) has 
argued that MNCs that are organized as network or matrix organizations have 
higher knowledge spillover potential than MNCs organized as multidomestic or 
global companies.
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1.5.5 Th e nature of linkages (C)
In recent years, emerging literature has directed attention toward the organiza-
tional modalities through which spillovers occur, that is, linkages. This literature 
is relatively novel; as argued by Meyer (2004) in his review of the spillover litera-
ture, ‘future research ought to prioritize the study of vertical relationships by ana-
lyzing how spillovers arise in individual interactions of a multinational firm and 
a local agent or firm. What characteristics of relationships facilitate spillovers?’
The linkage literature essentially treats linkages as an intermediary variable, 
moderating and shaping FDI-spillover effects. So, with one-sided and hierarchi-
cal relations between foreign and local firms, we may get dependent linkages with 
few catalytic effects on the local business environment, with collaborative and 
interactive relations, we may get developmental linkages with huge catalytic ef-
fects in terms of technology and skills upgrading (Dicken, 2003; Scott-Kennel 
and Enderwick, 2005). The early linkage literature (see for example Singer, 1950) 
argued that MNCs often fail to integrate in local industries and sectors, provid-
ing little impetus for development. Thus, the presence of a multinational or sev-
eral multinationals could take the form of ‘enclaves’ which do not communicate 
with the rest of the economy. Linkages were mostly found to be missing in sec-
tors in which multinationals are internalizing their activity and/or importing the 
bulk of the needed intermediates (UNCTAD, 2001) for example in agriculture 
and in mining activities (Larsen et al., 2009). On the other hand, multination-
als in other industries appeared to foster broad linkages in the host economy by 
creating industries that supply the MNC and by inducing forward industries to 
use the multinational’s output as inputs, the so-called crowding-in effect of FDI 
(Wilkins, 1998). It has even been argued that some MNCs may be ‘developmen-
tal’ in the sense that they have the creation of linkages as a key component in their 
strategy (Altenburg, 2000). Rodriguez-Clare (1996) argued that linkages will be-
come more intense, the more complex the good produced by the multinationals, 
the higher the transport costs, and the more similar the intermediate products 
produced in the host and home country. Enclave behavior results from low com-
munication costs and from the production of different varieties of intermediate 
products in the home and host countries of the multinationals. Lin and Saggi 
(2007) found that MNCs either choose an anonymous short-term market inter-
action with suppliers or prefer a long-term contractual relationship and engage 
in technology transfer to suppliers who in turn accept to serve the multinational 
exclusively. The multinational’s entry under the exclusivity clause has a de-linking 
effect by which the multinational displaces pre-existing linkages between local 
firms and their suppliers. The exclusivity clause reduces the rivalry among local 
suppliers which tends to reduce the aggregate output level of the intermediate 
Multinational corporations and local firms
goods industry but increases the technology transferred to local suppliers. The 
net effect can either be positive or negative. When the multinational chooses an 
anonymous market interaction, the number of competing suppliers that serve the 
multinational is large, but the technology transferred is poor.
Giroud and Scott-Kennel (2009) consider that three key attributes determine 
the spillover impact of linkages: quality, quantity and scope. Quality is linked 
to the magnitude of transfer of resources, which occurs between subsidiaries of 
MNCs and local firms. Duration of the relation is central because the develop-
ment of trust between firms positively influences interfirm exchange and learn-
ing. Quantity refers to the number of interfirm relationships formed in the host 
country, as well as the value added by local firms in value chains managed by 
MNCs. Scope refers to types of linkages: they may concern other firms in the 
value chain or take the form of collaboration with competitors or firms in other 
industries and collaboration with local institutions. The larger the types of link-
ages formed (supply-chain, collaborative) and the industries/institutions con-
cerned the greater developmental impact is expected.
The nature of integration between MNCs and local firms in global value chains 
may also be of importance for spillovers. Thus, the global value-chain literature 
(see for example Gereffi, Sturgeon and Humphrey, 2005; Sturgeon, 2008, for 
overviews) examines how global value chains configure production patterns glob-
ally. Large dominant lead firms in the North organize these value chains, with de-
veloping country firms being integrated in more or less dependent positions. The 
literature essentially identifies five different linkage structures between MNCs 
and local firms: integrated, captive, modular, relational and market. These linkage 
structures provide different spillover opportunities for emerging economy firms 
in terms of upgrading and learning. A distinction between four types of upgrad-
ing spillovers is made; process upgrading, product upgrading, functional upgrad-
ing and value-chain upgrading. Whereas there may be opportunities for process 
upgrading and even product upgrading for developing country firms in linkage 
collaborations within global value chains, MNCs will rarely be willing to assist 
local firms in moving into higher value adding activities such as R&D or market-
ing and sales. Thus, due to the linkage structure inherent in global value chains, 
the spillover potential on firms in emerging economies appears to be limited.
1.6 Contributions to the book
We have now provided an overview of the extant literature on spillovers in terms 
of theoretical orientation as well as the main issues debated. In the following sec-
tion we will present the main findings of the spillover studies presented in this 
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book and discuss how the studies are all contributing to our understanding of 
MNC-local firm interaction.
Part II of the book provides four spillovers case studies:
During the last twenty years, Hungary has attracted significant FDI in the 
manufacturing industry and especially in the automotive and electronics sectors. 
Empirical literature assessing the impacts of FDI in these industries is relatively 
abundant. On the other hand, the FDI phenomenon in business services – which 
is relatively new in economies in transition – has hardly been studied at all. The 
extant literature, with the notable exception of Alfaro’s study (2003), is short 
of studies of spillovers of MNCs in the services sector. The chapter The impact 
of foreign direct investment in business services on the local economy: The case of 
Hungary written by Magdolna Sass aims precisely at filling this gap by assessing 
the impact on the local economy of offshore outsourcing and offshoring of ser-
vices by MNCs. Hungary has become one of the leading locations in attracting 
FDI in business-services projects in the East-Central European area. Thanks to 
interviews taken from eight large companies which created approximately 5,500 
jobs (out of roughly 20,000 jobs in the business service activity), Magdolna Sass 
suggests that spillovers are scarce because backward linkages, but also forward 
linkages, with indigenous firms remain limited. This can be explained by at least 
three main factors: 1) FDI is recent in the business services and linkages only 
develop progressively with the growing embeddedness of MNCs in their new 
host environment. 2) Since almost the totality of the services are ‘exported’, for-
ward spillovers are absent. Finally, 3) Magdolna Sass detects ‘endogamy’ behavior, 
that is, cooperative relationships between the foreign-owned firms while sourcing 
from local firms is confined to buying various ‘basic’ services, such as cleaning, 
security services, catering, and certain training services, and to the use of local 
infrastructures (telecommunications, electricity, financial services, other infra-
structures). In the near future, potential spillovers may transit through the mobil-
ity of workers. Indeed, most of the jobs in the MNCs providing business services 
belong to the medium- and medium-high skilled categories, and some young 
trained employees (who represent the bulk of the workforce in the MNCs) may 
create their own company or go to locally-owned companies, although, currently, 
employees move more between foreign-owned companies than from MNCs to 
local firms.
The chapter Do Multinational companies transfer technology to local small and 
medium- sized enterprises? The case of the Tegal metalworking industry cluster in 
Indonesia by Tulus Tambunan consists of a case study of clustered metal work-
shops in the automotive and shipbuilding subsectors in the district of Tegal in 
Indonesia. Based on a sample consisting of 34 respondents including owners of 
inti (first tier supplier) and plasma (second tier supplier) who have subcontract-
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ing businesses, local workshop owners who supply only to retail markets, local 
government officials, and non-government organizations, the author assesses the 
MNCs’ role in technology transfer to SMEs in Indonesia. Our review of the lit-
erature in Part I has demonstrated that the technological capacity of local firms 
is a decisive determinant of spillovers. Tulus Tambunan’s case study confirms this 
relation. The author suggests that among the different channels through which 
technology is transferred internationally, subcontracting arrangements managed 
by MNCs is probably the most promising channel for the metal industry in Indo-
nesia. The author highlights the prominent role played by the Japanese company 
Komatsu which has actively developed subcontracting production linkages with 
Tegal metal workshops and contributed to the development of the Tegal metal-
working industry cluster. Yet Tulus Tambunan suggests that technology transfer 
concerns a limited number of local firms: only firms which have already suc-
ceeded in mastering a certain level of technology capability become long-term 
partners of MNCs. The Tegal case study also demonstrates that small enterprises 
lack the technological, financial and management capabilities required to gain 
benefit from the presence of MNCs. In order to avoid a dualistic development 
of the Tegal metalworking industry the government should focus on the capacity 
building of the less advanced SMEs and especially of the smallest firms.
In the chapter African small and medium enterprises and the challenges in global 
value chains: The case of Nigerian garment enterprises Osmund Osinachi Uzor 
adopts an International Business perspective and focuses on the nature of link-
ages linking multinationals to local enterprises. He argues that it has become of 
central importance for African garment producers to integrate the Global Value 
Chains (GVCs) driven by MNCs. Yet with the exemption of South Africa, SMEs 
in sub-Saharan Africa are marginalized in GVCs. This is also the case for the 
garment producers in Nigeria. To highlight the challenges small and medium 
Nigerian garment producers face in order to participate in the GVCs’ activities, 
Osmund O. Uzor interviewed 60 entrepreneurs and their workers in Aba in the 
state of Abia in Nigeria, between 2003 and 2008. The empirical study suggests 
that the poor integration in GVCs results from insufficient production upgrad-
ing. Most of the firms in Aba are small firms which face a double constraint: 
a financial constraint preventing them from acquiring more modern equipment 
and a human resource constraint due to the low level of skilled workforce. This 
empirical work demonstrates that even in low-technology industries such as the 
garment industry, with the globalization of value chains, countries with insuf-
ficient capabilities fail to integrate the buyers’ world networks and consequently 
do not have access to the information concerning the consumer tastes, market 
niches and so on, that would allow them to advance their production to world 
standards. Policies should focus de facto on how the capability gap in micro and 
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small enterprises could be reduced so that linkages with large firms and global 
buyers might be developed.
In the chapter Mutual productivity spillovers and regional clusters in Eastern 
Europe: Some empirical evidence Chiara Franco and Kornelia Kozovska question 
whether spillovers between MNCs and local firms are more present in clusters 
than outside. Our theoretical framework (Part I) has suggested that industry 
factors matter and some empirical research has tended to demonstrate that clus-
ters facilitate linkages and spillovers. Hence, one may expect spillovers – that is 
‘direct’ spillovers from MNCs to local firms but also ‘reverse’ spillovers from local 
firms to MNCs – to be larger in clusters than outside since industrial specializa-
tion, higher concentration of specialized labor skills and geographical proximity 
should foster linkages between the two kinds of firms. In order to assess the pres-
ence of a positive ‘cluster effect’ the two authors use a econometric model in which 
they process firm-level data of 4,111 firms from Poland and 1,547 from Romania 
over the 2000-2006 period. Contrary to expectations, the two authors fail to find 
direct spillovers in clusters in Poland and Romania. Although some local firms 
are part of regional clusters, they are still not able to effectively create linkages 
and benefit from the various externalities which are present in clusters. ‘Direct’ 
spillovers are neither detected in low-technology sectors nor in high-technology 
sectors. Looking into the reverse effect, even though not statistically significant 
in many cases, the results suggest that foreign firms benefit from being located 
within clusters. These results question policies of many developing countries and 
transition economies, and especially the Central European countries, which have 
put the creation of clusters at a high position in their economic agenda as a cata-
lyst for the upgrading of local firms. The presence of local firms in clusters may 
facilitate the creation of linkages, yet it does not guarantee that they will benefit 
from positive externalities resulting from the activity of MNCs.
Part III of the book moves into discussions of policies and programs to pro-
mote linkages and spillovers from FDI:
In Part I we have suggested that the literature intensely debates whether incen-
tives policies are effective in achieving spillovers on local industry. In the chapter 
Scope and effectiveness of foreign direct investment policies in transition economies, 
Črt Kostevc, Tjaša Redek and Matija Rojec analyze the investment incentives 
policies of transition economies from the point of view of their effectiveness in 
attracting more and better FDI, and contribute de facto to adding new mate-
rial to the incentives policy issue. Although investment incentives are a second-
ary determinant of FDI they are increasingly expected by foreign investors when 
looking for an investment location. The chapter provides an overview of meas-
ures adopted in various transition economies. Transition economies’ investment 
incentives are predominantly of the behavioral type, targeted towards high-tech 
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sectors, transfer of technology, R&D and training. In principle, incentives are 
equally available for foreign and domestic firms, but implicitly most of them seem 
to target foreign investors. Increasing attention is also paid to the delivery of in-
centives, namely to the assurance that the incentives granted will really bring the 
expected payoffs. The overview of the incentives schemes of selected transition 
economies broadly suggests that such incentives have limited effectiveness. The 
main message for FDI policies of transition economies may be that, conceptually, 
FDI-related policies should primarily be regarded in terms of potential spillover 
effects, meaning that an increase of local firms’ absorption capacity is of para-
mount importance if FDI is really to be an agent of development.
In the chapter Policies for attracting foreign direct investment and enhancing its 
spillovers to indigenous firms: The case of Hungary, Katalin Antalóczy, Magdolna 
Sass, and Miklós Szanyi also evaluate the measures adopted by Hungary to at-
tract FDI and focus on the measures aiming at enhancing backward linkages. 
Three phases of Hungarian FDI policy are identified: An early phase starting 
already before 1989 when Hungary as one of the first Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean (CEE) countries opened up for FDI and continuing to around 1996. In 
this phase, FDI was aggressively promoted and FDI attraction became closely 
tied to privatization programs. A second phase (1996-2003) was a normalization 
phase, where FDI policy became more selective. Hungary offered extensive incen-
tives to foreign investors, but was increasingly challenged by other CEE countries 
offering even more generous incentives, leading to an incentive escalation. The 
third phase is closely connected to EU enlargement where competition concerns 
moved to the forefront at the expense of selective incentive schemes. In this phase, 
Hungary had to move towards non-discriminatory measures to attract FDI, for 
example tax reductions, infrastructure developments or the establishment of in-
dustrial parks. One of the key points of the chapter is that Hungary realized at an 
early stage that simply attracting FDI was not enough to benefit from FDI. Thus, 
the country, as one of the first CEE countries, adopted accompanying supplier 
development programs. The chapter provides a detailed account of the evolution 
of these programs and raises the question of whether they have been effective. As 
there is little empirical research on the effectiveness of Hungarian linkage promo-
tion policies, the chapter offers two short company case studies of large MNCs’ 
investments receiving substantial support from the Hungarian government. One 
of the companies, Electrolux, facilitated the formation of many local linkages 
but of low technical sophistication, while the other company, Nokia, created few 
linkages as the production was technically advanced. The two cases offer a para-
dox for FDI policy, as from a development perspective highly desirable advanced 
technologies are often associated with MNCs that have closely integrated global 
value chains and therefore result in relatively few local linkages, whereas less ad-
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vanced technologies will be associated with MNCs that create larger linkages to 
the local economy.
In the chapter Policies and institutions on multinational corporation-small and 
medium enterprise linkages: The Brazilian case, Delane Botelho and Mike Pfister 
observe that Business Linkages (BL) between MNCs and local suppliers can cre-
ate significant spillovers on local SMEs in the form of information and techni-
cal knowledge exchange, production efficiency, productivity growth, and market 
diversification. Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) can play a crucial role 
in promoting such linkages. The chapter evaluates current BL policies and pro-
grams in Brazil, the largest FDI recipient in Latin America. The chapter starts 
out by describing the complex FDI promotion architecture which exists in Brazil 
at the federal and regional level and which dates back to the late 1980s, emphasiz-
ing programs that seek to promote BL between MNCs and SMEs. The chapter 
moves on to present the results of an empirical study of BL in Brazil, how they 
are structured, where they are leading to the development of local firms, and what 
role BL programs have played in promoting these BLs. One of the conclusions 
is that while Brazil has many policies promoting SMEs, it still lacks effective 
BL promotion policies and BLs are mainly driven by the business sector rather 
than the government. The chapter ends with a number of tangible policy recom-
mendations, for example that BL programs should be further developed, that 
education and capacity-building activities should be intensified vis-à-vis SMEs, 
and that BL programs should be anchored outside governments (for example in 
business service providers). Overall, the chapter warns that linkage dynamics are 
highly context-dependent and that it is therefore essential for BL programs to be 
flexible and anchored at the local/regional rather than the federal level.
In the chapter Is attracting foreign firect investment the only route to industrial 
development in an era of globalization? The case of the clothing and textiles sector in 
South Africa Søren Jeppesen and Justin Barnes analyze the industrial develop-
ment strategy adopted by South Africa for its textile industry and the role played 
by FDI in this strategy. In recent years this industry has seen a profound de-
cline in terms of the employment generation, the contribution to GDP, turnover 
and performance. Simultaneously, foreign producers have thrived and imports 
especially from China have increased enormously. The chapter essentially exam-
ines whether the demise of the South African textile industry can be attributed 
to a failed industrialization strategy. Theoretically, four generic industrializa-
tion strategies can be envisioned: FDI attraction; integration into Global Value 
Chains; licensing and joint venture agreements; and the export of own-designed 
products. The South African government has clearly chosen to follow the lat-
ter strategy of export orientation without relying directly or indirectly on FDI. 
This in contrast to other African countries, such as Lesotho, Mauritius and Ken-
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ya, which all rely extensively on FDI. Thus, the chapter traces the failure of the 
South African strategy to its inability to use FDI to access technology, designs, 
and markets through licensing, subcontracting and joint ventures with MNCs. 
Only through closer linkages between foreign firms and local producers would 
South African producers have been able to close the ‘gap’ related to technology or 
marketing; indeed, the chosen export-oriented strategy with no FDI linkages is 
the only option South Africa should not have opted for.
1.7 Conclusion
Taken together, we believe that the chapters of this volume contribute to the 
received literature on MNC-local firm interaction in emerging economies in a 
number of ways. First, the studies provide new insights into spillover dynamics in 
the hitherto little analyzed empirical contexts of emerging economies of Eastern 
Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. We obtain some interesting glimpses of 
spillover dynamics in different regions of the world. The book sheds additional 
light on the spillover literature of economies in transition in a comparative per-
spective to developing countries. Spillovers and consequently the upgrading of 
indigenous firms in transition economies have been less present than was initially 
expected in the economics of transition literature. Despite the pre-existence of 
an industrial tradition and a relatively high level of human capital, but also ac-
tive FDI policies, spillovers from MNCs onto local firms have been rather dis-
appointing. Although transition economies differ from developing countries re-
garding the quality of institutions, geography, industrial structure and so on, they 
share many similarities with developing countries concerning the determinants 
and impacts of FDI on local firms.
Second, the book suggests that there are indeed huge spillover potentials 
from FDI. From Hungary to Brazil, from Indonesia to South Africa, we find evi-
dence of technology transfer, learning and upgrading in the relationship between 
MNCs and local firms. Indeed, as some authors have argued, from a development 
perspective these spillover effects may be the single most important contribution 
that MNCs may have made to economic development. The studies have further 
documented how these spillovers may occur sometimes through arms-length re-
lations, sometimes through more or less intense collaboration. However, a key 
message coming out of the studies is that spillovers do not occur automatically 
and under any circumstances. Indeed, the main message of the book is that spillo-
vers are highly context dependent. Spillover dynamics thus vary enormously be-
tween countries, industries and MNCs. Moreover, different linkage practices may 
moderate the spillover effects of FDI.
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Third, the chapters have contributed to the literature on spillovers regarding 
specific aspects, for example the importance (or rather lack of importance) of 
clusters, the role of linkages, the constraints and limitations on spillovers pro-
vided by global value chain dynamics, the importance and limitations of policy-
induced spillovers. In this way, the contributions of this book bring the literature 
forward and add to the accumulated knowledge in the field.
Fourth, the book suggests that the four main factors that we have indentified 
in section five interact and determine the magnitude of spillovers:
Industry factors: the rules of the game vary from industry to industry and 
contribute to determine the nature of linkages between MNCs and indigenous 
firms. Whereas in the metalworking industry in Indonesia MNCs have actively 
developed their local embeddedness, MNCs have only very limited linkages in 
the business services industry in Hungary. Global value chains’ perspectives have 
introduced an interindustrial comparative approach and contributed to a better 
understanding of the mode of governance of different value chains (automobile, 
electronics, garments and so on). Yet the empirical material remains poor on ser-
vices activities. Further research should focus on the spillovers of services activi-
ties in developing countries and transition economies, and assess the impact of 
MNCs in services compared to manufacturing activities. Do services open new 
upgrading opportunities in countries in which spillovers in manufacturing ac-
tivities have been disappointing? The technological intensity of the industry also 
matters. The spillover potential should be particularly high in high-technology 
industries, especially in clusters. Yet in Poland and Romania, the presence of 
spillovers in high-technology industries has not been detected. There is clearly 
a dilemma between the easy-to-achieve but limited spillover potential of low-
technology activities and the difficult-to-achieve but high spillover potential of 
high-technology activities. Further research needs to address this dilemma by 
entering into the ‘black box’ and focusing on the specific capacities that prevent 
local companies from benefiting from advanced technology.
Strategies of MNCs: International Business studies have largely demonstrated 
that the ‘genetic code’ and the strategy of the MNC also determine spillovers. 
This ‘code’ results from several factors such as the nationality of the firm, its com-
petitive advantages, its history, and so on. In this book it has been suggested, 
for example, that the Japanese company Komatsu has actively developed its pro-
duction linkages with the Tegal metal workshops. Since some companies have a 
developmental attitude whereas others tend to limit their interaction with local 
firms, further research might break up the strategies to assess the common fea-
tures of the ‘spillover-MNCs’.
Country factors: the limited absorption capacities by local firms of new man-
agement practices and technology, appears clearly in all the chapters of the book 
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as the Achilles’ heel for spillovers in developing countries, but also in transition 
economies. Local firms fail to adopt new technology or practices when they do 
not attain a certain threshold of development and/or when technology is too so-
phisticated. Several factors such as financial constraints, insufficient human capi-
tal and failing institutions interact and limit the learning potential of developing 
countries. Part III of the book also suggests that the quality of FDI policies mat-
ters. FDI open-doors policies and generous incentive packages do not support 
spillovers. Since spillovers are a catalyst for development, this book suggests that 
policies aiming at promoting MNCs-local firms relationships should be a prior-
ity in the upgrading agenda of developing countries and transition economies. 
Moreover, spillovers have idiosyncratic characteristics and de facto policymak-
ers should adapt policies ex ante and ex post to the three dimensions: industry, 
strategy of the MNCs and host country endowments. As a consequence, and this 
is indeed a key message of the policy-oriented chapters of the book, any policy 
measures to promote spillovers should carefully scrutinize the specific context in 
which these measures are adopted.
Nature of linkages: Part II and III of the book confirm that the quality, quantity 
and scope of linkages shape spillovers. Long-term collaboration and repetitive 
interaction between MNCs and local firms foster spillovers in the host economy. 
Trust is a decisive factor for the diffusion of spillovers. The number of connec-
tions of MNCs with local companies as well as the value added by local firms are 
also decisive. Scarce backward and forward linkages are most of the time respon-
sible for poor spillovers. Finally, dense collaboration with companies and institu-
tions in host countries increases the developmental impact in the host country. 
Yet most of the time, even in emerging economies (by comparison to the other 
developing countries and transition economies), the technology gap prevents 
MNCs from developing their collaboration with local entities.
 Notes
 ‘Emerging economies’ are defined as countries with rapid growth but low income using 
economic liberalization as a primary engine of growth. They encompass the developing 
countries of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa as well as the transition 
economies of mainly Central and Eastern Europe.
 There is a conceptual ambiguity in much of the literature concerning the exact relation be-
tween linkages and spillovers (Giroud and Scott-Kennel, ). Thus, there is a tendency 
to view any effect of linkage collaborations between MNCs and local firms as spillovers. 
However, linkages are typically planned and contract-based and the value of the transac-
tion is more or less fully appropriated by the transacting parties. Strictly speaking such 
effects are not ‘spillovers’, if spillovers are understood as positive externalities from a market 
transaction. Th e confusion of spillover eff ects and other eff ects deriving from linkage col-
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laborations is probably due to the fact that researchers typically are unable to untangle the 
spillover eff ect from the direct eff ect at the aggregate level (Giroud and Scott-Kennel, ).
 Yet in reality, each vertical multinational has some horizontal features and horizontal 
firms do not replicate the totality of activities of the headquarter.
 More recently, International Business has taken an interest in spillovers insofar as they 
have implications for the conduct and performance of MNCs. The prospects of large 
spillovers may ease approval of large investment projects and a MNC’s reputation and 
brand may gain from strong spillover performance.
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2 Th e impact of foreign direct investment in 
business services on the local economy
 Th e case of Hungary
Magdolna Sass
2.1 Introduction
East Central Europe and within it Hungary are locations where, especially start-
ing from 2000, more and more independent business services firms1 set up their 
operations and many firms concentrated their regional, European or even global 
service center. For example, in Hungary independent firms such as EDS, SAP, 
GenPact, Diageo and IBM are present. As for the second group, Alcoa, Voda-
fone, Exxon Mobil, Avis, Cemex, GE, InBev, Morgan Stanley, Celanese, Lexmark, 
British Telecom, among others, relocated certain regional, European or global 
service functions to Hungary. Not only the number of projects grew significantly, 
but there were also some very big projects involved, employing thousands of new 
employees in their newly opened sites (see for example Gál, 2007; Sass, 2008a; 
2008b). In many cases, these service functions are transferred from other, usually 
Western European locations, causing white collar job losses there. This is one 
reason why these movements figure highly in the (Western) media.
Off shore outsourcing and off shoring of service activities is not a new phenom-
enon (Metters and Verma, 2007). After and parallel to outsourcing/off shoring the 
low- and medium-skilled production processes in manufacturing, starting mainly 
from the 1990s, the off shoring and off shore outsourcing of certain production pro-
cesses of specifi c services from developed countries to other developed or devel-
oping countries has started to become more and more widespread (UNCTAD, 
2004). Th e process has been induced by technological development – in many 
various ways. As a result of technology developments, the fragmentation, divi-
sion, standardization, ‘algorithmization’ of services processes, evaluation of certain 
service process elements, digitalization, and the coding of information were made 
possible. Th is is similar to the fragmentation process in manufacturing, but on the 
basis of available evidence, the fragmentation can go deeper in services processes. 
After such fragmentation, certain service processes can be separated and they can 
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be carried out in locations where it is cheaper, more effi  cient, or where it provides 
better quality. As a result, certain services became tradable, even internationally. 
Information and communication technologies made mainly services dealing with 
information tradable. It is now possible to produce certain services in far away lo-
cations and consume them in another far away location at the same time, or even at 
diff erent times (UNCTAD, 2004). Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) developments also allowed reducing the response time (Metters and Ver-
ma, 2007). New goods appeared which acted as ‘mediators’ (for example compact 
discs, software) in services trade (Lindner et al., 2001). Th e outsourcing of ser-
vices has also been helped by the ongoing uni-, bi- and multilateral liberalization 
process of the services trade, although the level of liberalization does not reach 
that of manufacturing goods (UNCTAD, 2004). ‘Unilateral’ changes in relevant 
governmental regulations and incentives, with the aim of proactively attracting 
off shore business services, also played a role. Th is can be traced in investments in 
telecommunications infrastructure, and in more and more countries off ering tax 
allowances for such types of activities (Metters and Verma, 2007). Increased pres-
ence of global networks also contributed to the process (Dicken, 2003; Netland 
and Alfnes, 2007). Other specifi c factors, such as for example the acceptance of 
English as lingua franca, general institutional compatibility and adaptability, sim-
pler logistics in services compared to manufacturing, also played a role in the quick 
advancement of the process (Bardhan and Kroll, 2003, p. 3).
The services functions affected include a heterogeneous group of activities 
such as various computer services, legal, finance, accounting, marketing services, 
a range of R&D processes, certain medical and cultural services and so on. Ta-
ble 2.1 shows the categories used in describing these processes. In this chapter 
we concentrate on captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing. Offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing refer to a company’s decision to transfer certain activities, 
which were hitherto carried out inside the company, to another unit of the firm 
in a foreign location (captive offshoring) or to an independent firm (offshore 
outsourcing). Business process outsourcing describes a relationship between a 
vendor and a client, where the vendor performs an entire business service func-
tion for the client (this definition is based on Chakrabarty, 2006, p. 35).
Table 2.1 Categories used in the analysis
Location of production Internalized Externalized (outsourcing)
Home country Production kept in-house at 
home
Outsourcing (at home)
Foreign country (off shoring) Intrafi rm (captive) off shoring Off shore outsourcing
Source: based on UNCTAD, 2004, p. 148
The impact of foreign direct investment
As far as the geographical dimension of the phenomenon is concerned, the pro-
cess of services outsourcing started in the USA, then other Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries (first of all Great-Britain) followed. While certain activities started to be 
outsourced as early as in the 1950s, the process itself accelerated and became 
widespread only in the 1990s (Metters and Verma, 2007). Countries (or rather 
companies) of continental Europe followed these two countries later, and they 
are in the process of catching up with the first movers. This can be explained not 
only by a slower reaction, a different culture within continental European com-
panies or higher obstacles to offshoring and outsourcing, but also by the language 
barriers existing for ‘smaller’ European languages.2 Moreover, in many cases they 
prefer ‘nearshoring’, that is to say, keeping the relocated functions close to the 
original site.3 On the receiving end, as ‘mirroring’ home countries and reflecting 
the dominance of the English language, Anglo-Saxon culture and other common 
elements (for example the common law structure, see Bardhan and Kroll, 2003, 
p. 3) – Ireland, India, Canada and Israel are the most important destinations 
(UNCTAD, 2004). In Europe, traditionally, Ireland is the most important host 
country, but other ‘old’ EU-member countries also have a relatively high market 
share (first of all Great-Britain, Portugal and Spain are important host countries) 
(UNCTAD, 2004).
All in all, the overwhelming majority of services offshore outsourcing and 
captive offshoring is still realized between developed countries, though certain 
developing countries, especially India, are becoming important players. The role 
of the new member states of the European Union is becoming increasingly im-
portant; however, their market shares are still very small. Because of methodo-
logical problems, it is not easy to prove this statement. Statistical data on services 
foreign trade, FDI or jobs can not be used to describe international developments 
and characteristics of the process (Sass, 2009). Estimations which are available 
are usually prepared by industry experts or consulting firms and are based on 
company surveys and interviews (Kirkegaard, 2005, p. 5). According to the data 
of UNCTAD (2004), one third of the services outsourcing projects of European 
multinational companies went to India. Western European countries (Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Great-Britain) had a 29 share, and 22 of the projects went 
to East-Central and Eastern Europe, mainly to Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
Because larger projects go to India, this country’s share can be close to 50 in 
terms of market share. According to McKinsey & Company, the share of the 
East-Central European region from global business services was as low as 1 in 
2005. Thus, the region is left behind the leading Asian countries, but the later 
start of European companies indicates that the process is only about to take off 
for the East-Central European region. According to the survey conducted by 
IBM and Oxford Intelligence, East-Central Europe – besides Ireland – is already 
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the location of pan-European service centers, that is, companies in Continental 
Europe are supplied from here. Altogether, the role of East-Central Europe is 
growing, though it is not as big as one could expect on the basis of the informa-
tion presented by the (Western) media.
Hungary has been one of the leading locations in attracting business services 
projects in the East-Central European region. Services centers appeared already 
during the 1990s, partly because Hungary opened up its economy to FDI the 
earliest and it has been a major destination of Western FDI in the region. Af-
filiates of multinational corporations operating in the country provided the de-
mand for business services, which in itself attracted such projects. Moreover, as 
an attracting factor, relevantly skilled labor with competitive wages, the legal and 
physical (especially ICT) infrastructure and office space have been available in 
the required quality and quantity similarly to other countries in the region. The 
number of such centers can be around 50 at present and the number of jobs cre-
ated around 20,000, according to 2008 data. This represents more than 0.5 of 
total employment and almost 1 of services employment in Hungary.4
This chapter analyzes the impact of business services projects on the Hungar-
ian economy. First, it presents the relatively scarce results in the literature con-
cerning the evolution and impact of business services FDI generally and in the re-
gion. Second, based on eight company interviews taken in Hungary during 2008, 
it describes channels and importance of local impact of FDI in business services. 
Third, the policy environment surrounding these projects is shortly described. 
Fourth, the last part summarizes the most important findings.
2.2 Review of the literature and analytical framework
Offshoring and offshore outsourcing of business services offer various advantages 
and disadvantages for the host country as well. Because almost all related projects 
in East-Central Europe and in Hungary involve the presence of multinational 
corporations (MNCs), our analytical framework relies on Barba Navaretti and 
Venables (2004). Host country impacts of MNCs can be grouped in three cat-
egories: product market effects, factor market effects and spillover effects. The 
relative importance of these impacts depends on the nature of FDI, whether it is 
vertical or horizontal, and on the characteristics of the host country (Barba Nav-
aretti and Venables, 2004). Moreover, it depends on the special characteristics of 
the sector, in this case on those of business services.
The impact of foreign direct investment
In this chapter we analyze in detail the impact of FDI in business services on the 
host economy, based on the experiences of Hungary. There are not many prec-
edents in analyzing this topic. There is little written about the impact of services 
FDI: academic studies usually concentrate on offshoring and offshore outsourc-
ing in the manufacturing sector (van Gorp et al., 2006, p. 3). Moreover, the lit-
erature concentrates mainly on (developed) home country impacts, especially in 
terms of job losses and welfare implications, as well as home country firm strate-
gies for outsourcing (Hansen et al., 2007, p. 4). There is little written about the 
‘supply side’ of international fragmentation in services (Grover, 2007). Even anal-
yses concerning home country impacts are somehow one-sided. They concentrate 
on the negative impact on the home country factor market in terms of changes in 
employment and wages. While there are many studies concerning the job loss and 
wage impact in the Western part of Europe (or in the USA) due to globalization, 
and thus due to the changing nature of distribution of manufacturing and service 
activities (see among others Geishecker, 2002; 2005; Egger and Egger, 2003; 2005; 
Marin, 2004; Schöller, 2007; Geishecker et al., 2007; Gianelle and Tattara, 2007), 
there is basically no information or estimate about the number of jobs created in 
both parts of Europe due to that process ( Jensen et al., 2006, p. 2). Analysis of 
the impact of services offshoring and offshore outsourcing on the host economies, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe is basically missing.
There is also little written about business services in Hungary. The few exist-
ing papers describe the main processes, based mainly on the analysis of available 
statistical data or using information published by consulting firms. These pa-
pers agree on the increasing importance of this kind of services in the Hungarian 
economy and the role of FDI in it (see for example Hamar, 2005; Bajmócy, 2007; 
Table 2.2 Eff ects of MNCs on host countries
Where do the eff ects arise?           Eff ects
Host Home
Product markets Productivity diff erences Productivity diff erences
Competition and market supply Output levels
Factor markets Employment and wages Employment and wages
Skills Skills
Volatility Volatility
Spillovers Transmission of technology Technological sourcing
Transmission of intangible 
eff ects
Pecuniary externalities
Source: Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004
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Gál, 2009; Sass, 2008a.). Hamar (2005) also calls attention to the problems of 
measurability and lack of data, which limits our knowledge about the sector.
It was already mentioned that there are many definition, data and methodo-
logical problems in analyzing the characteristics of offshoring and offshore out-
sourcing of business services (see for example Sass, 2009; or for services overall, 
Francois and Hoekman, 2009). Experts examining these data problems in detail 
suggest that the best approach in this field is to supplement existing quantita-
tive analysis with more qualitative examinations and to combine quantitative and 
qualitative research (Sturgeon et al., 2006). This instruction is basically followed 
in this chapter as well: statistical data are used to provide some insights into the 
extent and role of these kinds of services in the host economy. Further analysis 
of the impact on the local economy and local firms is carried out using company 
case studies. Managers of eight companies were interviewed, of which four are in-
dependent service providers and four are captive centers. These eight companies 
represent about one fourth of total employment in the information technology 
(IT) and business services sector in Hungary, which rests upon the fact that the 
two biggest companies are involved. These eight company case studies do not 
provide a sufficient basis for making unchallengeable conclusions about the local 
impact of offshored and offshore-outsourced business services FDI in Hungary. 
However, in some respects, given the uniformity of the companies interviewed, 
certain common characteristics of these kinds of projects are reinforced.
2.3 Foreign direct investment in business services in Hungary and 
channels of its local impact
In Hungary, in terms of the relative share of output and value added, significant 
growth characterizes computer services, while other business activities show very 
little change (Table 2.3).
However, the share of these two subsectors in total services exports increased 
significantly, and the share of business services decreased in services imports. The 
trade balance of the two subsectors turned to positive from a slightly negative one 
(Table 2.4).5 Moreover, specialization indices turned positive for other business 
services, and converged to zero for computer and IT services (Sass, 2008b). Thus, 
in spite of all the methodological difficulties, a change in the relative importance 
of the two subsectors in the Hungarian economy and foreign trade is obvious. 
Similar developments are indicated for Romania (Ghibutiu and Dumitriu, 2008) 
showing an improving revealed comparative advantage (RCA)6 (approaching 
unity) in both subsectors vis-à-vis the EU-15 and positive RCAs in 2006 vis-à-vis 
other new member countries of the EU.
The impact of foreign direct investment
Business services FDI (including computer and related activities) is mainly of 
a vertical nature, because parts of the service operation are transferred to a new 
location, while other parts remain on the original site. However, in business ser-
vices horizontal FDI can also be present, as we shall see later.7 As far as product 
market effects are concerned, this type of FDI results mainly in the increase of 
the variety and quality of products, and through that impact, they may increase 
competition and displace domestic entrepreneurs and companies. However, this 
specific product is tradable and highly export oriented. Even previous to the ap-
Table 2.3 Changes in the share of business services in total output and value added in 
Hungary
% in total 1996 2006
Gross output
K Real estate, renting and business activities 10.1 11.2
72 Computer and related activities 0.5 1.1
73 Research and development 0.3 0.3
74 Other business activities 5.1 4.9
Gross value added
K Real estate, renting and business activities 13.4 15.4
72 Computer and related activities 0.5 1.4
73 Research and development 0.4 0.4
74 Other business activities 6.0 6.1
Source: National Accounts of Hungary, Hungarian Central Statistical Offi  ce
Table 2.4 Changes in foreign trade of computer/IT services and other business services 
of Hungary
1996 2006 2007
% in total exports
2.7 computer and IT services 1.6 3.7 4.2
2.9 other business services 23.6 26.7 27.8
% in total imports
2.7 computer and IT services 1.5 4.6 4.2
2.9 other business services 36.6 29.9 29.7
Balance (million euros)
2.7 computer and IT services 27 -40 49
2.9 other business services -57 38 85
Source: Balance of payments, published by the National Bank of Hungary
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pearance of these companies, these types of business services (with the possible 
exception of computer services) were basically nonexistent in the country accord-
ing to Western standards, and were mainly imported or were provided by partly 
or wholly foreign-owned service companies, which followed their clients to the 
new location. That is why this crowding-out effect is of smaller importance. We 
can identify two segments of the market: one with Hungarian-owned compa-
nies providing services to Hungarian-owned companies and the other one with 
foreign-owned companies providing services to foreign-owned clients. There is 
some overlap between the two, but they seem to operate in quite a separated way 
from each other. The impact of business services related FDI is much more im-
portant on factor markets, especially on the labor market. It increases the overall 
demand for labor, and it has a significant influence on the skill composition of 
that demand, since it increases demand for highly skilled employees. This may 
impact upon the development in relative factor prices – however, the analysis 
of this phenomenon is outside the scope of the present study. Spillover effects 
may take two distinct forms: those of technological and pecuniary externalities, 
because FDI goes together with costs and benefits which are not directly trans-
mitted through the market (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Direct tech-
nology transfer is important in this case, as all companies use the highest level 
technologies and they also use high-quality management and production organi-
zation. Other types of effects, for example acquisition of labor skills concerning 
technology, managerial skills, know-how, knowledge about the markets and even 
‘business ethics’ in a wide sense, and their transmission to local companies is an 
important channel through which these foreign-owned companies may have an 
impact upon the local economy. Pecuniary externalities may occur in this case 
through the use of local suppliers, including local services providers and through 
selling products to local companies (backward and forward linkages). This may 
result in an increase in the quantity and quality of local output, and in the in-
crease in the productivity of local companies, through providing access to good 
quality services and opportunity to outsourcing certain services, and thus concen-
trating on core activities. Moreover, by its nature, this type of FDI has an impact 
on the balance of payments: a one-off impact on the capital balance, followed by 
further impacts if reinvestment of earnings is realized, and another impact on the 
current account by its export intensity. However, the analysis of this latter impact 
is seriously hindered by methodological problems and data limitations. Another 
instant gain and benefit for the host economy is from taxing the companies in 
question (Caves, 2007, p. 239). Here not only profit tax is important, but all other 
taxes, minus the extra costs (incentives, additional public services required to deal 
with foreign-owned companies). Here, due to lack of data, we do not deal with 
this latter type of impact.
The impact of foreign direct investment
Using the categories presented in Table 2.2, on the basis of company inter-
views, the following main categories of impact on the host economy can be dis-
tinguished for export-oriented business services FDI.
2.3.1 Raising demand for skilled labor
First of all, it is important to determine what kind of activities are transferred 
to Hungary in export-oriented business services projects. It is obvious from the 
company interviews that the activities in question are very diverse, and the skill 
content of these activities varies from the least skill intensive to processes using 
the highest quality workforce. Even in the case of the same activity, the skill con-
tent may be different depending on the real content of the activity: for example a 
call center can provide basic information in one language, and more comprehen-
sive information (for example IT support) in multiple languages.
What kinds of jobs are offered and what kind of activities are carried out in these 
companies? This is the topic on which  the interviewed companies are usually 
reluctant to give out any information. However, it is obvious, that two of the 
eight companies in the Hungarian sample carry out the most complex activities 
and belong to the fifth category in Figure 2.1. The other companies interviewed 
operate in a bunch of activities, comprising mainly functions described in the 
Figure 2.1 Off shored services
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second, third and fourth boxes of Figure 2.1. In one of the interviewed companies, 
in one of its twenty plants, even activities belonging to the first box (transaction 
processing and document management) are also carried out, though this activity 
represents a very minor part of the activities of the company in question (around 
a dozen of close to 2,000 employees do that activity). Specific IT call centers are 
also operated by one of the companies, which can not be assessed as a ‘simple’ cus-
tomer contact activity, because a higher level of IT-knowledge of the employee is 
a prerequisite. Except for the back-office activities, in all other jobs in Hungary, 
the knowledge of at least one foreign language is a prerequisite.
Altogether, on the basis of the company interviews, most of the activities car-
ried out in Hungary belong to the medium- and medium-high skilled categories 
(Figure 2.2). To a certain extent, unskilled, intensive and high-skilled activities 
are also present, but medium-skilled ones dominate. Thus, service center and 
regional headquarter projects created a large number of mainly medium to high-
skilled jobs (according to Figure 2.1) in Hungary. Just to give an estimation for 
the shares of various activities: the eight interviewed companies created approxi-
mately 5,500 jobs. Around a dozen of these belong to the lowest category and 
around 220 to the highest. All the remaining jobs can be considered as being of 
Figure 2.2 Activities carried out in the foreign-owned companies interviewed in Hungary
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medium-high complexity. Altogether, according to various sources and estima-
tions, in Hungary around 20,000 such jobs were created up till now. The over-
whelming majority of these jobs is white collar (there was only one company case 
among those interviewed in Hungary, as was already mentioned, where a dozen 
of blue-collar jobs were involved among the total number of 2,000 jobs created). 
As for other characteristics of workers, the average age of employees in the in-
terviewed companies is relatively low, below 30 years of age, and there are many 
for whom this is their first job after graduation, thus these projects contributed 
to the reduction of unemployment among fresh graduates. This seems to be a 
problem in other Central European countries as well with the possible exception 
of the Czech Republic. Between 80 and 90 of employees have a university 
diploma, the majority of them speak more than one foreign language. There 
is a gender aspect at the lower level of aggregation of services activities carried 
out in the interviewed companies: while engineers, software engineers and other 
computer-related services employees are predominantly men, human resources 
managers and accountants are mainly women. The picture is more mixed for call 
center workers; however, a slightly lower domination of women is also present 
there. Partly due to the strenuousness of certain job categories and to the high 
demand and relatively low supply of relevant workers, a relatively high attrition 
rate (fluctuation) characterizes those interviewed companies which were estab-
lished earlier. By now, the sector faces shortage of properly trained employees. 
In one of the interviewed companies, there are 200 vacancies out of the 2,000 
positions.
2.3.2 Linkages
Linkages and other local contacts between foreign investors and local firms can 
be one of those channels through which these projects may impact upon the local 
economy and local firms (see chapter 1). In the literature, linkages between servic-
es projects and local economic actors are hardly analyzed. However, the literature 
on linkages in manufacturing can give some insights into those in services. There 
is a set of factors which influence the intensity of local linkages of a company with 
foreign participation (Sass and Szanyi, 2009). Chapter 1 of the book suggests 
that the following are particularly significant: the mode of FDI entry (greenfield 
or acquisition), the share of foreign ownership (100 foreign-owned and joint 
venture), sectoral differences, export-oriented versus domestic-market oriented 
investors (or vertical versus horizontal FDI), the gap between the performance 
of the ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ sectors (the larger the difference, the less the link-
age), the age of the investment (for older investment there are more linkages), 
the quality and quantity of local suppliers, the size of the affiliate, the nationality 
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of the investor, the global strategies of MNCs and the role of the affiliate in the 
production network of the company. The impact of these factors is especially 
relevant when the vertical, export-oriented nature of this type of project is taken 
into account and the role and independence of the affiliate in decision making is 
analyzed.
On the basis of our company interviews, in terms of backward linkages, they 
are quite limited for all companies functioning in the service sector. This finding 
is in line with that of Caves, who noted that for labor intensive processes there is 
less potential for backward linkages (Caves, 2007, p. 224). While the business ser-
vice activities analyzed here are not unskilled but skilled-labor intensive, on the 
basis of the information gained from the interviews backward linkages are very 
limited in our sector as well. Local sourcing is confined to buying various ‘basic’ 
services from local companies, such as cleaning, security services, catering, and 
certain training services, and to using local infrastructure (telecommunications, 
electricity, financial services, other infrastructure), as revealed in the company 
interviews. There are only a few cases (two of the eight companies) in which part 
of the core activity of these companies is outsourced to local companies: one rea-
son can be the temporary lack of capacities, another reason, which may result in a 
more lasting relationship with a local company, is when lower value-added activi-
ties are outsourced to local companies. The alternative to that latter is to relocate 
these activities to lower wage neighboring countries, which is what happened in 
one of the interviewed companies.
As far as forward linkages are concerned, they can benefit the host economy 
by raising the quality of business services provided for local companies. How-
ever, selling services to local companies is also at a relatively low level in our 
sample. Export intensity in terms of the percentage of export sales to local sales 
is close to 100 in most of the cases. In the captive cases, this is understandable: 
all services are exported except for when the local affiliate is served, though the 
share of this latter is minimal in the Hungarian captive cases. One Hungary-
based company has a relatively low export/sales ratio of 60. Here one reason 
for the relatively high share of local sales can be found in the long history of the 
firm in the Hungarian market, where it has been present since 1991. This resulted 
in concluding longer-term contracts with big local companies during the 1990s, 
including privatized Hungarian companies and local affiliates of GE, Coca Cola, 
Thyssen-Krupp, ABN-AMRO, and Sony. For another independent service pro-
vider, sales on the domestic market are significant, mainly because one plant of 
the local affiliate was acquired with the aim of serving the local market.
Thus the contribution of backward and forward linkages to raising the level of 
the competitiveness of local companies is rather limited in these cases.
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2.3.3 Technology spillovers
Direct technology transfer is important in the analyzed sector, as all companies 
use the highest level technologies, and they also use high quality management 
and production organization, as it is obvious from the interviews. However, as 
far as the ‘leakage’ of these technologies into the local economy is concerned, the 
analysis of it is outside the scope of this study. However, on the basis of company 
interviews, channels for this (including linkages and other contacts with the local 
economy) were limited.
2.3.4 Mobility of trained employees
One of the most important channels of local spillovers in this sector is through 
trained workers. All interviewed companies provide training to recruited employ-
ees. Some concentrate on knowledge and abilities directly connected to the actual 
work of the employee; however, there are others, which offer a set of courses, 
including language and self-development courses. In that respect, affiliates in 
the sector seem to deviate from other affiliates, because trainings organized by 
foreign-owned affiliates are usually narrowly focused on the actual needs of the 
activity that the employee carries out (Dunning, 1993, p. 372). In our sample al-
most all companies offered training which had a wider focus, the reason for which 
can be found in the knowledge intensive nature of the sector. Training has been 
continuous in all interviewed companies.
Some of these trained employees may either go to work at local companies, or set 
up their own companies (or go to work at another local affi  liate in the sector, due 
to the arising shortage of relevantly trained employees). Th ese kinds of ‘spin-off ’ 
companies are the most present in computer and related services. Specifi c mention 
was made of these types of ‘spin-off s’ in the case of two companies interviewed. 
Th is phenomenon was especially important for one company dealing with software 
engineering, where training is relatively lengthy (between one and two years), and 
there are cases when former employees of the company set up their own small en-
terprise and carry out similar activities, successfully setting foot on the local market. 
Th e other company is an independent service provider and sells relatively large vol-
umes on the domestic market, representing a confl uence of vertical and horizontal 
FDI. Some smaller consulting fi rms were established as ‘spin-off s’ from this latter 
company. For other interviewed shared-services centers, where employees have no 
access to knowledge about the overall service process, this type of ‘spin-off ’ is basi-
cally nonexistent. Th ere was only one company in the interviewed sample where 
employees could get an oversight of the whole, not IT-related service process. How-
ever, maybe due to the young age of that company there were no such ‘spin-off s’ yet.
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It is important to note that in the case of employees not setting up their own 
small business, but going to work at a domestic company, it is not only the special 
knowledge on technology, management, and the accumulated skills that are trans-
ferred to local companies, but a kind of business culture and working ethics as 
well. This channel may contribute to raising the productivity of local companies 
and improving the business environment.8 However, from the company inter-
views it is obvious that employees tend to move more between foreign-owned 
companies in the subsector and that there are only a few workers who go to work 
at domestic companies. However, even moving between service centers may rep-
resent a kind of upgrading: when after some training and gaining experience from 
service centers with lower requirements, workers move to another service center 
with higher recruitment requirements. This was also mentioned by one company 
as a problem which caused high attrition rates and a quick increase in real wages 
in the sector.
However, one has to note that the knowledge transfer and organizational 
technology transfer to the local economy is very limited on the basis of the Hun-
garian experience. That is one reason why in this sector there are only a few 
Hungarian-owned companies that would be able to provide the required quan-
tity and quality of services and could become an important domestic or regional 
player. Another reason for that can be that the appearance of business services 
offshoring and outsourcing companies has increased the competition for skilled 
labor, which first, may have a crowding-out effect on Hungarian firms in the sec-
tor, and second, may have an adverse effect on other industries in the economy. 
Shortage of skilled labor is especially apparent for example in IT and engineer-
ing in Hungary.
2.3.5 Impact on local infrastructure and services
Both companies with foreign and domestic participation use infrastructure and 
other services. One of the important elements of locational advantages for these 
types of investments is the availability of relevant infrastructure, especially an 
internet connection (broadband). Companies in the export-oriented part of the 
business services sector, through their intensive demand for some elements of local 
infrastructure and other services, contributed to the increase in the quantity and 
quality of services off ered. First of all, telecommunications infrastructure and ser-
vices are aff ected. According to UNCTAD (2004), improvements in ICT- related 
infrastructure is one of the most important spillovers from business services in-
vestments. Among other services, according to the interviews, the following are 
used the most intensively: training, catering, security, offi  ce space, fi nancial servic-
es, and employment/job agencies. Th ese are called ‘usual services’ in Table 2.5. One 
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Table 2.5 Characteristics of the interviewed companies from the point of view of impact 



































































































1 I 1991 2000 Limited, but existent, 
especially in software 
development, with local 
SME and cooperation 
with SMEs set up by 
former employees; 




of sales to 
the domestic 
market





2 C 2008 165 Negligible, the ‘usual’ 
services bought locally 




Yes AMCHAM, HOA, 
universities
3 C 2005 330 The ‘usual’ services 
sourced locally
Export/sales: 









600 The ‘usual’ services 
sourced locally
Export/sales: 




No AMCHAM; through HR 
for a: informal links, 
business schools




Yes AMCHAM, HOA, 
universities
6 C 2008 50 The ‘usual’ services 
bought locally
Close to 100% 
exports
No HOA, AMCHAM, 
French Chamber of 
Commerce
7 I 2005 750 The ‘usual’ services 
bought locally
Close to 100% 
export/sales
Yes AMCHAM, HOA, 
universities









Note: AMCHAM: American Chamber of Commerce; HOA: Hungarian Outsourcing Association. 
‘usual services’: training, catering, security, offi  ce space, fi nancial services, employment/job 
agencies.
Source: own compilation based on the company interviews
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manager explicitly noted that some local service providers were given technical and 
managerial help in fi nding relevant employees for the company. Th e increase in the 
quantity and quality of services, and the decrease in their prices due to the more 
intense competition may be benefi cial for the domestic companies as well.
2.3.6 Impact on the business environment
All companies interviewed in the framework of the project were active par-
ticipants in the local business life, with memberships and active participation 
in various local organizations (AMCHAM, Hungarian chamber of commerce, 
other chambers of commerce, and Hungarian Outsourcing Association). For the 
companies, these associations provide an informal forum for exchanging ideas, 
discussing experiences and so on. Moreover, through these associations, they can 
express their views about the business environment; exercise some pressure for 
changing certain detrimental elements of it. One company actively (and success-
fully) lobbied through AMCHAM for including certain jobs in the agreement 
with Romania and Bulgaria on the free flow of workers. Another reason is the 
unstable nature of the business environment due to frequent changes in taxes and 
in the regulatory environment, which makes the companies quite active in voicing 
their opinion. This type of association may bring benefits to domestic companies, 
because they provide a forum where domestic and foreign managers may meet 
and pass on information and knowledge to each other (see for example Dunning, 
1993, p. 470). Trying to find traces of this was outside the scope of this study, but 
we can state that the membership of AMCHAM and the Hungarian Outsourc-
ing Association consists predominantly of foreign-owned companies. Thus they 
can share information and knowledge only with a very few domestic-company 
members of these associations.
The interviews outlined that competition for relevant employees is one of the 
main factors determining local activities and links of the companies in the sector. 
This was to a great extent motivated by the fact that as more and more compa-
nies appeared in Hungary in this sector, the availability of relevant employees 
became more and more limited – and connected to that, wages started to move 
upwards relatively quickly. This problem motivates companies to build up local 
links with universities and other educational institutes. They approach students 
partly for temporary jobs, partly to offer them jobs after graduation. In Hungary, 
more substantial relationships in terms of research and development cooperation 
between the companies and universities were also established, and the companies 
also financed various university activities. The presence and problems of these 
companies called attention to the missing educational categories, and as a result 
of which secondary level training for future call center employees was introduced 
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in seven secondary schools in Hungary. Moreover, the Hungarian Outsourcing 
Association, with the help of its members, recently organized a university level 
training course in service sciences, which will be taught in at least five universities 
in Hungary.
The analyzed companies use various measures to keep their employees. Be-
sides relatively high wages, other types of benefits (for example free canteen, 
health care insurance) are given to employees, and social events and various 
trainings are organized for personal and skill improvements. Overall, the work-
ing environment in these companies can be evaluated as superior compared to 
an average company.
2.3.7 Regional impact
Agglomeration forces are at work when export-oriented services companies 
choose their locations (see for example locations in Table 2.6). Budapest hosts the 
overwhelming majority of these types of companies. However, the biggest one of 
the interviewed companies is now present in 20 cities in Hungary. There are only 
a few (smaller) centers or plants which move to the countryside. The main reason 
for leaving the city is the increasing shortage of suitable workers in Budapest, 
as was mentioned by the interviewed companies. In Hungary, especially three 
university towns (Miskolc, Szeged, Debrecen) close to the border gained some 
important projects. An additional advantage of being situated near the border 
is that people from Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries with ‘small’ 
languages can be employed. This factor played a part when for example one of 
the interviewed companies established a center in Miskolc. In the countryside, 
especially traditional university towns became hosts to these types of investments 
(besides the above mentioned cities, Győr and Pécs) and newly emerging local 
centers of tertiary education, such as Békéscsaba or Székesfehérvár. In the case of 
Székesfehérvár, a captive service center was established because a manufacturing 
affiliate of the same parent company was already present there. The low level of 
spreading out of these types of investments to the countryside is in line with the 
statement of UNCTAD (2004, p. 169), according to which the regional impact of 
that type of investment is very limited because of the relatively skilled intensive 
nature and the required high level of infrastructure.
2.3.8 FDI policies concerning business services in Hungary
The majority of the interviewed FDI projects is of the vertical type. For them 
incentives may play an important role when choosing among similar locations 
(usually among locations in the East-Central European region). According to 
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the interviews, incentives are of secondary importance for companies, and their 
extent is quite limited compared to the invested amount or to the number of jobs 
created. However, in Hungary (and in other Visegrad countries, with the pos-
sible exception of Slovakia), attracting regional headquarters and shared service 
centers is one of the most important targets of investment agencies. Incentives 
offered for these types of projects are relatively generous in all three countries, 
though their generosity does not differ to a great extent from country to country. 
At present, most of the companies receive training-related grants or grants for 
job creation, financed from European Union funds. Moreover, projects deemed 
to have strategic importance can receive additional tailor-made support from the 
respective government. This exceptionally large support is offered to really big 
projects in the sector. However, EU-regulations limit the maximum amount/
share of offered incentives in all three countries, thus regional incentive competi-
tion is held back.
There is information on the overall financial support granted to these types 
of projects in Hungary up till the first half of 2008. The 16 companies (among 
them there are four which were interviewed) in Table 2.6 received HUF 9 billion 
(around EUR 35 million in 2008) financial support from the Hungarian state, 
which equals approximately HUF 700,000 (around EUR 2,750) support per job 
created (11,669 jobs). Other similar centers (their number can be between 25 and 
35 and their average size smaller than of those in the table) did not receive any 
financial support, though many of them were helped by the Hungarian invest-
ment agency through providing information or mediating between the company 
and the local municipality of potential locations. Three of the eight companies 
interviewed received this type of other incentive of getting information and help 
from ITDH, the Hungarian investment agency.
In contrast to manufacturing, there is no special support for these companies 
to deepen their local contacts and to increase local supplies, which is understand-
able given the predominantly vertical and export-oriented (even export platform) 
nature of these projects. As another policy measure of special importance for the 
sector, after observing the growing scarcity of suitable workforce and lack of spe-
cial knowledge, efforts were made in Hungary for introducing special secondary 
and tertiary level training courses for prospective employees. As was already men-
tioned, secondary level training for future call center employees was introduced 
in seven secondary schools, and a university level training course in service sci-
ences, organized and managed by the Hungarian Outsourcing Association, will 
be taught in at least five universities.
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2.4 Conclusion
Hungary, together with the Czech Republic, Poland and to a lesser extent with 
Romania, is increasingly involved in business and computer services outsourc-
ing as a host country. More and more companies are present with their regional, 
European or even global centers there. Although Hungary’s market share is still 
minimal it is growing inside the business and computer services of the European 
Union. The impact of these kinds of projects on the local economy hardly has 
been analyzed up till now. While this chapter could not look at all the aspects and 
channels of local impact and could not offer a quantitative analysis, it found that 
besides the medium- to high-skilled job creation impact, which is quite substan-
tial, these companies have limited contacts with the local economy. Their forward 
and backward linkages are scarce, though forward linkages seem to grow with the 
age of the investment, if it can be characterized with a confluence of horizontal 
and vertical FDI. A more substantial form of local impact are spillovers through 
trained employees. While these employees prefer moving to other MNCs in the 
Table 2.6 Service centers that have received fi nancial incentives in Hungary
Company Home country Location in Hungary Number of jobs
(current or planned)
ExxonMobil USA Budapest 1200
IBM ISSC USA Budapest 1300
Diageo United Kingdom Budapest 600
Getronics Netherlands Budapest 510
Jabil USA Szombathely 719
SAP Germany Budapest 600
Tata India Budapest 450
Convergys USA Budapest 282
EDS USA Budapest, Vasvár 2000
InBev Belgium Budapest 380
Budapest Bank USA Békéscsaba 530
Morgan Stanley United Kingdom Budapest 450
Citigroup USA Budapest 302
Vodafone United Kingdom Budapest 746
British Telecom United Kingdom Budapest, Debrecen 700
T-Systems Germany Budapest, Debrecen 1750
Note: Getronics withdrew its application for the incentives.
Source: ITDH
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sector, there are some cases in which they move to domestically-owned compa-
nies or they set up their own small firms.
 Notes
 Independent business services firms or outsourcing vendors are companies specialized 
in various business services (accounting, computer services, human resources, financial 
services and so on) selling their services to companies, which decide to outsource these 
activities.
 Jensen et al. () show the impeding role of the Danish language for offshoring certain 
service functions. Company interviews in Hungary also underlined the role of language 
barriers for offshoring and offshore outsourcing, especially for smaller European lan-
guages, though French and Spanish speakers are also not abundant in the East-Central 
European region.
 Hollinshead () also underlines the importance of nearshoring. Jensen et al. () 
show that cost considerations are in many cases overwritten by the importance of near-
shoring, thus for Danish companies Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany are im-
portant offshoring partners. The preference for nearshoring explains partly the emergence 
of the East-Central European region in business process outsourcing.
 Own approximation based on the data of the Central Statistical Office (employment) and 
the estimated number of jobs created.
 A caveat is due because of the data and measurement problems, which is analyzed in 
more detail in Sass (). However, these data are presented here only as illustrations of 
developments in the sector.
 RCA= revealed comparative advantage, showing relative specialization. It is calculated as 
the share of a good/service export in total goods/services export of a country compared to 
the share of the same good/services export in total export of another country or country 
group, in this case to EU- and EU- countries.
 Horizontal FDI is a demand-driven investment, where a company seeks to establish itself 
in new markets by supplying the same goods or services in a different country. Vertical 
FDI is a result of a firm’s vertical disintegration, that is when the firm breaks the value 
added chain and carries out one part of its operation in another country/countries.
 This is especially important in a country with a relatively big black and gray segment of 
the economy.
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3 Do multinational companies transfer technology 
to local small and medium-sized enterprises?
 




It is often argued that the key to increasing the competitiveness and productiv-
ity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries is to 
build the capacities of these enterprises through improved technology. This tech-
nology development can take place internally (inside the firm) or can be fostered 
through access to outside sources, including transfer of technology from multi-
national companies (MNCs). Technology here is defined broadly including the 
product, process, as well as management skills.1
There is a large body of literature on technology transfer, particularly from 
MNCs to firms in developing countries.2 However, very little work, especially 
empirical studies, has been done on technology transfer to SMEs in develop-
ing countries.3 Thus, with Indonesia as the case study, the main objective of this 
chapter is to fill this gap. It addresses the following two research questions. First, 
what role do MNCs play in technology transfer to SMEs in Indonesia? Second, 
under what conditions do MNCs play such a role?
Methodologically, this study is based on a review of key literature on technolo-
gy transfer to Indonesia, and for its empirical part, a case study on the Tegal met-
alworking industry in Central Java was undertaken. For this case study, in-depth 
and semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in 
Tegal district.
The structure of this study is as follows. Section II discusses the importance 
of MNCs as a source of technology transfer in Indonesia. Section III presents 
and discusses findings from the Tegal metalworking industry. Section IV gives 
concluding remarks.
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3.2 Multinational companies in Indonesia
There is a large body of literature on channels through which technology is trans-
ferred internationally. The channels include: MNCs’ foreign direct investment 
(FDI); technical licensing agreements between foreign and local firms; imports 
of intermediate and capital goods; education and training in technologically ad-
vanced countries; turnkey plants and project contracts; technical consulting by 
foreign companies/consulting firms; and simply through participation in world 
trade (export).4
From the developing countries perspective, given that MNCs opt to produce in 
these economies, they are the preferred route and are therefore a prominent chan-
nel of technology transfer. For Indonesia too, MNCs are a more attractive means 
of developing technology in their industries than is obtaining technical licenses 
or other sources. The reason for this preference for MNCs over other sources of 
technology transfer is that with the latter, technology is provided, whereas with 
the former, it involves continuous interaction between the acquirer and the sup-
plier of technology, and such continuous interaction is important for effective 
technology transfer since tacit knowledge is a component of virtually all tech-
nologies, and at the same time it is a long-term and difficult process. Therefore, 
for firms in developing countries, transfer of technologies through cooperation 
with MNCs is not only easier but also a better learning process than through, for 
example, imported capital goods.5
Probably, the importance of MNCs’ FDI as a source of technology transfer in 
developing countries can be best shown by South Korea and Taiwan’s success in 
developing their technology. In their early phase of development, they fully ac-
quired technologies from abroad, though not only through MNCs (Evans, 1998). 
But now, with their successful ability to master and assimilate foreign technology, 
they are not only the most advanced economies among the developing world, but 
also major world suppliers of high-technology goods.6
During the Suharto era (1967-1998), the government tried to encourage the de-
velopment of subcontracting linkages between SMEs and large enterprises (LEs), 
including domestic located MNCs by imposing a system of protection and local con-
tent rules in several industries including machinery, electronics and the automotive 
industry, as part of import substitution policies. Th e main aim of this local content 
policy was to encourage industrialization in the country and also to encourage a 
pattern of industrial development that followed the industrial pyramid model from 
Japan. In this model, small enterprises (SEs) were at the base to support medium 
enterprises (MEs), which then supported LEs at the top of the pyramid (TAF, 2000).
Industrial development supported by this local content policy in Indonesia, 
however, unexpectedly did not develop as strong production subcontracting link-
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ages between LEs-MEs-SEs as in Japan. On the contrary, the policy resulted in a 
vertically integrated production system within LEs. The Asia Foundation (TAF, 
2000) argues that the lack of success of this policy in creating strong interdepend-
ence between SEs, MEs and LEs was largely due to the government’s excessive 
interference, aimed at replacing the market mechanisms.7 Similarly, Thee (1990a; 
1990b; 1997) argues that such production linkages did not develop smoothly dur-
ing the New Order era because of market distortions and the lack of skills and 
low technological capabilities of local SMEs. SRI International (1992) found that 
such linkages between LEs and SMEs are weak and only a small number of clus-
ters (all located in Java) established subcontracting relationships with LEs, in-
cluding MNCs, mainly from Japan.
Although generally the policy was not very successful in developing viable do-
mestic supplier firms, successful private-led subcontracting networks did arise 
in some industries, with the evidence showing that these arrangements did suc-
cessfully facilitate technological capacity building. One example is the case of PT 
Astra International, part of the Astra international business group, Indonesia’s 
largest integrated automotive company. Up until today, through a subcontract-
ing system, PT Astra International has been able to develop many SMEs into 
efficient and viable suppliers. As a result of the rigorous training, which the com-
pany has provided to local suppliers with potential, over time, these suppliers are 
able to produce a wide range of parts and components for cars and motorcycles 
according to the strict quality standards set by Astra, and also to meet its strict 
delivery schedules (Tambunan, 2008).
The literature assessing the role of MNCs in technology transfer to local firms 
in Indonesia is still rather limited. Among the existing studies is Hayashi’s (2002) 
study of subcontracting activities between SMEs and Japanese firms in four in-
dustries, namely, diesel engines, pump units for oil, bicycles and motorcycles in 
Indonesia. The study reveals that the subcontractors obtained technical support 
in various forms, ranging from quality control (QC) support, technical support 
during the production process, inspection via the dispatch of experts, the selec-
tion of proper production equipment, a study tour to foreign markets, assistance 
in designing, to various technical trainings.
Earlier, Thee and Pangestu (1994) tried to find evidence of technology transfer 
at the micro level in the Indonesian textile, garment and electronics industries. 
They found that in efforts to increase technological capability, Indonesian tex-
tile and garment manufacturers established strategic alliances with their Japanese 
counterparts, and that these alliances had become the most important channel 
of technology transfer. Similarly, they found that business linkages with foreign 
companies had been a very important channel for the transfer of technology 
within the electronics industry, especially for consumer electronics and electronic 
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components. However, technology transfer in the textile industry was limited 
to improvements in production capability. Whilst important, more sophisticated 
activities that might help local firms upgrade their technological capabilities, in-
cluding activities related to preinvestment, project implementation and technical 
changes in production or product were conducted by Japanese counterparts.
Others such as Sjöholm (1999a; 1999b) and Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) 
used cross-sectional data to assess technology transfer or spillovers from MNCs 
in Indonesia. They showed both the level and growth of labor productivity to be 
higher for locally-owned plants in subsectors with a high foreign share of output. 
This suggests that MNCs do play an important role in transfer of technology as 
the companies generate positive technology spillovers in Indonesian firms.
Overall, however, research is still inconclusive in relation to the importance 
of MNCs as a source of technology transfer to local firms in Indonesia, since 
there is little evidence of their significant contributions to technological capa-
bility accumulation through transfer of technology in domestic firms, especially 
SMEs. The possible reasons are the following. First, the mineral extractions in 
the country attracted more MNCs than in other sectors, but they are highly con-
centrated geographically and have high import content. Most of those operations 
are wholly owned by foreigners rather than joint ventures with local firms. They 
tend to operate as enclaves, such as the case of PT Free Port, an American gold 
mining company in Papua, or the case of Caltex in the oil sector in Riau, Suma-
tra, since they are weakly integrated into the country’s domestic economy, as they 
have few forward and backward linkages with domestic firms. With this type 
of operation, important technology transfer channels from MNCs to domestic 
firms are largely absent. In contrast, MNCs in the manufacturing industry, po-
tentially, will have greater technology transfer effects, since the industry is not 
geographically concentrated, and relatively more labor intensive, and it is easier 
for foreign firms to establish subcontracting links with domestic firms than in the 
mineral extraction. Second, although the Indonesian government has been very 
active in encouraging production links between MNCs and domestic firms, there 
are still many (although unintended) distortions generated by macro-, meso-, and 
microeconomic policies that put more disincentives than incentives for MNC 
subsidiaries to do subcontracting arrangements or other forms of linkages with 
domestic firms.
Third, many studies8 conclude that the presence of MNCs is likely to have a 
positive impact on local firms through transfer of technology only when the local 
firms have enough absorptive capacity, that is when they have human resources 
with adequate skills and basic technical knowledge. Whereas, in Indonesia, ap-
propriate policies and institutional changes, especially with respect to R&D and 
human capital accumulation, in order to take full advantage in the form of tech-
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nology upgrading in domestic firms of the increased MNCs in the country are 
still lacking.
With respect to this third reason, findings from existing studies on subcon-
tracting activities in Indonesia such as Harianto (1993), Kitabata (1988), Sato 
(1998; 2000), Supratikno (2001; 2002), JICA (2000), Iman and Nagata (2002) 
and Pantjadarma (2004) suggest that subcontracting arrangements between 
SMEs and MNCs in Indonesia is still weak, mainly because SMEs cannot meet 
the required standard of quality due to their lack of technology and skills. Also, 
from his analysis on how much technology has been transferred by Japanese com-
panies through the development of Indonesia’s car manufacturing industry, Tar-
midi (2001) concludes that the main constraints to technology transfer in the 
automotive component industry were, among others, lack of basic technological 
know-how and an insufficient number of skilled workers. Nevertheless, all those 
studies have one common conclusion, namely that through subcontracting ar-
rangements MNCs can play an important role for capacity building, including in 
technology, in local firms.
3.3 Th e case of Tegal metalworking industry9
3.3.1 Brief history and profi le
The district of Tegal (Kabupaten Tegal), hereinafter Tegal, is part of the provin-
cial government of Central Java located near the north coast on Central Java and 
close to the border of West Java on key trucking and rail routes. Major industries 
in the district include processed food (tea and tofu), textiles (batik and embroi-
dery) and furniture (bamboo and wood). Based on data from the Tegal Regional 
Office of Industry and Trade in 2007, the district generates 22.09 of its annual 
income from the industrial sector, compared to 24.24 and 24.62 from its trade 
and agriculture sectors respectively. Those three sectors are the largest contribu-
tors to the district economy. The other important sectors are services, construc-
tion, mining and transportation.
Tegal is among one of the few areas in Indonesia with a long history of develop-
ment in the metalworking industry. It has been a metalworking center since the 
mid-1800s when it was the locus of several sugar processing factories and related 
enterprises including locomotive repair shops and metal-processing factories. Th e 
industry continued, thriving particularly under the New Order’s massive infra-
structure and development agenda. In the beginning of the 1980s, the fi rst subcon-
tracting activity started in the district, sparking government activity to develop the 
metalworking industry. In the beginning of the 1980s, as many MNCs, especially 
in the manufacturing industry, already entered the country, the fi rst subcontracting 
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activity started between local producers and a foreign affi  liate company (Kubota), 
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Most of Tegal’s metal workshops rely on the same basic metalworking tech-
nologies, for example, casting, cutting, bending, drilling or stamping depending 
on the product, machining, welding, and finishing (painting or electronic plating 
depending on the product, and assembly). Most of the metal products are final 
consumer goods; metal craft, kitchenware, building fixtures, furniture, accesso-
ries and agricultural tools (sickle, shovel). Industrial goods range from various 
small items (nuts, bolts, washers, locks, hinges, door handles, some automotive 
components and ship parts) to hydrant pumps, hand tractor, coffee bean peeler 
and rice dryer. Their comparative advantage has been in filling small orders for 
simple metal products or components. The small size of workshops gives them 
greater flexibility and Tegal’s abundant cheap labor can outweigh the productiv-
ity advantages of more capital-intensive production. There is often intense price 
competition between workshops.
During the execution of the survey in 2005, the district had a population of 
1,423,346 people, and the Tegal metalworking industry employed about 30,029 
workers out of 118,820 workers or approximately 25 of total workers employed 
in the district’s industrial sector. There are around 2,811 metal workshops in the 
district, or about 10 of the total number of local enterprises in non-farm sectors. 
Among these are seven sentra or clusters, which are groups of geographic agglom-
erations of metal enterprises producing the same metal products, including LIK 
Takaru. Since the New Order era (1969-1998), clusters have become the focus of 
government development strategies for SMEs in all manufacturing subsectors, 
including the metalworking industry. The majority of metal workshops are small, 
employing less than 20 workers, mainly male.
Although metalworking involves a range of processes, the sector is dominated 
by the plate-forming business. Their comparative advantage has been in filling 
small orders for simple metal products or components, mostly for household ap-
pliances and handicrafts, but also for furniture, and, to a lesser extent, for parts 
and components for the general machinery and automotive industries. The small 
size of workshops gives them greater flexibility and Tegal’s abundant cheap labor 
can outweigh the productivity advantages of more capital-intensive production. 
There is often intense price competition between workshops.
Pantjadarma (2004) made a general assessment of the level of sophistication of 
the production facility in the sentra which was based on a capability to utilize high-
precision equipment such as computer numerical control (CNC) machines for pro-
duction, degree of order and cleanliness of the plants. Although it is an imprecise 
technique, it provides some insights into the level of technological capabilities of 
the fi rms. It was observed that the majority of fi rms are not ‘modern’ enough. Also, 
that only a few had entered the export market. Nonetheless, Pantjadarma concludes 
that it has suffi  cient technological capabilities to serve the domestic market.
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3.3.2 Main objective, methodology and sample
The main objective of the survey was to answer these two questions: What role 
do MNCs play in technology transfer to SMEs in Indonesia, and, under what 
conditions may MNCs play such a role?
In relation to the objective, a multimethod approach was used for this case 
study, namely, interviews and focus group discussions. Since this study was ex-
ploratory, in which the author wanted to remain open to less tangible factors that 
could have an impact on technology transfer to and diffusions among SMEs, 
it was conducted according to the descriptive and hypothesis-generating ap-
proach (Yin, 1989) rather than the hypothesis-testing model. The respondents 
were not selected on the basis of pattern-matching, but on the basis of logistics 
and willingness of them to participate in the interviewing process. Since factors 
that may influence the three general features are possibly numerous, and the data 
that might help in hypothesizing regarding these factors are rare, not only semi-
structured but also in-depth interviews were adopted to as much evidence as 
possible in order not only to have a deeper understanding of the process of the 
three features and their determinant factors, but also to increase the validity of 
the study (Kirk and Miller, 1986).
Th e research focused on clustered metal workshops in the automotive and ship-
building subsectors.10 Th e sample consisted of 34 respondents including owners of 
inti (fi rst tier supplier) and plasma (second tier supplier) who have subcontracting 
businesses, local workshop owners who supply only to retail markets, local govern-
ment offi  cials, and non-government organizations (NGOs). Th ese respondents 
were selected from four subdistrics: Adiwerna, Talang, Desa Kebasen and Desa 
Dampyak. Some of them were interviewed semi-structurally, including relevant 
local government offi  cials to discuss government-led technology diff usion initia-
tives and the history of subcontracting linkages in the district, while others were 
interviewed in-depth, including representatives of some subcontractors. Th e re-
search focused on metal workshops in LIK Takaru. In addition, two focus group 
discussions (FGDs) were held in Desa Kebasen, including with ten local work-
shop owners to discuss the needs of their businesses and to rank and discuss gov-
ernmental and private sector training that they received in the last fi ve years.
3.4 Findings
 types of workshops
The structure of the Tegal metalwork value chain is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Ac-
cording to the size of production and level of production sophistication, there 
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are two types of workshops in the Tegal metalworking industry: MEs and LEs as 
the modern type and SE as the traditional type of workshop. In addition, there 
are two types of subcontractors: workshops that receive orders for metal compo-
nents directly from contractors, mainly LEs including MNCs outside the district, 
called inti, and workshops that make subcontracting arrangements not directly 
with LEs/MNCs but with the inti workshops, called plasma. The first type of 
subcontractors consists mainly of MEs and some LEs and plasma workshops are 
dominated by SEs.
Figure 3.2 Structure of the Tegal metalwork value chain
Especially large inti workshops with a total of employees up to 100 men derive a 
majority of their income from subcontracting works. Inti workshops often sub-
contract part of their production to plasma workshops. Plasma workshops usu-
ally hire cheap, unskilled labor or use family members (mainly men) as unpaid 
workers (helpers) and the owner passes basic metalworking skills on to his em-
ployees, leaving the technical capacity of the workshop highly dependent on the 
technical capacity of the owner.
During the survey, there were several Japanese affiliated companies which sub-
contracted work to Tegal metal workshops, including PT Komatsu Indonesia 
Tbk, PT Daihatsu and some divisions of the Astra Group such as PT Sanwa, 
PT Kubota, and PT Katshusiro. These big companies often source metal com-
ponents from several parts of the country, mostly in West Java. Among these 
companies, the most prominent one is PT Komatsu Indonesia Tbk (KI), which 
has established subcontracting production linkages with Tegal metal workshops 
since 1998.11 This company produces various equipments for construction and 
mining activities under the global trademark of Komatsu, such as hydraulic ex-
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cavators, bulldozers, motor graders, frames and related components, steel cast 
products as well as off-highway dump tracks. This case study focuses only on KI 
and its local subcontractors.
Local workshops that have no subcontracting businesses with other firms 
manufacture entirely for the wholesalers and retailers or sell their products di-
rectly to local consumers. Many wholesalers and retailers purchased goods from 
Tegal metal workshops for resale in city stores.
 examples of the process to become a local 
subcontractor
KI has periodically opened competition for new subcontractors (inti). How-
ever, not all local producers/workshops could become subcontractors. Many 
candidates tried but failed to meet the requirements. Especially for SEs, which 
in general are poor in necessary resources such as capital and skilled workers 
compared to MEs, establishing subcontracting relations with MNCs is not an 
easy task. To become subcontractors, local firms must have attained a certain 
level of technical and managerial capacity. They must prove that they have the 
capacity to produce high-quality components and meet the stringent delivery 
times. An audit determines if they have the required machinery, manpower 
(they must have enough manpower to have two shifts for higher productivity), 
facilities, legal standing12 and use of ISO standards (KI as many other LEs 
require the use of ISO standards even if the workshop is not officially certi-
fied). Subsequently, they are requested to produce a sample component from 
provided technical drawings. According to KI’s inti workshop owners inter-
viewed, before an agreement is signed, KI often ask for a trial run of the mass 
production process, subjecting the output to quality control tests. If they could 
produce a certain product item on a regular schedule and consistent quality, 
they would then be granted a license for manufacturing different product items, 
thereby expanding their product lines. In the past few years, many suppliers 
have been tested through a few initial batch orders, but, in the end, only some of 
them were able to meet KI’s satisfaction; two of them, that is PT Prima Karya 
and PT Karya Padu Yasa, were included in the sample.13
The owners of these firms have learned a lot about many things from KI, such 
as quality control, standardization, and efficiency and all these have increased 
their innovation capability. The success of these two firms indeed can be seen as 
a direct reflection of the importance of MNC as a source of technology transfer 
to local firms. PT Prima Karya specializes in making parts and components for 
heavy equipment and it was formally incorporated in 1983, beginning operations 
with the manufacture of spray cans and agricultural machinery such as hand trac-
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tors. Currently, the company has 50 employees, of which more than 50 are high 
school graduates or under and two are university graduates. The company’s first 
experience as a subcontractor started in 1985, as it won a contract with a large 
local conglomerate for manufacturing large quantities of ‘coffee peeler’ machines 
(although the contract was later terminated due to the economic crisis in 1997-
1998). Currently, besides being one of the inti suppliers for KI, the company also 
succeeded in becoming one of the prime local suppliers for Natra Raya (NR), an 
affiliate of US Caterpillar, which came to Tegal in search of potential suppliers. 
It has managed to expand its product lines to more than 100 items supplied to 
KI and to NR on a regular basis. Total turnover in 1999 was Rp 650 million per 
year and increased continuously though slightly in recent years. The company 
virtually was a manufacturer of heavy equipment parts, including engine tools, 
dashboards, and forklift parts. It expanded its operations to include the manufac-
ture of pumps, agricultural equipment, parts for scales and door railings for sale 
to the general market. These jobs were merely incidental orders received along 
with the routine work the company did for KI and NR. Prospects for growth are 
extremely favorable. However, the company is chronically short of working capi-
tal because of the arrangement whereby payments are made only after the final 
products are manufactured and delivered.
The company has a great innovative capability. The fact that the company was 
able to advance from making relatively simple products to supplying metal com-
ponents with higher grades of precision on a consistent basis demonstrates its 
ability to learn and increase its skills. This ability is largely attributable to the 
owner who has been vigilant in solving on-site technical problems. According to 
the owner, being accepted as a prime KI supplier was his company’s first mile-
stone, a role which requires in advance the ability to translate technical drawings 
and to work toward the final product. Another prerequisite fulfilled by the com-
pany as a prime KI supplier was a level of quality that ensured that no rejects were 
classified as fatal ones; the company was able to correct defects easily and ship the 
products back to KI.
The company reached the second milestone when it was presented with the 
challenge of supplying a large complex piece associated with engine hoods. Mak-
ing the first sample proved to be quite difficult using the inappropriate machinery 
available at the time. Even with several days help by an expert from KI, the com-
pany was still unable to produce a satisfactory sample according to specifications. 
After several trials driven forward by the persistence of the owner, PT Prima 
Karya finally sent the finished sample to KI at the end of the week. Approval was 
achieved not long afterwards.
All jigs and fixtures that allow assemblage and welding on a consistent basis 
are built by the company itself. Much of the machinery is developed in house, 
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such as large bending and pressing machines, with up to 70 local contents. This 
level of accomplishment demonstrates the experience and skills the company ac-
quired, largely in tacit or unspoken form, as it overcame each major challenge. 
One of the benefits obtained by working with KI is the opportunity to send em-
ployees to be trained at KI’s facility in Jakarta.
PT Karya Padu Yasa has also a similar success story. The company has three 
plants, each with a specific production objective, namely for: 1) casting, princi-
pally hydrants and fire monitors; 2) incidental job orders, usually in small lots; 
and 3) a stamping process especially for large parts and automotive components. 
It began by making textile equipment and parts in Jakarta in the 1950s. After the 
company moved to Tegal, it diversified into making agricultural tools and ma-
chinery. While rapidly diversifying its product base, it improved its productive 
capability. Among the important achievements of the company was the develop-
ment of the casting capability to produce hydrants. Hydrant manufacturing was 
driven by a government contract. At the peak of production, the company made 
around 200 units per month.
One major milestone for the company was to be selected as one of the few 
local prime suppliers for heavy equipment not only for KI but also for NR. Fur-
thermore, because of its ability to deliver the products in timely fashion with 
consistent acceptable quality, PT Karya Padu Yasa’s base of product lines in the 
heavy equipment business expanded rapidly. However, the company manufac-
tures fewer items compared to PT Prima Karya for both KI and NR.
Recently, a sign of positive growth emerged as hydrant orders began to increase 
to 10-20 per month, with a similar increase in orders from KI and NR. However, 
because of the arrangement under which payments are sent only after the final 
products are manufactured and delivered, the company suffers from shortages of 
working capital, especially after the substantial layoff of workers.
Th e company has ample facilities for metalworking operations, which range from 
casting to welding to fi nishing. What is more impressive, however, is the company’s 
ability to make an increasingly complex range of products as it acquires experience 
over time. As noted previously, this ability was a key factor in being chosen as one 
of the regular suppliers of KI and NR. Th e company’s most recent accomplishment 
was its expansion into the manufacture of automobile components for an automak-
er. Th is move was soon followed by the construction of a plant dedicated to the 
stamping process. Th e company equipped the plant with its own dyes and fi xtures, 
and also set up a small crane to make a large heavy bottom piece for a tractor. It 
manufactures many of the machines and tools it uses in this plant. Its dedication to 
effi  ciency is also demonstrated by its eff orts to minimize waste from paint spraying 
by constructing six large fans directed at a pool of water to capture paint droplets. 
Th e stamping plant’s overall facilities are well organized and maintained.
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Finally, the company devotes considerable attention to skill development. It 
provides incentives to employees to participate in various training activities at 
other locations by covering their travel and accommodation expenses.
During the survey it was learned that larger and more modern workshops are 
more likely than their small counterparts to adopt new technologies in their bid 
to become subcontracting inti to KI. By building upon existing technical and 
managerial capacity, they are thus able to enter a virtuous circle where quality 
output leads to subcontracts which lead to private training provided by KI. Most 
of those who have been accepted as subcontractors for KI had worked before 
as employees for many years in KI or other MNCs in the same industry. It was 
found that only some SEs have indirect subcontracting with KI through a plasma 
relationship with its inti subcontractors.
For those who failed to become subcontractors, lack of capital, limited skill, 
and no access to information appeared to be the three most important constraints. 
Th ey did not have enough money to purchase the required machinery and to hire 
suffi  cient workers (generally, SEs are self-employment units without helpers or 
hired workers). Th ey often use second-hand or homemade equipment. If they hire 
workers, they are often low-skilled workers with little or no experience who rely 
on the shop owner’s technical knowledge.14 Since many SE owners built their ex-
pertise through working in small shops (and never worked in LEs/MNCs) and 
rarely have formal academic training, they have diffi  culties reading technical draw-
ings and instead rely on copying samples, which leads to less accurate output. So, 
they lack the technical experiences to produce complicated components with the 
precision required by LEs. Also, due to lack of information and skills, they did not 
know how to meet ISO standards. Th ey said during the interviews that from the 
government they could not expect too much. Th e government did give some infor-
mation, but they needed direct assistance too, which they had never received, or if 
they did it was often irregular, both from central and local government.
 major technology providers
In general, the technical capability of the Tegal metal industry has derived from 
a long history of family experience in metalworking or similar industries. Ac-
cumulated technical knowledge of over 20 years, since the first subcontracting 
activity started in the district, has sparked government activity to develop the 
metal working industry. They are now capable of producing various kinds of ag-
ricultural and industrial machinery, as well as automotive and ship components. 
However, the quality of most of their products is low. Only in a few firms whose 
core businesses cater to as the likes of KI does the need for consistent product 
quality become a concern. In such firms, the ability to translate technical draw-
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ings and to manufacture products according to listed or drawn specifications is 
actively developed (Iman and Nagata, 2002).
Tegal metal industry’s main external technology providers are LEs, mostly for-
eign affiliate companies such as KI to their subcontractors (inti workshops).15 
After winning a contract with KI, an inti subcontractor has access to a significant 
level of technical training. According to one subcontractor of KI, trainings di-
rectly addressed the technical needs of the workshop in meeting the production 
requirements of KI. Indonesian experts from the Jakarta Komatsu office leading 
the training used a teaching style that clearly delivered the necessary knowledge 
and emphasized practical application, with 90 of training time spent on hands-
on practicea. Trainers also help the workshop identify problems and troubleshoot.
However, according to the owners of the two KI’s inti workshops, the training 
does not seek to develop their capability to rise beyond their capacity as low-cost 
production centers for selected components. Moreover, KI does help them gain 
the capacity to manufacture component parts, but there has been little interest in 
upgrading from specialized parts manufacture to manufacture and assemblage of 
finished products.
For workshops which were rejected by KI as inti subcontractors, because they 
did not have the capacity to produce high-quality components (they did not 
have the required machinery, manpower, facilities), the only source of technol-
ogy or knowledge is from wholesalers/retailers by informing workshop owners 
about consumer preferences, demand, production methods, appropriate tech-
nology to be used and new innovations. The workshops generally sell the whole-
salers/retailers a limited range of simple final products, such as pulleys and ship 
windows. One workshop owner stated in the interview that the retailers created 
new products and commissioned them from the local small workshops. While 
for KI quality is the first priority, retailers generally emphasize low cost over 
quality. Some other interviewed workshop owners who sell their products only 
to retail markets said that strong competition among retailers inhibits knowl-
edge transfer and, instead, encourages the production of low-quality, inexpen-
sive products.
If they are lucky the workshops can become plasma for KI’s existing inti sub-
contractors and thus they can gain from the incentive to produce higher quality 
for a higher price with technical coaching from inti clients in their own virtuous 
circle. Inti respondents for auto components, for instance, turn to plasma work-
shops to produce some parts of their orders from KI, usually components of com-
ponents or basic parts made more cheaply in small workshops while still passing 
the quality control requirements of KI. Learning or technology transfer to plasma, 
not directly from KI but from KI’s inti subcontractors, takes place through qual-
ity control as inti subcontractors build a procedure for troubleshooting mistakes 
Do multinational companies transfer technology?
into their subcontracting relationships with their plasma workshops. Often soft 
loans are provided by inti to plasma to help them acquire new machines capable 
of higher quality output. In some cases, inti workshops support their former em-
ployees already familiar with these standards in starting up plasma.16
For workshops that have no subcontracting arrangements with KI or with KI’s 
inti subcontractors, the only source of technology is from government training 
programs and some technical assistance. In fact, both inti and plasma subcontrac-
tors also often use government sponsored facilities such as the UPT (a techni-
cal service unit, including laboratory), especially to test the quality of materials. 
They are able to offset lab usage costs through the higher price paid by LEs for 
quality parts.
 knowledge diffusions among workshops
In is often stated in the literature that the presence of MNCs is likely to have 
a positive impact on local firms in the host countries through transfer of tech-
nology only when the local firms have enough absorptive capacity, that is, they 
must have human resources with adequate skills and basic technical knowledge. 
Without these factors, MNCs can crowd out domestic firms with a technological 
gap that is too wide to bridge.17 However, in addition to this necessary condi-
tion, in order to materialize the spillover of technology transfer from MNCs in 
the receiving country, there should be undistorted knowledge diffusions among 
local firms, which can be in various forms, such as through production linkages 
or cooperation in R&D among local firms. Without this, only local firms having 
direct linkages with MNCs, which are often limited in number, will gain benefits. 
The transferred technology would not go further from the first recipient firms to 
other local firms.
Th ere are many factors which aff ect the extent and the speed of domestic diff u-
sion of technology among fi rms, and it is generally believed that the clustering of 
fi rms is one of the factors. A cluster can be defi ned as a geographical concentration 
of fi rms, not only from the same industries (for example, car, motorcycle and ma-
chinery industries) but also those operating in related industries (for instance, in-
dustries producing automotive components or spare parts) or sectors (for instance, 
banks, raw materials suppliers and trading companies). In the literature on indus-
trial clusters it is stated that through close cooperations among fi rms in a cluster, 
clustering can be a powerful means for diff usion of technology among fi rms.18
Existing literature on SME clusters in Indonesia shows, however, little evi-
dence of strong internal networks among firms inside the clusters. For instance, 
Sato (2000) found no interfirm specialization of work processes and no joint 
actions in technological development of in other aspects such as production, mar-
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keting and distribution among the firms inside the cluster studied. Supratikno 
(2001; 2002) also saw limited interfirm specialization and cooperation among 
producers inside the clusters. He concludes that the importance of a cluster for 
technology development as well as for production and marketing depends on 
whether there are leading/pioneering firms inside the cluster. These are usually 
larger and faster growing firms that are able to manage a large and differentiated 
set of relationships with firms and institutions both within and outside clusters. 
Such firms usually have utilized cutting-edge technologies in production.
In the Tegal case, it was found that interfirm linkages exist to a certain ex-
tent. Notably, producers in the cluster have a long tradition of collaboration in 
production as well as marketing and the procurement of raw materials. It is also 
indicated by the important role initiated by Takaru cooperative, a cooperative of 
producers in the cluster; though not all producers in the cluster are members of 
the cooperative. This cooperative was especially established to stimulate strategic 
alliance among them. This activity has a strong flavor of business and technol-
ogy which is based on market requirements and it has produced a hand tractor 
with own design for the domestic market. As quoted from Pantjadarma (2004): 
‘the manufacturing of the customized hand tractor is considered as a bonding 
agent for this collaboration’ (p. 20). The production of this hand tractor involves 
17 firms producing different parts. The Takaru cooperative organizes, assembles 
and performs quality control checks. The latter requires a certification process 
and this has to be conducted by other institutions including a government re-
search laboratory (Pantjadarma, 2004). Many of these producers involved had 
done subcontracting activities with foreign firms before. No doubt, as they said 
themselves, that their knowledge obtained from working with these foreign firms 
made them able to produce this hand tractor.
However, from the interviews, it appears that in general knowledge transfer 
among workshops in this Tegal cluster is often contingent on personal networks 
and conditioned by competition. Especially among workshops producing for the 
retail market, competition sometimes becomes ‘unhealthy’, which has the oppo-
site effect of inhibiting knowledge diffusion among them. For example, when a 
competing firm bought a shop owner’s driver after a marketing trip and sold it 
on with lower bids to the same potential clients. Many workshop owners were 
worried about the tactics of firms to reduce production costs, often at the ex-
pense of quality. Some workshops found the right combination of cheap scrap 
metals to get their products to pass buyers’ inspection standards, but these lower 
quality items wear out more quickly and do little to strengthen the reputation 
of the Tegal metalworking industry as a whole. This cost-cutting in turn creates 
price pressure forcing competing workshops to a race for the bottom in terms 
of quality.
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Some workshop owners stated that there was hesitancy among metalwork-
ers to share new and possibly advantageous technical knowledge, especially from 
producers who are working as inti or plasma subcontractors to MNCs to other 
producers outside their group. The same hesitancy was seen in giving too much 
training to employees. Ex-employees were likely to start up competing business-
es, as was the case with one interviewed workshop owner who lost 40 of his 
retail market share to ex-employees who began producing ship windows out of 
lower grade materials.
Marketing information is kept even more closely guarded. In addition to the 
tactics mentioned above, sometimes domestic market suppliers will come to the 
sentra and play the workshops off against each other, using their proximity and 
lack of specialization to engage them in competitive price cutting. The inter-
viewed owner of PT Karya Padu Yasa, one of the district’s most successful metal 
workshops in both subcontracting and retail production, explained that lack of 
trust and mutual suspicion between metalworkers was the main constraint to the 
development of metalworks and was the reason for the lack of growth in metal-
workers’ associations.
 the role of the government
Tegal district government has demonstrated a high level of awareness of the im-
portance of enhanced knowledge and skills to improve the competitiveness of lo-
cal metalworking shops. It has attempted to both facilitate direct training as well 
as build up supporting institutions that can assist firms, and lower information 
costs among firms. The district government has currently partnered with outside 
institutions, including strong partnerships with the Central Government’s Indo-
nesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) and 
with an NGO, Yayasan Dana Bakti Astra (YDBA). Since 2001, the majority of 
training provided by the district government has focused on technical subjects 
or technical quality management processes. Especially for plasma without direct 
subcontracting links with LEs and retail market workshops, local government-
facilitated technical training remains the only source of technical information 
outside the past experience of the workshop owners. But, many inti owners who 
receive only limited management training from LEs also participated in govern-
ment training. Maybe it can be said that a concrete example of the role of local 
government is the case of the production of the hand tractor organized by the 
Takaru cooperative, as explained before, which enjoyed strong support from local 
government officials (Pantjadarma, 2004).
However, from the interviews and focus group discussions, it appears that 
training provided by KI has proven to be the most successful method of efficient-
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ly transferring knowledge to its inti workshops. While government-led initiatives 
attempt to cover a broader range of workshops, this did not result in the efficient 
transfer of high-quality, usable knowledge to inti workshops. According to re-
spondents who participated in government training, these activities were poorly 
targeted, often exceeding their skills or not suitable for the available machinery 
or conversely focusing on skills they had already mastered. Those who did obtain 
training initiated by LEs state that private training materials are very suitable for 
improving their business. It is revealed from focus group discussions and inter-
views with local government representatives and some local NGO, that lack of 
sufficient funds, a small number of skilled staff dedicated to the effort, and weak 
feedback mechanisms between government and metalworking shops are other 
important factors that made these government trainings not very successful at 
systemically improving the skills of local firms.
In 1997, the district government opened a new laboratory and a polytechnic as 
part of the technical service unit (UPT) inside the cluster to enhance the ability of 
the subcontracting workshops to produce with precision. The first government-
funded UPT lab opened in 1982. There the metalworking cluster was able to ac-
cess the machines necessary to fill their orders. But, many respondents complain 
that the UPT was not able to keep up with technical advances. All the four KI’s 
inti workshops rarely use the UPT facilities. They said that the facilities are ag-
ing and that there are many associated business management problems. They 
especially needed technical support for heat treatment and moulds, but the UPT 
could not provide that, so they do the work by themselves with the help from KI. 
In other words, KI provides better technical services to them than the UPT does.
Th is evidence of the relatively weak performance of UPT in the Tegal cluster 
is supported by evidence from many other studies. For instance, from his observa-
tions on the importance of UPT in many SME clusters in Indonesia, Dierman 
(2004) notes that: 1) types of services are highly supply-oriented rather than de-
manddriven; 2) most of the machines and equipment are outdated. Originally, 
UPT in SME clusters were supplied with modern technological machines and 
equipment. However, over the years, especially after the economic crisis in 1997-
1998, budget constraints have prevented the replacement of the existing equip-
ment; 3) services have been delivered indiscriminately to clusters; 4) the staff  of 
the UPT had not had the appropriate training to respond to entrepreneurs’ needs; 
and 5) there was not great enough fl exibility in the system to respond to the chang-
ing needs of SMEs, possibly due to the bureaucratic structure of the UPT.
By the end of the 1990s, a number of initiatives were implemented in the clus-
ter, including the launch of an initial campaign to introduce information and 
communication technology as an enabling tool to accelerate the technological up-
grading process. The campaign was supported by the Information Unit for Small 
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Businesses and Cooperatives (UIUKK) located within the Regional Office of 
Department of Trade and Industry vicinity led by a highly dedicated government 
official. This was led by the Takaru Cooperatives with assistance from a mechani-
cal engineer with strong ICT capabilities. At the moment, there is one Inter-
net Service Provider in Tegal (wasantara.net) offering a discounted subscription 
price for the Tegal SME community (Pantjadarma, 2004).
3.5 Concluding remarks
There is a huge amount of literature on technology transfer and the role of MNCs 
in it. However, the literature mainly focuses on LEs, or there is no explicit dis-
tinction between LEs and SMEs. In other words, knowledge on what role MNCs 
play in technology transfer to SMEs and under what conditions these MNCs 
play such a role, especially in developing countries, is rather limited. This Indo-
nesian story, therefore, may contribute to close the gap in the literature.
This Indonesian story comes with microevidence from the Tegal case which 
shows that MNCs do play an important role as a source of technology transfer 
to SMEs in developing countries, through two main channels. First, via subcon-
tracting arrangements: KI has functioned as the most important source of tech-
nology to, at least, its inti subcontractors and, indirectly, its plasma suppliers. 
No doubt this MNC has played an important role in improving technology and 
hence the production capabilities of PT Prima Karya and PT Karya Padu Yasa, 
as its main local suppliers. Second, via transfer of labor: local workshops accepted 
as subcontractors for KI had worked as employees in KI or other foreign affiliate 
companies before.
However, only a few workshops are able to become local subcontractors to KI, 
and small enterprises in particular are largely excluded from direct transfer of 
technology from KI, since this MNC (and other foreign companies in general) 
is more likely to subcontract parts of its production to local firms which already 
have a certain level of technology capability. This means that the presence of FDI 
in an industry in a developing country does not automatically lead to technology 
improvement in SMEs in that industry. It depends on the readiness of SMEs to 
absorb advanced technologies brought by FDI. In other words, the more technol-
ogy absorptive capacity the local SME have, the more benefit they will gain from 
the presence of FDI-based companies.
Thus, the findings from the Tegal case may suggest that currently, within 
SMEs, MEs are abler to gain benefit from the presence of MNCs than their 
smaller counterparts, as MEs are abler to meet requirements to become sub-
contractors. If this evidence represents the current situation in developing 
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countries that only a few SMEs are ready to become local suppliers for MNCs, 
then technology transfer from MNCs will be limited only to a small portion 
of SMEs in developing countries. Consequently, the presence of MNCs will 
result in an increased technology gap and hence development dualism within 
SMEs. Here then, the role of the government is crucial. Its SMEs development 
programs should focus on capacity-building in less technological advanced 
SMEs. Also, to have an optimal spillover effect, a strong cooperation between 
the few SMEs as the first technology recipients and the rest of SMEs should 
be in place and, here again, the role of the government is very important as the 
main facilitator.
 Notes
 As generally realized, there is no universally accepted definition of technology. The most 
common approaches define technology as ‘a collection of physical processes that trans-
form inputs into outputs and the knowledge and skills that structure the activities in-
volved in carrying out these transformations’ (Kim, , p. ), or as stated in Rosenberg 
and Frischtak (), that technology is a quantum of knowledge resulting from the ac-
cumulated experience in design, production and investment activities that is retained by 
individual teams of specialized personnel. This knowledge is mostly tacit and often (is) 
not made explicit in blueprints or manuals. So, technology and knowledge will be used 
interchangeably in this chapter.
 See for example Islam (), Blomström and Sjöholm (), Nelson and Pack (), 
Saggi (), Morcos (), Thee Kian Wie (), UNCTAD (), Yusuf (, 
), and Yusuf et al. ().
 Most literature on technology transfer from MNCs to developing countries focus on large 
enterprises (LEs), or they do not make a distinction between SMEs and LEs. There are 
only very few studies on technology transfer to SMEs, which include Islam () and 
Marcotte and Niosi ().
 See for example, Kim (), Thee (), Yusuf () and Saggi () for a survey of 
literature.
 See for example, Marcotte and Niosi (), Yusuf () and Saggi () for a survey 
of literature.
 See for example, Kim (; ), Nelson and Pack (), Yusuf (), and Hsueh 
().
 The economic rationale behind the local content policy was to create a captive market 
for domestic products in order to increase the economic scale of production and thereby 
to increase efficiency. However, government interference went too far. The government 
decided which products were to get priority in this policy and introduced fiscal incentives 
in line with the type of priority recipient products. The determination of priorities does 
not always appear to have been on economic considerations, such as SMEs’ capacity for 
investment and absorption of technology.
 See also among others, Saggi (), Rajan (), Palit (), and Palit and Nawani 
().
Do multinational companies transfer technology?
 This case study was part of a research project on Rural Investment Climate Assessment 
(RICA) in Indonesia for the period -, which was one output of World Bank’s 
Indonesian Poverty Team (INDOPOV). The project was financed by the World Bank-
Netherlands Trust Fund for Institutional Development and Capacity Building and the 
DFID Poverty Reduction Partnership Trust Fund. The Tegal survey was conducted by 
the author, as the main researcher, together with Stefan Nachuk, as the team leader, and 
Agni Paramita and Nunik Yunarti as two main surveyors. The findings of the survey were 
first published as a consultative draft by the World Bank in July  (World Bank, ).
 These two subsectors were selected by the local government for intensive assistance based 
on existing competency in terms of access to ‘key markets’, quality management systems, 
and able and willing to cooperate with other workshops.
 By the end of the s, KI occupied the first rank with a  share of sales and played 
an indispensable role in the localization of production. KI also fulfills a crucial role in 
Komatsu’s international business strategy, as it serves as a construction machinery pro-
duction base along with Komatsu’s facilities in the USA, Brazil, Germany and the UK, 
and conducting global sourcing with other production bases (Iman and Nagata, ).
 KI as many other LEs require their subcontractors to be a PT (Limited Liability Com-
pany) not a CV (a Limited Partnership not involving a legal person and personal assets 
are liable for obligations).
 The interviewed representatives of these two inti subcontractors said that their reputa-
tion and personal network was also a critical factor for their successful bid to become 
subcontractors. However, they have insisted that the opportunity to become KI subcon-
tractors was open for every workshop in the cluster as long as they could prove themselves 
to be capable of meeting the quality requirements asked by KI. KI has periodically opened 
other competitions for new inti. 
 Cheap labor and relatively small, shifting job orders reduces incentives for them to special-
ize or acquire expensive machinery to increase productivity. As one seasoned metalworker 
explained, the strength of the plasma workshop is the flexibility to do smaller orders. 
However, this flexibility becomes a liability to capacity development when workshops 
must fill many small orders and never develop specialization that leads to an expanded 
command of technology. 
 Japanese companies are sometimes accused of being more centralized than firms from 
other countries and are therefore less inclined to share knowledge with local firms in the 
host countries. This was also the main reason, as officially stated, for the Indonesian gov-
ernment during the Suharto era to build the national car industry ‘Timor’ in cooperation 
with Kia Motor Company, South Korea. However, due to increasing production costs and 
competition pressures, Japanese MNCs have become more reliant on local suppliers, and, 
in order to have local components with their required quality standard, Japanese MNCs 
have become more open to knowledge-sharing with their local suppliers. 
 The owner of PT Karya Padu Yasa explained that his company received useful technical 
coaching as part of a quality control process conducted upon delivery of his product to 
this PT. In a case of knowledge spillover, his firm applied some of these technical lessons 
not only to his subcontracting operations, but also to the production of retail market 
goods.
 See for example, Rajan (), Palit () and Palit and Nawani (). 
 See for example, Sandee (), Sandee and ter Wingel () and Tambunan ().
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4 African small and medium enterprises and the 
challenges in global value chains
 Th e case of Nigerian garment enterprises
Osmund Osinachi Uzor
4.1 Introduction
The increased intensity of economic globalization supported by the fallen barri-
ers to entry in production has pressured countries to improve their capabilities 
in industrial activities. The globalization process has accelerated the growth of 
world imports and exports as well as increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
across borders since the 1980s. The concept of Global Value Chains (GVCs) 
refers to the interrelated production activities performed by firms at different 
geographic locations. The interrelated activities offer opportunities for local pro-
ducers to learn from the global leaders of the chains. The internal governance of 
the value chain significantly affects the scope of local firms’ upgrading (Giuliani 
et al., 2005). Multinational Corporations (MNCs) play an important role in the 
GVCs. The MNCs are involved in the global production and outsourcing net-
works that facilitate linkages. They engage in subcontracting or joint venture ac-
tivities with local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and have the ability to 
source products and services from a variety of vendors at various stages of their 
operations (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 1). In some cases, the MNCs take active steps 
in upgrading the capabilities of their suppliers for efficient delivery of services 
(UNIDO, 2004, p. 5).
With exemption of South Africa, SMEs in sub-Saharan Africa are marginal-
ized in GVCs because they lack the potential individually to improve perfor-
mance. The aim of this chapter is not only to show why sub-Saharan SMEs are 
marginalized from the GVCs but also to analyze the challenges the SMEs in the 
region face in order to be integrated in the GVCs. The chapter also provides the 
analytical framework on how MNCs can impact transformation in African SMEs 
using the global value chains approach. The chapter is divided into six sections. 
The next section provides the methodology of the study while section three fo-
cuses on the literature review and the theoretical framework of the study. Section 
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four provides the relationship between GVCs and upgrading while section five 
focuses on the capabilities of Aba garment producers, how MNCs can impact 
growth in garment industries in Nigeria as well as the challenges the garment 
producers face for possible integration in the GVCs. Section six concludes the 
chapter and provides GVCs-specific recommendations.
4.2 Th e methodological limitations
The analysis of this chapter is based on the assumptions that sub-Saharan coun-
tries can be integrated in the international production networks if they have the 
capability to upgrade and diversify their primary commodity products (Uzor, 
2007, p. 273). It is also based on the assumption that competitiveness of small 
enterprises is a function of capital stock and level of technological application 
within the firm (Lall, 2001, p. 1509).1 The chapter reviews some literature related 
to GVCs, Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) and analyzes the capabilities of 
the Nigerian garment producers. In analyzing the capabilities of the SMEs gar-
ment producers in Nigeria, three indicators were used to assess the local com-
petitiveness of garment producers. The indicators are the educational level of the 
enterprise’s heads and workers, the level of skilled workforce and the nature of 
technology.
In examining the technological application in garment production, the equip-
ment was classified into secondhand machines only, new machines only, and a 
mixture of new and old machines. This provides the basis for analyzing the rela-
tionship between the quality of the skills of the workforce, technology, product 
output and quality. The technology root in the firms sampled is assumed to be 
zero since all equipment is externally imported. There are no firms reported to be 
using locally produced machines. There is no evidence of direct linkage with the 
local textile industry or foreign buyers. This would suggest that garment produc-
tion in Nigeria depends on import and may imply that change in trade policy may 
affect firm performance.
The empirical analysis of this chapter is partly based on the primary data col-
lected from field study which contains a wide range of data. Due to the complex-
ity of the subject, limited research data on GVCs in Nigeria and lack of effective 
channels of communication in Nigeria, data collection from 60 entrepreneurs 
and their workers in Aba, in Abia state of Nigeria, was done using face to face 
interviews and discussions. To validate information, discussions and interviews 
were conducted with private and public institutions that promote the garment 
industry and SMEs in the city of Aba. Due to sensitivity of some factors and re-
action of the interviewees (for example profits and income), questions were con-
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stantly reframed and some were dropped in the process. One visit is not sufficient 
to generate reliable information, hence repeated visits were conducted in order 
to verify and validate information. The stratified sampling method was used be-
cause the populations are located in different parts of Aba city. It is appropriate to 
sample each subpopulation independently because stratification helped to group 
the enterprises in the population into relatively homogeneous subgroups before 
making a random sampling. In evaluating the pattern of the responses, the study 
did not apply econometrics techniques; instead the responses were presented in 
cross-tabulations showing the data analyses and the related outcomes.
4.3 Overviews of literature and theoretical background
4.3.1 Background literature
McCormick (1997) examined the economic activities of Kenya’s garment mar-
ket and its potential contribution in the country’s industrialization effort. The 
study revealed that there are extensive weak internal and external linkages in 
the industrial subsector. Interfirm specialization and division of labor are to-
tally lacking. In a few cases, the interfirm linkages are informal in nature. The 
producer-trader relation in the garment market is centered on access to market 
information. There is poor coordination and implementation of national policy 
on small enterprises due to poor institutional support and lack of infrastructure 
needed for market development. McCormick argued that productivity of the 
small enterprises in the garment production would have been strengthened if 
large and small firms in the garment industry in Kenya could explore the pos-
sibilities of mutual benefits in subcontracting relationships. The implication of 
her argument is that if the small producers of garments in Africa can undertake 
product and process upgrading, the possibility of engaging in subcontracting 
with global buyers can be feasible. Improving the quality of small firm output 
would become the subcontractor’s concern because quality enhancement re-
quires appropriate interventions.
Knorringa (1999) also used the international commodity chain approach to 
show the heterogeneity and trajectories of enterprises cluster in Agra, India. The 
analysis shows the differences between the market channel and the global com-
modity chain. The former according to the author illustrates the scenario where 
traders, producers and other relevant units are linked in the production and 
distribution of particular products to a specific market segment. Knorringa ex-
plains how international manufacturers and traders incorporate producers from 
developing countries in the supply chain. The study revealed that the market 
channels of a producer and producer’s performance is significantly related. In 
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other words, market channels that involve value chains tend to enhance produc-
ers’ productivity.
In analyzing the trend in international trade and industrial upgrading in the 
apparel commodity chain, Gereffi (1999) used the concept of global commod-
ity chains to explain the difference between buyer-driven and producer-driven 
global commodity chains. The buyer-driven commodity chains according to Ger-
effi refers to those industries in which large retailers, brand marketers, and brand 
manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized production net-
works in a variety of exporting countries typically located in developing countries. 
Producer-driven commodity chains are those in which large firms, especially the 
multinational manufacturers, play the central role in coordinating production 
networks. The producer-driven chains are capital- and technology-intensive in-
dustries normally found in industrialized countries. The manufacturers in pro-
ducer-driven chains have the ability to exert control over backward and forward 
linkages existing in the chain structure. The buyer-driven commodity chains on 
the other hand are characterized with highly competitive, locally owned, globally 
dispersed production systems (Gereffi, 1999, p. 43).
The UNIDO’s (2001) report on integrating SMEs in global value chains rec-
ognized the role SMEs can play in promoting industrial and economic develop-
ment in developing countries. The report prepared by Kaplinsky and Readmann 
emphasized the importance of capacity upgrading in terms of product, process, 
functional and chain upgrading. The argument here is that MNCs have inte-
grated their production systems across the globe to ensure compatibility along 
the chains (Kapinsky and Readmann, 2001, p. 31). The implication here is that 
for local SMEs in the region to be integrated in GVCs, the policymakers in the 
region have to restructure their industrial development strategies towards capa-
bility upgrading.
Bair and Gereffi (2001) analyzed the dynamics of industrial transformation in 
Torreon, Mexico after the creation of the North American Free Trade Associa-
tion (NAFTA). The analytical framework is based on the concepts of Industrial 
District and GCC. The findings revealed that inserting the firms in Torreon in 
the GCC led to upgrading and improving performance. Consequently, firms in 
the district moved from a full-package production system that lacked the capac-
ity for process upgrading to GCC that set conditions for quality upgrading. This 
subsequently led to an export and employment boom in the region.
Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) analyzed the governance in global value chains 
and showed how firms in the chains set and/or enforce the quality parameters 
under which others in the chain must follow and operate. The analysis suggests 
that even when developing countries liberalize their markets, entry to the global 
value chains or access to external markets is not automatic. The essence of gov-
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ernance in the GVCs therefore is to ensure that the necessary quality systems are 
in place. The main function of the governance structure is to transmit informa-
tion about the quality parameters and enforce compliance.
UNIDO (2004) applied the GVC and Global Production Network (GPN) 
approaches in analyzing the opportunities for and challenges in industrial up-
grading. The analysis is centered on the opportunities created for local firms in 
the GVCs and GPNs. The former refer to the ability to source products and 
services from different vendors across the globe. The latter concern production 
networks with interconnected functions and operations across borders through 
which goods and services are produced and distributed. Such networks support 
integration of firms into structures and the national economies to reap enormous 
economic advantages derived from GVCs. In general, participation in the GVCs 
and GPNs broadens the scope of access to international trade and attract invest-
ment in the local market.
Kudi, Akpoko and Abdulsalam (2007) used the local commodity chain ap-
proach to identify and analyze the constraints in production and marketing pro-
cesses in the cotton production in Nigeria. The analysis shows the impact of com-
modity marketing processes that change from the peasant farmers, merchants, 
spinning industries to textile and export. Uzor (2007) also analyzed the local 
value chain in Palm Kernel Oil extraction in Nigeria. The analysis showed how 
the rural and urban economies are integrated in a production process in order to 
add values and create wealth.
The OECD (2008) report on the role of SMEs in GVCs shows why firms 
in developed and developing countries need to meet specifications in terms of 
international standards and systems. The report argues that strategic partners 
should meet future demand because the quality of the relationship between in-
ternational contractors, partners and suppliers are crucial in global value chains. 
In other words, a sustainable linkage between SMEs and MNCs is one of the 
most effective ways to integrate domestic suppliers into GVCs. The challenge 
facing SMEs in Africa is how to meet international standards and be part of the 
GVC systems. OECD (2008) further argues that participation of SMEs in de-
veloping countries in GVCs will generate numerous advantages for the firms and 
economies in general. The advantages comprise entry to foreign markets, earn-
ings of foreign currencies, diversification of exports to the upgrading of skills and 
knowledge of the local workers as well as improving technological applications 
production. Such advantages are necessary for productivity enhancement and 
economic growth. In this context, the challenge facing the policymakers in Africa 
is how garment producers in the region can improve capabilities and have access 
to the chains’ lead firms, either directly as a first-tier supplier (or subaltern), or 
indirectly as a second-tier supplier.
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4.3.2 Th eoretical background
Th e concept of value chain is based on Porter’s (1985) idea of manufacturing (or 
service) as an organization system comprising subsystems that involve inputs, 
transformation processes and outputs. Th e activities carried out in the value chain 
determine the costs which have eff ects on the organization’s profi ts. Th e activities 
are classifi ed into primary and supportive. Th e primary activities are those that en-
able the fi rm to fulfi l its role in the value and to satisfy customers’ desires. Th e sup-
portive activities are the necessary activities that are aimed at improving business 
performance over time and at the same time add values indirectly (OECD, 2008). 
Value chain can be defi ned as the process which is required to bring a product or 
service from its conception, through the intermediary phases of production, then 
delivery to the fi nal consumers and to fi nally be disposed off  after use (Kaplinsky, 
2000, p. 121). OECD (2008, p. 9) argues that an organization can gain a com-
petitive advantage over its competitors if it can manage eff ectively the entire value 
chain. A value chain can be contained within a single fi rm or divided among diff er-
ent fi rms which can be contained within a single geographical location or spread 
over wider areas. Th e GVC concerns value chains that are divided among multiple 
fi rms and spread across wide geographic space (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). 
How to reduce uncertainty has been the most critical aspect of GVCs. To reduce 
uncertainty in the entire value chain system, there is a need for value chain ‘govern-
ance’. Governance in this context implies all eff orts directly or indirectly that are 
aimed at reducing any form of uncertainty in the system. Th e major objective of 
the governance in the GVC is to maintain an eff ective cooperation among the key 
actors in the chain. Firms or groups of fi rms can defi ne and enforce the param-
eters for the operations in the value chains such that sustainability of transactions 
within the chains can eff ectively be maintained (OECD, 2008, p. 9).
There is a conceptual difference between the global value chains and global 
commodity chains. The GCC consist of sets of interorganizational networks 
clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises and 
states to one another within the world economy (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994, 
p. 2). GVC analysis focuses on cross-border linkages between firms in global pro-
duction and distribution systems. It also laid emphasis on governance through 
non-market relations which is an important factor that aids generation, transfer 
and diffusion of knowledge for firms to improve their performance and to up-
grade (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004, p. 97). Both GVCs and GCCs emphasize 
the importance of product quality upgrading (Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001, p. 
29; Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003, p. 4). GVCs proponents argue that for SMEs 
in the developing countries to maintain increased income as globalization pres-
sure persists, they must upgrade by increasing the skill content of their activities 
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(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, p. 1018). Th e role by governance in the upgrading 
of local fi rms is to coordinate the economic activities through non-market rela-
tionships with the aim to facilitate relations with the external world (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2002, p. 1018). Under the GVCs framework, upgrading can occur 
through learning by doing or by allocation of new tasks by the chain’s leading fi rm.
Inserting African SMEs garment producers in the global value chain requires an 
institutionalized framework that encourages learning. Such a framework requires 
measures geared towards creation of awareness and understanding the structure 
and dynamics of GVCs across fi rms and sectors. GVC is a complex confi guration 
and SMEs in Africa have limited information about how the value chain operates: 
there is a need for eff ective GVC ‘brokers’. Th e main functions of the brokers are to 
identify the sectoral and branch specifi c positions, the capability level for African 
SMEs participation and the structure of the linkages. Moreover, African SMEs 
lack the fi nancial resources, in-house technological capability to upgrade and the 
managerial capability necessary in complex global production networks. It is the 
function of the value chain brokers to source the funds, and initiate and organize 
measures to reduce the capability gaps in the SMEs. Furthermore, eff ective par-
ticipation in GVCs requires eff ective government intervention in the area of skill 
upgrading and regulatory framework on intellectual property rights (IPRs).
4.4 Global value chains and the challenges in upgrading African 
small and medium enterprise garment producers
Upgrading along the value chain can be, for example, in the form of moving from 
cotton production to textile manufacturing or garment manufacturing. In the 
garment industry, upgrading can follow a systematic process in terms of moving 
from ordinary equipment manufacture (OEM) to ordinary design manufacture 
(ODM), or from ODM to ordinary brand manufacture (OBM). OEM is full 
package production in which the supplier takes on a broader range of manufac-
turing functions, including sourcing of inputs and logistics, while the buyer is re-
sponsible for designing and marketing. In ODM the supplier carries out parts of 
the design process, possibly in collaboration with the buyer. Upgrading to OBM 
implies that the supplier undertakes designing and producing, as well as market-
ing its own products under its own brand (Humphrey, 2004, p. 7). The idea of 
upgrading refers to how to improve and make better products more efficiently or 
move into more skilled activities as put forward by literature on competitiveness 
(Porter, 1990; Kaplinsky, 2000). In general, upgrading is strictly related to inno-
vation which involves process, product and organizational innovation. Upgrading 
as innovating can be defined as to increase value added. Enterprises may achieve 
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this in various ways, for example by entering higher unit value market niches, by 
entering new sectors, or by undertaking new productive (or service) functions 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, p. 1018). This requires gradual improvement of 
products and processes, and continued and consistent investment in technologi-
cal capabilities (Lall, 1992, p. 9; Pietrobelli, 1998, p. 16). Innovation is relative in 
the sense that a firm or a cluster of firms upgrade when they innovate faster than 
their competitors. This involves reorganizing activities, products and sectors in 
order to sustain higher value added and enforce higher entry barriers (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2000, p. 3).
Process upgrading is the process of transforming inputs into outputs more 
efficiently by reorganizing the production system or introducing superior tech-
nology (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000, p. 3). The transformation that took place 
in footwear producers in Sinos Valley, Brazil, can be taken as an example. The 
firms in the cluster reorganized their production system that adopted a just-in-
time production system in terms of reliability and faster production. The firms 
overcome competitive pressure and market their products quicker than the com-
petitors (Schmitz, 1999, p. 1628). Product upgrading is moving into more sophis-
ticated product lines in terms of increased unit values (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2000, p. 4). For example, the apparel commodity chain in Asia was upgraded from 
discount chains to department stores (Gereffi, 1999, pp. 6-7). Functional upgrad-
ing is acquiring new, superior functions in the chain, such as design or marketing 
or abandoning existing low value-added functions to focus on higher value-added 
activities (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000, p. 4). For example, Torreon’s blue jeans 
industry was upgraded from maquila (in bond plants) to ‘full-package’ export-
oriented apparel production (Bair and Gereffi, 2001, p. 1892).
Figure 4.1 shows the annual cotton production output in four selected African 
countries. As shown in the figure, the output in Egypt declined drastically from 
2428 lb. bales in 1980 to 920 lb. bales in 2003 (62.1) but increased from 920 lb. 
bales in 2003 to 1050 lb. bales in 2007 (12.4). In Mali, the second largest pro-
ducer of cotton in Africa after Egypt, cotton production output increased from 
37 lb. bales in 1967 to 775 lb. bales in 1995. The production output declined from 
775 lb. bales in 1995 to 480 lb. bales in 2000 (38.1) and subsequently increased 
from 480 lb. bales in 2000 to 1200 lb. bales in 2003 (150) but fell from 1200 lb. 
bales in 2003 to 475 lb. bales in 2007. In Cameroon, the production output has 
shown a dynamic growth from 1960 to 2004, which represents the turning point. 
The annual production output declined from 500 lb. bales in 2004 to 275 lb. bales 
in 2007 (45). In Nigeria, the cotton production output is not relatively stable. 
Between 1960 and 1975 the output declined from 260 lb. bales in 1960 to 180 lb. 
bales in 1970 (30.8) but increased from 180 lb. bales in 1970 to 280 lb. bales in 
1975 (55.6) and declined to its lowest of 46 lb. bales in 1985.
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Figure 4.1 Cotton production in some selected African countries, lb. Bales
Source: USAD, 2009
As shown in Figure 4.2, the cotton export followed the same pattern of pro-
duction output with Egypt losing its export position to Mali between 1990 and 
2006. Nigeria on the other hand recorded zero export in the cotton subsector 
between 1975 and 1995. Several factors led to the decline in output of cotton in 
Africa. In Mali, the devaluation of the currency produced a positive impact on 
the production and export of cotton. This was jeopardized by a world price drop 
in 2000-2001, as well as increasing the subsidization of local production in USA 
and China. Consequently, the cotton price plunged from 91 cents per pound on 
average in 1994-1995 to 52 cents per pound in 2004-2005 (USDA, 2005).









































































 Osmund Osinachi Uzor
Nigeria has lost its competition and comparative advantage in cotton production 
and export arguably due to overdependency on the oil sector. The challenge Ni-
geria is facing is how to upgrade and insert its SME garment manufacturer in the 
GVCs. It is imperative for Nigeria to redirect its industrial development strate-
gies towards upgrading the garment industrial subsector and take advantage of 
its labor surplus. As argued by Krugman (1996), countries are bound to benefit 
economically from international specialization, provided that it is consistent with 
their pattern of comparative advantages.
Furthermore, Nigerian government trade policies can affect the aims of GVCs. 
For example, the structure of tariffs indicate the level of protection or the level at 
which competition is stimulated in the economy. The 1995-2001 tariff structure 
in Nigeria was designed to stimulate competition and efficiency by reducing tar-
iffs on consumer goods items relative to tariffs on raw materials and intermedi-
ate and capital goods. The aim of the government to reduce tariffs was to expose 
domestic manufacturers to import competition (World Bank, 2002, p. 10). The 
relatively higher tariffs on raw materials were aimed at encouraging investment 
into raw materials and intermediate goods production. This was counter-pro-
ductive because the Nigerian government failed to encourage investment in raw 
material research. However, the level of protection in Nigeria has reduced to a 
certain degree but generally, the tariffs are still high compared to world averages 
(World Bank, 2002, p. 10). In 2005, the tariff binding coverage was 19.2 of 
total imports.2 The simple average of ad valorem duties for Most Favored Na-
tion (MFN) applied in 2006 for all goods and agricultural goods were 12 and 
15.6 respectively, while the tariff for non-agricultural goods was 11.4 (Trade 
Policy Review, 2005). The implication of high tariffs above the world averages 
in a GVCs framework is that the cost of inputs for locally manufactured com-
modities will rise, thereby affecting the competitiveness of the garment products 
in the chain negatively.
4.5 Th e capabilities of small and medium enterprises in garment 
producers in Aba
4.5.1 Historical background
Garment manufacturing in Aba is directly linked to migrants from Bende com-
munities and has a history dating back to colonial times. Bende is a colonial 
district in the eastern region of Nigeria located in the present northeastern part 
of Abia State, Nigeria. The formation of a garment manufacturing cluster in 
Aba town began when migrants with specialized skills in weaving and tailoring 
expanded in the area that was settled by Bende indigenes. The workshops were 
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located within the residential areas of the entrepreneurs which later formed the 
nucleus of the cluster (Meagher, 2005, p. 8).3 Vocational training in weaving 
and sewing initiated by early missionaries for women in the Bende provided 
the background skill development in tailoring. The traditional cotton-producing 
areas in the northwestern subregion of Nigeria are Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, 
Sokoto and Kebbi states. The cotton production in the northern states of Ni-
geria is the main supplier of yarns to the traditional ‘Akwete’ women weavers in 
Aba since the early 1900s. By 1946 about 668 women weavers were producing 
high-grade cotton cloth in the southeastern region of Nigeria (Chuku, 2005, p. 
138). Other weaving centers in the then eastern provinces were located at Nsuk-
ka, Udi and Abakilki (Chuku, 2005, p. 141). The imported high-quality yarns 
reduced the demand of locally produced yarn from northern Nigeria. Increased 
demand of western-style garment production led to a decline of the Akwete 
weavers’ products.
4.5.2 Competitive factors in Aba small and medium scale garment 
enterprises cluster
Economists consider competitiveness based on a macroeconomic framework in 
terms of real exchange rate, full employment, and persistent current account 
position. The measure of competitiveness in this context is the relative price or 
cost indices expressed in tradable currencies (Boltho, 1996, p. 3). The second 
consideration is based on the well-being of the citizens of a country (human 
capital stock) which has an effect on medium- and long-term economic perfor-
mance (Fagerberg, 1996, p. 40). The latter can be referred to as a competitive 
lag which Lall and Kraemer-Mbula (2005, pp. 55-56) considered a problem in 
African garment manufacturing. Firm upgrading as a result of innovative per-
formance depends on the educational attendance level of workers and the entre-
preneurs. Education is extremely important for innovation and growth because 
human capital plays an important role in technology diffusion (Baumol, 2004). 
This is also fundamental in GVC’s operation in terms of the level skill develop-
ment. As shown in Table 4.1, the educational level of enterprise heads did not 
change significantly with firm size. 67.2 of workers and enterprise heads of the 
total sample had attained primary education while 31.8 had attained secondary 
education.
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Only 2.9 of enterprise heads in microenterprises were educated beyond second-
ary school. Table 4.1 also shows that 70 and 65 of entrepreneurs in micro and 
small enterprises respectively had vocational training in tailoring.
Over the sample, 69.7 of the workers and entrepreneurs are trained tailors. 
The scenario however portrayed a different picture when the educational level 
of skilled tailors including the entrepreneurs and workers were considered. The 
total number of skilled tailors (including entrepreneurs and managers) expressed 
as a percentage of the total number of those who attained primary and second-
ary education is 71.7 and 65.5 respectively. Expressed as a percentage of the 
total sample, 48.2 of the skilled tailors attained primary education while 20.8 
received secondary education.
Table 4.2 shows the technological base and linkages in and nature of innova-
tive activities in the Aba garment enterprises cluster. The use of old and outdat-
ed machines as opposed to new machines results in financial limitations for the 
firms. Low investment in modern technology has led to high internalization of 
production and weak firm linkages in the sector, as well as poor product output. 
Table 4.1 Educational level of entrepreneurs and workers expressed in percentage of 
sample number across fi rm size







































































Note: * = expressed as percentage of the total number of those that had primary or secondary 
education; ** = expressed as percentage of sample total.
Source: Uzor, 2009
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This suggests that firms in the cluster lack the required technological capability 
for effective operation as required in the GVC. The process of innovation iden-
tified in the sector is such that entrepreneurs and traders organize and control 
the distribution of garment products within established market channels to 
reduce excess production. In general, the process innovation in the clusters is 
associated with problems similar to ‘around the edges’ and ‘black box’ syndrome. 
The former suggests that the authorities only perceive the entrepreneurship 
talent (outcome) but ignore the problems faced by the entrepreneurs. The latter 
means that authorities fail to understand the details of the innovative process 
in the clusters or what to do in order to upgrade the subsectors. Product in-
novation in the cluster is such that new product designs are introduced in the 
market using new raw materials. The innovative activity can be regarded as a 
survival strategy that keeps prices low in order to withstand competitive pres-
sure. The firm tried to reposition their survival strategy with a low degree of 
technical change which resulted in slow growth. The competitiveness in the 
Aba garment industry is based on a strategy that focuses on sales maximiza-
tion through closed networks. The implication here is that government policy 
should focus on factors that will increase productivity of the firms and access 
to technology to upgrade the sector for possible integration of the firms in the 
GVCs.
Table 4.2 The level of technology and linkages in clusters in the Aba garment industrial 
cluster
Upgrading variables Characteristics Remarks
Nature of
technology




Very weak linkages and 
internalization
Absence of institutional 
support
and technology linkages




Diff erent methods of 
supplying the market




New product designs and use 
of new materials




Closed networks Low degree of technical 
change
Source: Own fi eld survey
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The weak competitive capability in Nigeria’s garment manufacturing industry has 
implication for the general well-being and economic growth. Improved employ-
ment rates in the sector would have served as a means to reduce poverty. Nigeria 
will continue to experience the Dutch Disease since crude petroleum continues 
to be the dominant industrial output at the expense of manufacturing and other 
sectors. Nigeria has failed to diversify the economy from its overdependence on 
the capital-intensive oil sector which provides 20 of the country’s GDP, 95 of 
foreign earnings and about 65 of budgetary revenue. The share of the non-oil 
sector in total export has never been stable and currently lies below 6 (CBN, 
2007). The foreign earnings from the oil sector have resulted in raising incomes 
and inflation, which have a negative effect on the exchange rate and arguably has 
weakened the manufacturing sector.
4.5.3 Th e multinational corporations and growth in the Aba garment 
industry: A global value chain approach
The growth in the Aba garment industry can be measured in terms of higher 
wages and an employment increase. MNCs can impact growth in the subsec-
tor through linkages in respect to international subcontracting and joint venture 
activities. Table 4.3 highlights the income situation in Aba small enterprises gar-
ment production. There are no differences in wage earnings in micro and small 
enterprises in the subsector. Over the sample, the average cash earnings in gar-
ment enterprises are below the minimum wage of USD 50 for the private sector 
in Nigeria. Low wages in the garment industry suggests that the subsector cannot 
sustain employment and there is a need to upgrade the GVCs approach. Lack of 
internationalization of the Nigerian SMEs in the garment sector has resulted in 
poor product quality and improved value added. Several factors are responsible 
for the lack of internationalization of the sector. The major constraint is the limi-
tation of access to modern technology. The entrepreneurs failed to develop ex-
plicit strategies on how to access technology through international collaboration. 
Lack of technological development and diffusion in the subsector is a result of the 
absence of governmental and institutional support. The local institutions in the 
region have limited knowledge regarding international issues, on how to support 
firms, their marketing strategies on a global scale and how to be integrated in 
international subcontracting. Moreover, the SMEs in the region lack the financial 
capacity to engage in GVC processes because the cost of internationalization is 
relatively high.
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Apart from the barriers and challenges associated with internationalization, the 
SMEs face infrastructural and other growth constraints. Government and donor 
support play an important role in facilitating GVC. Th e growth problem in Aba’s 
small and medium scale garment enterprises is not only due to internal constraints 
but also due to several external factors facing the sub-sector. Entrepreneurs were 
asked to name the major factors that hinder production activities. Th e responses 
indicated common problems but divergent in perceptions. Figure 4.3 shows that 
89 of the entrepreneurs interviewed linked the problem of poor infrastructure 
to the case of neglect by the government authorities. Th e dilapidated nature of the 
access roads and frequent power failures essential for production are often cited as 
examples. More than 96.4 of the interviewees gave government trade policy as the 
reason for shortage of raw materials. Th ey argued that import restrictions on foreign 
inputs have paralyzed the production activities in Nigeria’s apparel industry. Most 
of the local textile industries were forced out of production due to the low quality of 
products that can no longer compete in current Nigeria’s fashion industry.
Figure 4.3 Distribution of interviewees’ perceptions of their major constraints in Aba SME 
garment enterprises cluster expressed in %
Source: Own fi eld survey
Table 4.3 Average monthly wage earnings of entrepreneurs and workers in Aba’s 
small and medium scale garment enterprises (in USD)4
Variables Micro Small Medium
Average wage earning of enterprises heads 77.52 77.52 116.27
Paid skilled workers 31.01 31.01 34.88
Paid unskilled workers 23.26 23.26 27.13
Apprentices allowance 7.75 7.75 0.0
Average cash earnings 34.89 34.89 44.57
Source: Uzor, 2009
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The interviewees were asked if liberalization measures had any effect on their 
firm performance. 92.9 of the interviewees insisted that the nature of techno-
logical application had been the major problem in the subsector. They argued 
that since their financial situation could not afford modern equipment, they had 
to rely on old secondhand equipment. 89.3 of the interviewees considered the 
shortage of skilled workers and the educational level of the skilled workers as a 
major problem. 85.7 of the entrepreneurs interviewed linked local demand of 
their products to price and quality such that those consumers who could not af-
ford foreign products resorted to locally produced ones. 71.4 of the interviewees 
insisted that product upgrading in the subsector was limited, partly due to finan-
cial constraints to acquire modern equipment and partly due to the present low 
level of the skilled workforce.
4.5.4 Integration of Nigerian small and medium enterprise garment 
producers in the global value chains
Integration of SMEs in the GVCs can be feasible through linkages with larger 
firms and global buyers. This is a potential benefit for the SMEs in Nigeria and 
for the country in global trade. The Aba SME garment producers face two chal-
lenges in order to engage in subcontracting with global buyers. The first is under-
standing the impact of international competition and how to engage in GVCs. 
The second is to understand how to engage process and product innovation by 
improving capabilities. The GVC approach will help the garment producers in 
the region to understand how strategic relationships with key external actors 
function. Integrating the SME garment producers in the region in the GVCs not 
only shifts the emphasis from manufacturing but is also significant for marketing 
and logistics. This includes distributing and marketing the supply of goods and 
services which contributes to an increased total value added (Wood, 2001).
As put forward by McCormick (1997), engaging with global buyers will not 
only increase the international division of labor and facilitate the access to market 
information for local garment producers, but will also force the garment produc-
ers in the region to engage in process and product upgrading. The question is 
how to strengthen the product and process upgrading in the subsector and how 
to link the Nigerian garment producers to global buyers. The first step would be 
to address numerous internal and external obstacles that limit the capability of 
the garment producers to upgrade. The barriers include poor internal capabilities 
and resources, as well as difficulties in identifying foreign business opportunities 
and accessing export distribution channels, followed by the removal of the barri-
ers to access the international market. Trade liberalization has increased the abil-
ity of well-established international manufacturers and retailers to penetrate the 
African small and medium enterprises
remote and underdeveloped market in Africa. Linking the local garment produc-
ers will compel them to conform to international standards. This requires invest-
ment technology in quality improvement and delivery which the GVCs demand. 
It also requires government provision of infrastructure and incentives that can 
induce FDI initiatives in the garment sector in Nigeria. Furthermore, network 
relationships that are not based on ownership serve as a mechanism of coordina-
tion between firms have gained importance in global value chains. Such networks 
where the lead firms act as governors in the chain help to set product and process 
standards, quality and terms of delivery (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004, p. 104).
4.6 Conclusions and recommendations
The African garment subsector is dominated by micro- and small enterprises 
operating in the informal economy as is indicated in the literature review and 
empirical analyses. Policies should focus on how the capability gap in micro and 
small enterprises can be narrowed so that linkages with large firms and global 
buyers can be feasible. The garment enterprises have failed to identify market 
niches effectively and cannot maintain the quality standard with the changing 
test. The internal constraints identified in the subsector are low-skilled workers 
and technology problems. The firms use obsolete machines with a high energy 
consumption rate. The linkages in garment enterprises are not innovative enough 
in finding solutions to the market changes so that they fail to achieve econo-
mies of scale. The entrepreneurs have not been able to forge collective action in 
order to improve quality so that access to large external buyers can be feasible. 
The government has not come up with any articulated policy incentives aimed at 
promoting garment manufacturing in Nigeria. In general, the value chain starts 
from the primary activities supported by supportive activities, hence upgrading 
the production output in the cotton subsector. Investment in new technology and 
human capital development are the fundamental determinants of integration of 
African countries and SMEs in the region in the GVCs and GPNs.
New policy design is necessary to promote integration of African SME gar-
ment producers in the GVCs. Several policy options are open for policymakers 
in the region. Capability upgrading should come first because GVCs involve link-
ages with external buyers or foreign large firms. The policy strategy should focus 
on improving or upgrading the capabilities of SMEs. The aim here is to improve 
productivity and product quality. GVC enhances information filtering and com-
pliance to standards, knowledge diffusion and structural flexibility, which are all 
very important for innovation and technological adaptation. Policies designed 
to promote linkages are indirect methods of enforcing compliance to standards 
 Osmund Osinachi Uzor
and upgrading the entire economy. Promoting linkages or GVCs implies initiat-
ing projects that are aimed at encouraging interactions or relationships between 
firms across borders. Linkage will compel local SMEs in the garment production 
to learn how to improve quality standard as well as increase the capacity of firms 
to innovate.
Furthermore, strengthening the legal legislation is an essential factor in 
GVCs participation. Although firms use their linkages to enforce contract dis-
cipline, the development of the legal system is the only sufficient measure to 
install confidence in an economy. Social networks as shown by the Aba garment 
producers, lead to exclusion and limit competition. Strengthening the commer-
cial law and legal institutions will serve as the basic instrument for protection 
enforcement of contractual relationship. Effective institutional mechanisms that 
are transparent and functional in terms of specifying and protecting investments 
are crucial for much needed confidence for FDI and GVCs as well as incentives 
for local investors.
 Notes
 The capital stock includes level of education, workforce skills and attitude, and mana-
gerial talent. Other forms of capital stock are the quality of legal interventions, regula-
tory practices governing business as well as social capital that contribute to the quality of 
overall capital stock. Technology includes the technological knowledge embedded in the 
nation’s scientific and technological institutions as well as those rooted in the firm (Lall, 
, p. ). In this study we considered two aspects of capital stocks, namely educa-
tional level, the skill of the workforce and the regulatory practices.
 The tariff binding coverage corresponds to the number of the Harmonized System (HS) 
subheadings containing at least one bound tariff line.
 This is confirmed by the author’s field survey and an interview with Divine Heat, Secre-
tary of the Aba garment producers cooperative union.
 Workers’ wages were computed on the basis of their monthly wages, the enterprise heads’ 
incomes were calculated based on personal out-of-pocket weekly expenses, monthly ex-
penditure on housing, family maintenance upkeep, plus average monthly savings. The 
Naira equivalent of USD is based on an exchange rate of USD  to N . ( Decem-
ber ).
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5 Mutual productivity spillovers and regional 
clusters in Eastern Europe
 Some empirical evidence
Chiara Franco and Kornelia Kozovska
5.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that foreign direct investment (FDI) is beneficial for the 
economic development of nations as it introduces fresh capital, new knowledge 
and the possibility for spillovers (technology, production, knowledge) for the host 
country. This has led to the wide support and progressive use of policies for the 
attraction of larger amounts of FDI. At the same time, the empirical literature 
on the likely impacts of FDI has been largely inconclusive for developing coun-
tries and transition economies (for example Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 
2004). Some conditions that may affect the process, such as firms’ absorptive ca-
pacities or the relative technology gap, are traditionally taken into consideration 
in empirical analyses (see chapter 1). However, not enough emphasis has been put 
on the industrial environment in which local firms operate, in particular, whether 
the presence and strength of links with other firms may encourage or discourage 
spillovers. With the increasing importance given to regional clusters and cluster 
policies as a tool for local and regional development, the relation that these have 
with FDI is evident. Regional clusters, in fact, present an interesting case for the 
study of spillovers from foreign firms as their essential characteristics – industri-
al specialization, higher concentration of specialized labor skills and geographical 
proximity – could favor the spillover effect due to the potential role they have in 
attenuating the importance of large productivity gaps or low absorptive capacity.
The literature on FDI spillovers has been traditionally focused on the pos-
sibility that the spillover effect runs in only one direction – from the foreign to 
the local firms. This approach is grounded in the OLI (Ownership, Location, 
Internalization) paradigm (Dunning, 1977) according to which foreign firms own 
firm specific assets such as a higher level of technology which is likely to spill over 
on local firms through various channels (labor mobility, demonstration effect, 
vertical linkages). The motivations which could drive such behavior have been 
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categorized by the International Business literature in market-seeking, resource-
seeking and effi  ciency-seeking FDI (Dunning, 1993). Th ere is a growing strand of 
literature focused on understanding a further type of motivation, the so-called 
asset-seeking (for example Fosfuri and Motta, 1999). In this case, the foreign fi rm 
is investing abroad in order to have access to resources not available in its home 
country rather than to exploit an advantage that it already possesses. Only recently 
some papers, such as Driffi  eld’s (2006), have investigated whether this type of 
motivation may be a source of spillover eff ect.
Contrary to studies on direct spillover eff ect, empirical studies on reverse spillo-
vers, or the so-called technology or knowledge-sourcing activities of multinational 
corporations (MNCs), have been less common, especially so for developing coun-
tries and transition economies which should theoretically have less potential for 
such reverse spillovers. In fact, positive evidence for technology sourcing has been 
mostly found for developed countries (see De Propis and Driffi  eld, 2006 for a study 
on the UK) while very few attempts have been carried out for developing countries 
(see Wei et al., 2008). Th is is due to the fact that these types of spillovers are con-
sidered to be more likely in economies with a higher presence of technologically 
advanced sectors. However, foreign fi rms may need to have access not only to higher 
technology but also to local knowledge. In such a context, regional clusters are in-
teresting cases for the analysis of the presence of reverse spillover as they potentially 
have a higher concentration of knowledge and expertise and, thus, could be a source 
of spillovers for the foreign fi rms as well. Th is chapter contributes to this discus-
sion by showing some empirical evidence on the potential role regional clusters 
could have when considering FDI spillovers. By combining information on the ex-
istence of regional clusters with fi rm-level data we have created an original dataset 
to specifi cally address the problem of mutual spillovers between foreign-owned and 
clusters. We test two hypotheses: 1) whether the overall eff ect of direct spillovers is 
greater for fi rms in clusters compared to non-clustered fi rms and 2) whether there 
is evidence for reverse spillover eff ects and whether clusters play a part in this.
The choice of studying the interplay between regional clusters and FDI in two 
new EU-member states – Romania and Poland – is driven by several considera-
tions. In the first place, their experience in transition is an interesting example 
of economic integration and development. Furthermore, they are of comparable 
size, and are both new EU member states, implying similar membership benefits 
and constraints as well as similar potential attractiveness for foreign investors. 
However, the two countries present two different levels of advancement in eco-
nomic development as well as different paths of FDI inflows.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on spillo-
ver effects from MNCs to domestic firms. Section 3 gives an overview of the 
recent literature on reverse spillovers, giving some insight in the possible occur-
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rence of spillover effects from domestic firms to MNCs. Section 4 extends and 
specifies under which conditions both types of spillover effects are likely to be 
verified by considering some mediating factors with a focus on the potential con-
tribution of regional clusters. The methodology used for the empirical analysis 
is described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results, while Section 7 offers 
conclusions and possible policy implications.
5.2 Foreign direct investment and spillovers: the direct eff ect
During the transition period in Eastern Europe FDI has consistently been viewed 
as a general solution for achieving fast growth with the expectation that it would 
bring various benefits to the local economies, most importantly fresh capital and 
technological change. The figures below show the rate of FDI flows into East-
ern European countries in the period 1990-2006. Differences in FDI are evident 
within Central European countries on the forefront, while Bulgaria and Romania 
have become recipients of higher inflows only in the last couple of years. The 
second figure isolates the inflows into Poland and Romania where we can note 
that Poland has been more successful in attracting larger amounts of FDI, while 
Romania has had a continuous and sharp progress in recent years.
Figure 5.1 FDI infl ows into Eastern Europe (1990-2006)
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Figure 5.2 FDI infl ows into Poland and Romania (1990-2006)
Source: FDI database, UNCTAD
Spillover effects coming from FDI have been extensively studied in the eco-
nomics and international business literature. The usual definition of spillover 
given (see chapter 1) is that of an externality: it takes place when the presence 
of foreign firms in the host country affects (both positively and negatively) the 
productivity of local firms without the possibility for MNCs to fully internalize 
those benefits.1 The motivations for such effects to occur lie in the OLI para-
digm mentioned above. It consists of three categories of factors which simulta-
neously motivate FDI: 1) ownership-specific advantages (O) for firms to operate 
abroad (for example, intangible assets or property rights), 2) location-specific 
advantages (such as differences in natural endowments, transport costs, macro-
economic stability, cultural factors, government regulations) to invest in the host 
rather than the home country (L), and 3) benefits arising from internationali-
zation-specific advantages (I), that is, exploitation of imperfections in external 
markets. According to this framework, MNCs are essentially asset-exploiting 
entities in that they own superior assets (technological, managerial and so on) 
allowing them to successfully invest abroad. At the same time, due to their na-
ture of public goods (at least partially) some part of these superior assets could 
‘spillover’ to local firms.
In our discussion we will call such spillover effects ‘direct’ because they run 
in only one direction, that is, from MNCs to domestic firms. However, as sum-
marized by some authors (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008), evidence 
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theoretical nor an empirical point of view. The estimated final impact on firms’ 
productivity is influenced by various factors: the channels considered, some as-
pects influencing the behavior of local firms (for example, absorptive capacities, 
technology gap, geographical proximity), FDI motivations or the behavior of sub-
sidiaries in the host country (see chapter 1). Moreover, there are also a number 
of methodological issues, such as the use of cross-section rather than panel data 
(Görg and Strobl, 2001) or the way the externality term is specified (Castellani 
and Zanfei, 2007).
A further aspect is the categorization of spillovers according to the indus-
trial sectors considered – intra-industry spillover effects or horizontal versus 
interindustry spillover effects or vertical. The search for intra-industry spillo-
vers has often been more difficult in comparison to inter-industry spillovers, 
irrespective of the country considered. With regards to the former, they can 
occur through imitation, demonstration, acquisition of human capital from 
MNCs, or the so-called competition effects (see chapter 1). The latter, on the 
other hand, can occur in the process of MNCs building relationships with lo-
cal firms which may be their customers or suppliers. The usual motivation for 
positive vertical effects is that MNCs would prevent the leakage of knowledge 
to competitive firms in the same industry, while they would be more willing 
to share their knowledge and raise productivity of those firms which are their 
buyers or suppliers (see chapter 1). For example, Javorcik (2004), analyzing the 
case of Lithuania, finds a positive vertical spillover effect due to backward link-
ages. Similar evidence is found by Blalock and Gertler (2004) with respect to 
Indonesia.
Another issue to be underlined is that according to the OLI paradigm and 
Dunning’s taxonomy (1993) of FDI motivations, the case of direct spillover ef-
fect may be justified in the presence of asset-exploiting motivations. In particu-
lar, three categories of motivations, which could be potential sources of direct 
effects, have been identified. The first is relative to the market-seeking motiva-
tion, which considers that MNCs invest abroad in order to exploit the possibil-
ity of selling their product in a larger market with potential high demand. A 
second, resource-seeking FDI motivation, is determined by the desire to acquire 
resources (natural resources, raw materials, or low-cost inputs such as labor) at 
a lower cost not available in the home country. It involves the relocation of parts 
of the production chain to the host country. This type of FDI is often driven by 
the lower cost of labor in the manufacturing sector while availability of natural 
resources such as oil and gas drives resource-oriented FDI. Further motivation 
for FDI can be the so-called efficiency-seeking investment characterized by the 
desire to gain from the common governance of geographically dispersed activi-
ties in the presence of economies of scale and scope (Kinoshita and Campos, 
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2003).2 Bevan and Estrin (2000) find proof for this kind of FDI in the first wave 
of EU-accession countries as the prospects of EU membership have assisted in 
the establishment of regional corporate networks. All these factors are also in-
fluenced by some more general aspects such as political stability and more con-
cretely the frequency of changes in a country’s legal policies and administrative 
barriers (OECD, 1994), as well as possible FDI incentives such as free economic 
zones, tax breaks, and so on.
Empirical studies on the direct spillover effect have shown mixed results for 
the case of transition economies. Djankov and Hoekman (2000) report nega-
tive spillovers in the case of the Czech Republic. Similarly, Konings (2001), ex-
amining three transition economies, finds negative spillovers for Romania and 
Bulgaria and no spillovers for Poland. Some authors distinguish between di-
rect effects coming from horizontal and vertical spillovers, but mixed results 
remain. Some studies find positive results for vertical spillovers (Schoors and 
van der Tool, 2002; Damijan et al., 2003; Javorcik, 2004; Javorcik and Spatar-
eanu, 2008). Other studies, such as Merlevede and Schoors (2005) for Romania 
or Yudaeva et al. (2003) for Russia, find no significant results for the vertical 
spillover effect.
5.3 Foreign direct investment and spillovers: the reverse eff ect
As discussed in the previous section, the usual spillover effect identified by the 
empirical literature is the direct one. In this framework, flows of knowledge may 
run in only one direction, that is, from MNCs to local firms. As predicted by the 
OLI paradigm, FDI will be carried out only if MNCs have ownership advantages 
to be exploited. However, recent papers are starting to challenge this position, 
suggesting that local firms may be the source of spillover effect for MNCs as 
well. This new stream of literature points out to the fact that MNCs do not 
search for places to invest only in order to exploit the existing assets at their 
disposal, but also in order to have access or to increase those already possessed 
at home. In the context of Dunning’s taxonomy (1993), we are now considering 
the case of strategic asset-seeking motivations. This issue has been studied both 
on a theoretical as well as an empirical level (Neven and Siotis, 1996; Fosfuri and 
Motta, 1999; Niosi 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002). Empirical papers estimate 
whether R&D differentials between countries could stimulate the possibility for 
technology sourcing, or the so-called reverse spillovers (Kogut and Chang, 1991; 
Neven and Siotis, 1996). Recent empirical evidence by Driffield and Love (2003) 
and Driffield (2007) sheds some further light on this issue, even though neither 
of the papers finds any evidence of spillovers coming from similar asset-seeking 
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motivations. Theoretical studies, on the other hand, underline the fact that even a 
laggard firm may engage in FDI by choosing the location on the basis of the pos-
sibility of benefiting from reverse spillovers due to the proximity to local firms. 
These types of studies are particularly linked to the role of agglomeration econo-
mies and spatial proximity. Agglomeration economies refer to the positive exter-
nalities and economies of scale associated with spatial concentration of economic 
activities and co-location of related production facilities (Smith and Florida, 
1994). Agglomeration effects due to the presence of specialized service suppliers, 
skilled labor, location-related reputation effects and the development of clusters, 
in fact, could have an important role in the location attractiveness for foreign 
investments (Porter, 1990; Dunning, 1998). New investors tend to concentrate in 
locations with already established investors which can lead to positive externali-
ties such as knowledge spillovers, specialized labor and intermediate inputs from 
the surrounding companies. Most of the empirical studies on the issue may be 
found for developed countries and specifically for the USA (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992; Head et al., 1995) but only very few studies have been done on develop-
ing countries and transition economies. Kinoshita and Campos (2003) find that 
for Eastern European and Baltic countries institutions, agglomeration economies 
and the abundant natural resources are the main determinants for FDI, overrid-
ing the importance of other variables.
In all these cases, contrary to the direct spillover effect, the flows of knowledge 
between MNCs and local firms (whatever type we want to consider) may also 
be reversed. For this reason, such processes have been defined as reverse spillo-
ver effect. Reverse spillovers are considered more likely where the possibility of 
spillovers from local firms is greatest and this occurs mostly in cases where the 
technological level of the host country is higher. It is for this reason that only a 
few papers analyze the reverse spillover effect in developing countries and transi-
tion economies. One of the very few contributions trying to examine this issue 
is the paper by Wei et al. (2008) considering the case of China. It argues that 
local knowledge of the context contributes to the productivity increase of MNCs 
and finds evidence for mutual spillovers (both direct and reverse) between local 
Chinese manufacturing firms and foreign firms. No studies discussing reverse 
spillovers have been carried out with respect to transition economies. Transition 
economies have some peculiar characteristics distinguishing them from both de-
veloped and developing countries such as high-skilled labor, relatively developed 
infrastructure, favorable geographical position and improving institutional struc-
tures. These characteristics, in fact, could theoretically contribute to the creation 
of conditions for reverse spillover effects.
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5.4 Foreign direct investment and spillovers: the mediating factors
In the generation of the spillover eff ects three essential aspects should be taken 
into consideration. Th e fi rst one is related to the MNCs which represent the spill-
over potential as without their investment no spillover eff ect could take place. Th e 
second are the local fi rms, the so-called receiving side as opposed to the supply 
side represented by MNCs. Th e third one consists of the local conditions that may 
hamper or favor the occurrence of the spillover eff ect. Examples are the industrial 
context in which both MNCs and local fi rms operate or the institutional context 
(such as for example the level of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection).
In considering the spillover effect we should point out that it can be influenced 
by some characteristics considered as internal (for example, the firm’s resources 
or sector of activity) or external (for example, the local conditions mentioned 
above) to the firms. Such internal and external factors may be co-evolving and 
may influence each other reciprocally as well. Moreover, their importance may 
vary according to the mechanism through which the spillover effect occurs or the 
sector considered.
In the literature, the most debated internal characteristics infl uencing the oc-
currence of spillovers are those relative to the absorptive capacity or the technol-
ogy gap. Th ey are part of the fi rm’s resources and contribute to diff erentiate the 
technological profi le of each fi rm. In the current fi rm-level literature, absorptive 
capacity is measured with the fi rm’s R&D expenses. Technology gap, the other 
variable used to measure the technological distance between fi rms, is usually meas-
ured with the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) diff erentials. With regard to the 
role of absorptive capacity, the evidence is mostly in favor of a positive relationship 
between its level and the level of spillover (see for example, Girma, 2005), implying 
that all fi rms need a minimum amount of absorptive capacity in order to be able 
to capture some spillover eff ect. Th e role played by absorptive capacity may re-
sult especially interesting in the case of transition economies because the presence 
of industries and industrial experience which diff erentiated transition economies 
from developing countries was found a misleading factor for higher expectations 
by some authors (Kornai, 1992; Poznanski, 2001).3
With regard to the role played by the technology gap between foreign and 
domestic firms, on the other hand, the ‘technological accumulation’ hypothesis 
of Cantwell (1989) and the ‘catching-up’ hypothesis of Findlay (1978) present two 
different positions. In the first case, a smaller gap leads to higher potential for 
spillovers towards local firms; in the second one, a larger gap is considered to have 
a higher potential for generating spillover effect (see chapter 1).
There is a large debate in the literature on the role of these two factors for me-
diating the final spillover effect, as well as on the wide variety of ways to measure 
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and interpret them theoretically. Other internal characteristics, not directly relat-
ed to the technological intensity of the firms, are also taken into consideration by 
some contributions. Barrios et al. (2002), for example, consider how the presence 
in foreign markets as exporters may be crucial in helping firms reap the benefits 
of FDI. A similar point of view is taken by Kinoshita (2001), when analyzing the 
case of the Czech Republic, with evidence of positive spillover effects being more 
relevant when considering more R&D intensive sectors.
External characteristics or the local conditions in which firms operate can 
range from a macroperspective on the institutional and legal climate in a country 
to a more microperspective on the specific firm location conditions, such as spa-
tial proximity to competitors, suppliers or customers. Some recent papers analyze 
the relationship between the spillover effect and spatial proximity4 (Girma and 
Wakelin, 2007; Resmini and Nicolini, 2007) and find that the spillover effect is 
positive only when a specification for the location of a firm inside or outside a re-
gion is made. This same effect is found, although at the sectoral level, by Driffield 
and Propis (2006). Our specific contribution is relative to the impact of the pres-
ence of regional clusters for spillover effects between foreign and domestic firms.
In this study, we have concentrated on regional clusters as both MNCs activity 
and absorptive capacity offer interesting implications when examined at the clus-
ter level (Gugler and Brunner, 2007). The attention which clusters have received 
in recent years through the increased interest in the work of Porter (1998, 2000), 
as well as the proliferation of cluster initiatives around the world, shows a grow-
ing awareness of the localization factor in firm organization. The role of clusters 
may be worth exploring for many reasons. Regional clusters provide proximity 
benefits and they assist small and medium enterprises to compete in global mar-
kets (Brown and Bell, 2001), thus increasing the productivity and export capacity 
of local SMEs. As Belussi (2006) points out a growing strand in the international 
business literature links clusters to MNCs as FDI inflows and subsidiary devel-
opment can be motivated by the competence and knowledge endowment created 
in clusters. This could then lead to direct spillovers to the domestic suppliers 
and other neighboring firms. At the same time however, MNCs in clusters could 
have the potential of benefiting from reverse spillovers, as even if the technology 
level of firms in a cluster might be lower, the geographical proximity and the con-
centration of well-qualified, specialized workers, good knowledge of the market 
and already established networks could still be factors from which the foreign 
firm can extract benefits. In fact, potentially due to the characteristics of clusters, 
firms which are part of a cluster should be able to have higher absorptive capac-
ity than single firms which do not belong to similar agglomeration economies. In 
fact, a proof of the benefit of clusters for both direct and reverse spillovers can 
suggest that the usual hypothesis for the technology and R&D difference as being 
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essential for the possibility of benefiting from spillovers could be challenged by 
the presence of clusters and its importance could become less significant.
It is important to note that MNCs could be localized in proximity to clusters 
for reasons not necessarily related to the higher technological base, for example 
low cost labor, specialized labor resources, tax incentives and market presence. 
They can theoretically find a favorable environment in clusters and could also ex-
pect to benefit from reverse spillovers as clusters often possess unique knowledge, 
expertise and human resources, not necessarily always related to higher technol-
ogy but for example also to knowledge of the local market. In fact, the main char-
acteristics of clustering could offer benefits to foreign firms which go beyond the 
pure technological sourcing, and can thus be available also in countries which do 
not possess superior R&D endowment. This could add a further motivation for 
foreign firms to locate themselves in or close to clusters abroad, and especially 
so in less technologically-advanced or developing economies. In this context, we 
consider that transition economies present an interesting environment for testing 
such processes. The link between regional clusters and the absorptive capacity of 
host firms has not been examined in detail and this chapter tries to shed some 
light on this interesting and challenging argument, proposing the hypothesis that 
proximity and networking enhance the positive effects of FDI while, at the same 
time, creating favorable conditions for reverse spillovers as well. To our knowl-
edge only one paper (Driffield and Propis, 2006), considering the case of the UK, 
tests the presence of both direct and reverse spillover effect inside and outside 
clusters. They reach the conclusion that being located inside a cluster makes a 
difference with regards to both direct and reverse spillover effects.
In this theoretical context, we hypothesize that both direct and reverse spillo-
ver effects are likely to be present and positive in regional clusters, compared to 
non-clustered firms. Furthermore, we believe that contrary to the current evi-
dence in the literature on technology sourcing, reverse spillovers may be found 
even in the case of low-tech firms located in clusters. MNCs could be able to 
benefit from knowledge and competence endowments present in clusters which 
are not necessarily related to superior technology levels. In the following section 
we test these hypotheses.
5.5 Empirical analysis
5.5.1 Description of datasets
Our analysis draws on two sets of data: the first allows us to identify clusters 
in two Eastern European countries (Poland and Romania) using the European 
Cluster Observatory (ECO) database while the second, the Amadeus database, 
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contains firm level data consisting of annual company accounts for all incorpo-
rated firms in the manufacturing sectors of the two countries for the time period 
2000-2006.
The Cluster Observatory Mapping, made available at the end of 2007, presents 
a unique comparable database on the location of clusters across Europe and espe-
cially for Eastern European countries, where studies on clusters are still in their 
initial phase. As such, it is one of few sources of systematic data on the type and 
location of clusters in new EU member states. The Cluster Mapping database5 
is built through the intersection of regions and sectors in Europe, combining the 
two dimensions of geography and industry by statistically tracing agglomerations 
of employment in co-located industries, defined as statistical regional clusters, 
across Europe. Regions are considered at the NUTS 2 level while employment 
data is considered for the 4-digit industry level. The cluster definition used by 
ECO is based on the definitions6 developed by Porter in his similar analysis of 
the geographical distribution of economic activity across the USA.7 In order to 
evaluate whether the presence of employment in specific industries belonging to a 
cluster category in a specific region has a sufficient specialized critical mass to de-
velop the linkages and spillovers which can lead to positive economic impacts, all 
clusters have been assigned from one (weak clusterization) to three (very strong 
clusterization) stars. For our sample of countries we have concentrated exclu-
sively on clusters with two or three stars.
The Amadeus database, published by Bureau Van Dijk, includes firm-level 
accounting data in standardized financial format. Besides financial information, 
it also contains industry classification, the regional location of each firm and de-
tailed ownership information, including the names and country of origins of all 
block shareholders which has allowed us to label each firm as domestic or foreign. 
We have used the accepted definition of foreign-owned firms as firms with a 
minimum ownership of at least 10 of the shares by a foreign investor.8
For each country we have identified all 2 and 3 star clusters from the Euro-
pean Cluster Observatory database, aggregating them in low-tech and high-tech 
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) classification9 for a total of 81 clusters. For Poland we have 25 low-tech 
and 12 high-tech clusters and for Romania 37 low-tech and 14 high-tech clusters 
(see annex for an overview). For each cluster, the relative firm level data for the 
period from 2000 to 2006, available from the Amadeus database, has been iden-
tified, using the relative NACE codes and the respective country’s geographical 
region. In order to be able to do a comparative study between firms in clusters 
and outside clusters, the information for all firms in the given country which do 
not belong to the respective clusters and geographical areas but are within the 
same cluster categories, as defined by the combination of NACE codes, have been 
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extracted from Amadeus. The dataset provides information on a total of more 
than 5,000 firms in Poland and Romania for the period 2000-2006. The use of 
both databases gives systematic data across countries and allows for a compara-
tive study. Many previous studies on clusters have been mainly done either with 
especially created ad-hoc datasets or with data available on national/regional 
level but not easily comparable with other countries. With this current study we 
attempt to fill in this gap. Table 5.1 gives an overview of our sample:
5.5.2 Methodology














where Y is some measure of productivity (for example, total factor productivity or 
labor productivity), X is the spillover variable (measured as the share of output of 
foreign firms on domestic firms at the sectoral10 level) and Z is a set of variables 
that takes into consideration some factors, the most important ones being the 
absorptive capacities and the technology gap.
In order to have some insights in the sign of the spillover effect (both direct 
and reverse), we estimate the benchmark model by only adding a R&D variable 
and interacting it with the spillover variable.
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Table 5.1 Data overview
MNCs Domestic fi rms
No fi rms No fi rms Total
Poland clustered 384 953 1337
non-clustered 873 1901 2774
TOTAL 1257 2854 4111
Romania clustered 433 507 940
non-clustered 204 403 607
TOTAL 637 910 1547
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Amadeus
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We measure Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as the residuals obtained by first 
estimating a log-linear transformation of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator.
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We preferred this estimator as it uses the value of intermediate inputs as a proxy 
for unobserved productivity shocks, taking for granted that firms will always use 
a certain positive amount of materials. An alternative, the Olley and Pakes (1996) 
estimation technique, considers investment as a proxy for the unobserved pro-
ductivity. A shortcoming of this method, however, is that it assumes that the firm 
makes a positive investment every year, a condition which is often violated. We 
measure output (Y) with sales, capital stock (K) is proxied by the declared value 
of the firm’s tangible fixed assets, material inputs (M) are proxied by material 
costs, and labor (L) is measured by the number of employees. Sales and mate-
rial costs are deflated by the relative annual two digit NACE production price 
indices, while capital is deflated by the relative annual country GDP deflator. 
R&D expenditure at the firm level is proxied by the declared value of intangible 
assets. The subscript i and t refer to firm and year, respectively, while j refers to 
the sector.
We estimate the benchmark model distinguishing between both the location 
of firms (within or outside clusters) as well as the sector (high-tech versus low-
tech). Our expectations for this benchmark estimation is that we find positive 
results for direct spillovers in both high-tech and low-tech clusters, even in the 
case where the level of absorptive capacity is not significant. This is motivated by 
the fact that we expect that flows of knowledge inside the cluster and spillover 
between and within firms, even though not directly observable, may contribute to 
enhance the productivity of domestic firms and the way the R&D is ‘used’ to take 
advantage of the spillover effect.
In our analysis we go beyond this benchmark model, adding further control 
variables and exploring the role of both traditional spillovers as well as R&D 
spillovers in the following two models. In the first one we add as a regressor a 
skills variable for each firm, proxied by the ratio between the cost of employees 
and the number of employees11, which could be a further element through which 
the spillover effect may be grasped more easily. In order to measure this effect, we 
interact the skills variable with the spillover variable.
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In the third model we use a proxy of a firm’s activities related to their techno-
logical activities and measured as the share of a firm’s R&D activities on the total 
R&D activities in each NACE 2 digit sector.
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We estimate the model using the residuals of the first step estimation as a de-
pendent variable. We take into consideration time (nt) and sectoral dummies (nt) 
in order to account for possible business cycle effects and sectoral heterogeneity, 
respectively. The estimation method chosen at this stage is OLS using first dif-
ference in order to eliminate any unobservable firm specific effects. The following 
table gives an overview of the way all variables have been constructed.
Table 5.2 Description of variables
Variables Defi nition Source
Sales Log of sales Amadeus
Capital Log of tangible assets Amadeus
Labor Log of number of employees Amadeus
Material costs Log of materials costs Amadeus
R&D Intangible assets Amadeus
Horizontal spillover (SP) The ratio of the share of foreign/
domestic fi rm’s output to the total 
NACE 2 digit sector output
Amadeus
Skills Proxied by wage intensity, 
measured as the ratio of cost of 
employees to number of 
employees
Amadeus
R&D intensity (RDint) The ratio between a fi rm’s investment 
in R&D, proxied by the declared value 
of intangible assets, and its sales
Amadeus
R&D spillover (RDsp) The ratio of the share of foreign/
domestic fi rm’s intangible assets 
to the total NACE 2 digit sector 
intangible assets
Amadeus
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5.6 Results
5.6.1 Direct spillovers
When examining the results of the Polish clusters case, we have no statistically 
significant results for the spillover variable for any of the models, but the sign 
is consistently negative for both low-tech and high-tech sectors. Similar results 
are observed in Romania as well. This suggests that the productivity of domestic 
firms located within clusters is negatively influenced by MNCs. When looking at 
non-cluster firms, we have consistently positive and significant results in Poland, 
that is, MNCs are a source of positive productivity spillovers for domestic firms. 
Also in this case, the technology intensity of the sector is irrelevant for the sign 
and significance of the results. For the Romanian case, results are not significant 
statistically but they suggest that domestic low-tech firms benefit from positive 
productivity spillovers while domestic firms in high-tech sectors are influenced 
negatively by the presence of MNCs.
5.6.2 Reverse spillovers
With regard to reverse spillovers, for fi rms located within clusters in both Poland 
and Romania, our results are in most cases not statistically signifi cant but the sign 
of the coeffi  cients shows a clear pattern of a positive eff ect on foreign fi rms’ pro-
ductivity (with the exception of the high-tech benchmark model in Poland and the 
low-tech benchmark model in Romania). For fi rms located outside the cluster, the 
evidence from Poland is generally not statistically signifi cant, but with a consistent 
negative sign. Similarly, in Romania negative and statistical signifi cant results are 
present for high-tech sectors while positive, but not signifi cant, for low-tech sectors.
5.6.3 Th e role of research and development
Interestingly, we find consistent negative and significant results for the role of 
R&D intensity on firms’ productivity, across sectors and independent of the loca-
tion within or outside clusters. Our results show that a higher ratio of intangible 
assets to sales, used as a proxy for firm’s R&D, leads to lower productivity.
Looking into the R&D spillover variable, the negative impact on domestic 
firms’ productivity persists in Poland even though not statistically significant for 
firms located in and outside of clusters. Romania shows mixed results, positive 
but not significant for high-tech domestic firms (negative for non-cluster firms) 
and negative for low-tech domestic firms (positive for non-cluster firms). For 
foreign firms, on the other hand, positive but not statistically significant impact 
is observed for both cluster and non-cluster firms. In Romania, positive influence 
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on foreign firms’ productivity is present for firms in clusters while outside of 
clusters, this is so only for high-tech sectors.
The R&D spillover variable, in its interactions with a firm’s own R&D, gener-
ally affects negatively the productivity of firms. Although the coefficients are in 
most cases not statistically significant, the negative sign of almost all relative coef-
ficients gives proof for a consistent trend. We can interpret these results as either 
the lack of ability of both domestic and foreign firms to internalize possible exter-
nalities caused by higher levels of R&D investment in the given sectors, or of the 
very insignificant role R&D spillovers have on firms’ productivity. On the other 
hand, firms not located in regional clusters show some evidence of a positive role 
of R&D, especially in the case of reverse spillovers, both for high- and low-tech 
sectors. This suggests that foreign firms with higher levels of R&D are influenced 
positively by R&D spillovers and skills and firm level R&D play a positive role.
5.6.4 Th e role of skills
When testing for the role of skills in explaining the productivity of firms, we find 
that higher wage intensity, taken as a proxy of skills, influences positively the 
productivity of firms, both in high- and low-tech sectors as well as in clusters and 
outside clusters. However, the role of skills for the ability of absorbing spillovers 
is much less clear. We see evidence that higher skill intensity in domestic firms, 
when interacted with the spillover variable, generally affects positively firms in 
Poland. However, the results are not statistically significant. In Romania, on the 
other hand, higher skills affect negatively the spillover effect in high-tech firms 
located in clusters. With regard to the reverse spillovers, we observe negative im-
pact for high-tech firms in Poland, that is, higher skill intensity does not increase 
the possibility of benefiting for spillover, but, on the contrary, affects negatively 
the productivity of foreign firms. In Romania the evidence is contrary and higher 
skills contribute to positive spillovers. No particular difference is noted for firms 
located within and outside regional clusters. This confirms theoretical affirma-
tions that domestic firms with higher skill levels are more capable of benefit-
ing from direct spillovers and increasing their productivity. High-tech sectors, as 
shown by our evidence, are especially sensitive to such dynamics.
5.7 Conclusion
According to the literature on spillovers, the spillover effect should predominant-
ly run in one direction, from foreign to domestic firms and this is the standard 
model tested in empirical specifications. Usually, the model is made more com-
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plex by taking into consideration the fact that there may be some conditionalities, 
such as absorptive capacities or the level of the technology gap, that may favor the 
process. However, the mixed results found in the literature suggest that some fac-
tors are not properly taken into consideration. First of all, the absorptive capacity 
may be enhanced by the fact that firms are clustered together. This is why we have 
investigated whether the spillover effect could be greater by using a dataset prop-
erly divided according to location within or outside regional clusters. Moreover, 
due to the higher attractiveness of Eastern European countries for FDI, we tested 
whether a reverse spillover hypothesis could be true in this case. Previous studies 
examining reverse spillover have been done in most cases for developed countries, 
but not for transition economies.
We go back to our initial hypotheses on the overall effect of direct spillovers 
for firms located in regional clusters compared to non-clustered firms and on 
the presence of reverse spillover effect and any potential role for clusters. With 
regard to our hypothesis on the presence of direct spillovers in cluster firms, our 
evidence shows that domestic firms located within clusters do not benefit from 
positive spillovers. Contrary to expectations, domestic firms not located within 
clusters do benefit from positive direct spillovers. In Poland the technological 
intensity of the sector does not make any difference while in Romania the pro-
ductivity of domestic firms located in high-tech sectors is affected negatively by 
MNCs, suggesting that possibly the technology gap is too large for any positive 
productivity spillovers. Looking into the reverse effect, even though not statisti-
cally significant in many cases, our results suggest that foreign firms benefit from 
being located within clusters while in contrast their productivity is influenced 
negatively if located outside.
Our findings could have important implications for FDI and cluster poli-
cies. In fact, where foreign firms are located in clusters, it is likely that their 
productivity is greater and thus, they are likely to be more willing to collaborate 
with other domestic firms and organizations to support the cluster as they could 
benefit from such collaboration themselves. This suggests that clusters could be 
considered attractive for MNCs as foreign firms could be able to benefit from 
cluster-specific assets and as such the cluster could become a motivation for 
asset-seeking MNCs. In fact, our results suggest that it is MNCs which could 
actually benefit more from locating within regional clusters in terms of produc-
tivity gains. On the contrary, domestic firms experience negative spillovers when 
located in clusters.
The potential role of regional clusters as a mediating factor, in general, finds 
mixed proof in our results. A possible explanation is the lack of tradition in net-
working and creating linkages among firms in transition economies due to the 
previously centrally planned system. This could lead to domestic firms being part 
 Chiara Franco and Kornelia Kozovska
of regional clusters which are still not able to effectively create linkages and ben-
efit from the various externalities which are present in clusters in order to trans-
form this in a positive effect on their productivity. The evidence from Poland 
and Romania shows that the level of R&D does not seem to be essential for the 
ability of benefiting from spillovers, while a much more important role is played 
by skills.
Cluster and FDI policies should in any case be perceived as mutually reinforc-
ing in their design and allow exploiting and creating synergies between the own-
ership advantages of the MNCs and the competitive advantage of the location. 
However, cluster policies which extensively encourage FDI, motivated by perceiv-
ing MNCs as a source of significant spillovers, should take into consideration 
that there is no robust evidence showing that MNCs indeed are a source of direct 
spillovers for domestic firms.
 Notes
 In this chapter, we consider spillover effects as those coming from both knowledge and 
pecuniary externalities.
 We should note that in most empirical studies the definition used for efficiency-seeking 
motivation mainly overlaps with that of resource-seeking.
 In fact, the socialist system was structured in such a manner that growth was a result of 
central resource transfers and not of entrepreneurial efforts. This led to almost absent 
local innovation and technological change, any technological innovation for most of the 
socialist period arrived generally via the acquisition of machinery. As there was no price 
premium and no free entry into the economy, underinvestment in new industries and 
services was a common phenomenon. Some authors question the advantages which tran-
sition countries were supposed to have in comparison to other developing countries as 
most of these advantages, inherited firm-specific assets, inherited accumulated human 
capital, have proven unsubstantial. Konings () and Jensen () find that transition 
countries experience similar difficulties in successfully benefiting from FDI.
 It should be pointed out, however, that the literature on localized knowledge spillover is 
more extensive than the literature related only to the spillover effect coming from FDI.
 The European Cluster Observatory database can be found under Cluster mapping on the 
website of the project www.clusterobservatory.eu. The project offers a unique compilation 
of data on geographical patterns of specialization across cluster categories, national and 
regional portfolios of clusters, cluster organizations, and national and regional policies 
and programs related to innovation and clusters.
 Porter identifies geographic distribution of employment, relates it to the appropriate defi-
nition of geographic regions (NUTS  level for the EU), obtaining employment data at 
the highest available level of industry granularity (mostly NACE -digit level).
 It should be noted that cluster definitions do not always reflect the true underlying link-
ages between industries in the new member states as trade barriers and other political 
interferences could have significantly influenced current location patterns.
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 This is the standard definition provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
 See Hatzichronoglou ().
 The term ‘sector’ is intended as the aggregation of all high-tech or low-tech sectors, re-
spectively, in the given country and according to the division cluster /non cluster.
 A better proxy for skills would be a variable which directly measures the skill training in-
tensity (that is, the expenditure devoted to training) or the skills intensity of employment 
(that is the number of employees directly involved in production, as a proportion of total 
employment). Such measures are used, for example, by Marin and Bell () and Girma 
et al. (). However, due to data constraints we only employ a measure that accounts 
for wage intensity calculated as wage per employee expenditure. Hence, results involving 
this variable need to be interpreted with caution.
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 Annex: Tables
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics – Poland










Domestic mean 53,70 225,07 113,64 322,04 7,01 0,01
fi rms std.dev 148,04 743,62 191,03 325,20 16,65 0,05
MNCs mean 156,11 511,21 267,77 429,12 9,36 0,02








r Domestic mean 51,94 187,77 80,50 319,89 7,44 0,02
fi rms std.dev 161,25 687,56 244,34 357,70 13,02 0,28
MNCs mean 127,69 467,67 285,39 418,37 9,68 0,02
std.dev 331,15 1422,04 927,76 605,22 9,26 0,26
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics – Romania










Domestic mean 12,33 26,69 16,02 479,71 2,57 0,01
fi rms std.dev 50,49 82,87 65,09 641,47 3,14 0,11
MNCs mean 29,95 63,62 40,42 467,58 4,61 0,10








r Domestic mean 16,72 31,87 20,55 411,82 2,97 0,03
fi rms std.dev 43,87 58,97 44,66 620,70 2,26 0,38
MNCs mean 49,80 107,86 76,29 558,78 5,18 0,14
std.dev 232,97 247,72 201,68 1020,83 13,26 1,84
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Table 5.9 Clusters in Romania
Region Cluster category High-tech/Low-tech sector
Vest Apparel Low-tech





Bucuresti - Ilfov Apparel Low-tech
Sud-Vest Oltenia Apparel Low-tech
Sud - Muntenia Building fi xtures Low-tech
Nord-Est Building fi xtures Low-tech
Nord-Vest Building fi xtures Low-tech
Centru Building fi xtures Low-tech
Vest Building fi xtures Low-tech
Vest Footwear Low-tech
Nord-Vest Footwear Low-tech







Bucuresti - Ilfov Leather Low-tech
Centru Leather Low-tech
Nord-Est Leather Low-tech
Sud - Muntenia Oil and gas Low-tech
Sud-Vest Oltenia Oil and gas Low-tech
Sud-Est Oil and gas Low-tech
Nord-Est Oil and gas Low-tech
Centru Oil and gas Low-tech





Bucuresti - Ilfov Textiles Low-tech
Sud-Est Textiles Low-tech
Sud - Muntenia Automotive High-tech
Sud-Vest Oltenia Power High-tech
Centru Power High-tech
Sud - Muntenia Power High-tech
Sud-Vest Oltenia Heavy machinery High-tech
Vest Heavy machinery High-tech
Centru Heavy machinery High-tech
Sud - Muntenia Heavy machinery High-tech
Sud-Est Metal High-tech
Sud - Muntenia Metal High-tech
Bucuresti - Ilfov Aerospace High-tech
Sud-Vest Oltenia Chemical High-tech
Vest Communications High-tech
Vest Constr. materials High-tech
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Table 5.10 Clusters in Poland






Slaskie Building fi xtures Low-tech
Warminsko-Mazurskie Building fi xtures Low-tech


















Slaskie Heavy machinery High-tech
Dolnoslaskie Heavy machinery High-tech
Wielkopolskie Heavy machinery High-tech
Podkarpackie Aerospace High-tech




Slaskie Production tech. High-tech
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6 Scope and eff ectiveness of foreign direct 
investment policies in transition economies*
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6.1 Introduction
Basic questions related to government actions in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in general, and specifically actions related to spillover effects and 
knowledge transfer via FDI are: Is there a rationale and scope for specific FDI-
related government intervention and, if yes, what should it look like and how 
efficient it is? We will tackle these issues by analyzing the existing theoretical 
considerations and empirical evidence on the subject, as well as experiences of 
selected transition countries.
In theory, the rationale for investment incentives seems to be quite limited; 
economics of investment incentives are largely based on the possibility of (posi-
tive) spillovers (knowledge and technology) from foreign-owned subsidiaries 
to domestic firms. But, in practice, governments have created numerous policy 
measures to attract foreign capital and reap the benefits of both their direct im-
pact on employment, income and growth, as well as benefits from spillover ef-
fects. Although specific foreign-investor-friendly policies cannot compensate for 
the lack of ‘basic attractiveness’ of a country or for an inadequate and/or business 
unfriendly legal, institutional and policy framework, research does show a posi-
tive link between FDI incentives and the amount of foreign capital attracted to a 
country, as well as the subsequent behavior of foreign investors. FDI incentives 
become especially important in the case of competition between similar potential 
investment locations. Data show that competition for FDI has increased strongly 
in the past two decades and so did the provision of fiscal and financial incentives 
for foreign investors.
The focus of the chapter is on analyzing the investment incentives policies in 
transition countries from the perspective of recent trends in incentives policies 
and their effectiveness in attracting more and better FDI. Existing studies on 
incentive policies of transition economies will be reviewed and their effective-
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ness from the point of view of policy objectives, type and size of incentives, and 
delivery practice will be studied. Investment incentives policies of the following 
countries will be analyzed in a comparative perspective: Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The focus will be on 
the behavioral incentives, targeting specific goals, like export propensity, transfer 
of technology, R&D activity, engaging of local suppliers and so on.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, the scope of the FDI regime 
and policy in determining a country’s attractiveness as investment location is ana-
lyzed. Second, we look at the economics of investment incentives, and, third, we 
analyze the main issues and trends in incentives policies. Then, the focus turns to 
transition economies. Section four overviews the existing studies on the effective-
ness of incentives policies in transition countries, and in section five we look at 
incentives policies of selected transition countries. The chapter concludes with 
some policy suggestions.
6.2 Th e scope of foreign direct investment regime and policy in 
determining a country’s attractiveness as investment location
Key elements of a country’s attractiveness as investment location are its basic 
structural characteristics, that is to say market characteristics (market size and 
per capita income, market growth, access to regional and global markets), and 
availability/quality/costs of factors of production (labor, raw materials and other 
inputs, technological, innovatory and other created assets, physical infrastruc-
ture). These are followed by general regulatory and policy frameworks, which 
define an investment climate in its broadest sense. They include elements such as 
economic, political and social stability, privatization policy, trade regime and pol-
icy, tax rates and tax structure, labor market and product markets regulations and 
policies, and so forth. Only if these basic preconditions are in place, can specific 
FDI regimes and policies become relevant for attracting foreign investors (see 
for instance, Dunning, 1993; UNCTAD, 1998; Creditanstalt, 1992; A.T. Kearney, 
1998; Meyer, 1998).
OECD intercountry variations in inward FDI stocks show that slightly over 
one half of the variation is explained by countries’ structural characteristics and 
slightly less than half by policy factors. The most important among the policy 
factors are labor market policies, explaining more than 25 of the intercoun-
try variations, followed by other border barriers, FDI restrictions and product 
market policies. The latter three combined account for approximately 20 of 
the variations in inward FDI stocks (OECD, 2003). Although the investment 
climate and FDI policy factors are in a certain sense of secondary importance, 
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they undoubtedly have a crucial impact on the decision of a foreign investor 
whether or not to go ahead with the realization in line with his primary moti-
vation determined with structural factors. In short, an inadequate investment 
climate and regulatory and policy framework could turn away a foreign investor 
who would otherwise choose to invest as far as market, resource/asset or cost 
considerations are concerned.
Specific FDI policy is only one element of the investment climate; not the 
most important one, because even the best and most friendly policy towards for-
eign investors could not compensate for an inadequate regulatory-administrative 
and economic policy framework. What, then, is the scope and what are the policy 
considerations in favor of specific FDI policy? In the last two decades, we have 
witnessed two processes of relevance for the perception and features of FDI poli-
cies. The first is that intercountry competition for FDI has increased considerably 
which resulted in an overall liberalization of FDI regimes. The second is increas-
ing convergence among countries in many aspects of economic systems, regula-
tory and policy framework. The more liberal FDI regimes are, the more similar to 
each other countries are, and the more similar their regulatory frameworks and 
economic policies are, the more important are other specific intercountry differ-
ences for location decisions of foreign investors. Specific FDI policy is the most 
obvious way for a country to make a positive differentiation from competitive lo-
cations. Countries are, thus, tempted to apply increasingly aggressive FDI policies 
and to offer increasingly generous investment incentives. This is especially so for 
member countries of the EU, which have a highly harmonized system, regulatory 
and policy frameworks.
In this context, FDI policy has become an increasingly important determi-
nant of creating a good investment climate. If a country does not offer some 
additional benefits, and when other primary and secondary FDI relevant factors 
in two countries are more or less equal, foreign investors may choose to invest 
in another country with ‘similar’ basic conditions yet which offers additional 
benefits. These benefits simply become the norm, expected by foreign investors 
when looking for a suitable investment location. Activities to attract FDI can be 
grouped into: 1) investment incentives, 2) image building, 3) direct acquisition 
of FDI and 4) provision of certain services for investors. There is a consensus 
among experts that image building of a host country, direct acquisition of FDI 
and providing certain services for foreign investors may be useful in attracting 
more and the right kind of FDI. Still, it is investment incentives, which are the 
core of FDI policy and whose pros and cons are repeatedly a matter of theoreti-
cal and policy discussions.
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6.3 Economics of investment incentives
FDI policies are a form of government intervention and this is justified when 
markets are characterized by either some distortions, such as externalities or the 
presence of market power, or because they are incomplete, which both lead to a 
socially inefficient outcome in competitive markets. The key arguments for gov-
ernment intervention are: 1) presence of knowledge spillovers (see Griliches, 1979; 
1992) and dynamic scale economies; 2) coordination failures; and 3) information 
externalities (Pack and Saggi, 2006; Rodrik, 2006). FDI is a typical source of 
spillover effects, which occur due to implementation of new technologies and 
other organizational knowledge and skills transfer, which are usually at a higher 
level than in domestic companies. Knowledge spillovers via FDI result from the 
inability of multinational corporations (MNCs) to fully internalize the benefits 
of superior knowledge. The presence of foreign subsidiaries can consequently in-
crease the rate of technology improvements and technological learning in a host 
economy ( Javorcik, 2004).
The rationale for policy intervention with respect to FDI has, thus, usually 
been associated with the potentially positive effect of FDI on the productivity of 
domestic firms via knowledge spillovers and linkage effects (UNCTAD, 2003). 
Spillover effects justify the incentives schemes to the point where private benefits 
equal broader social benefits. Incentives schemes are also economically justified 
when: 1) their use attracts one or more leading foreign companies, which leads 
to other investors being interested in entry, 2) potential benefits of economies of 
scale and learning by doing, 3) when they compensate other costs investors might 
incur due to government intervention (Blomström, 2002; UNCTAD, 2002).
There are also reasons for care when designing an incentives package, especial-
ly when these are aimed solely at foreign investors. Governments must carefully 
weigh the costs against benefits in order to avoid certain situations (UNCTAD, 
2002; Blomström, 2002):
– Offering of incentives to investors that would have invested anyway;
– Difficulties in calculating the value of externalities ex ante to the investment, 
problems of picking winners;
– Reduction of fiscal revenues (in the case of fiscal incentives) and/or increase 
of fiscal expenditure (in the case of financial incentives) reduce the amount of 
fiscal resources for other purposes (such as the improvement of infrastructure, 
education and training);
– Administrative costs related to managing incentive schemes;
– Potential efficiency losses if firms are induced to locate where incentives are 
the most generous and not where location factors might otherwise be the most 
favorable (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 124); rent-seekers behavior;
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– Competition among governments to attract FDI may create problems because 
there is a tendency to overbid and the subsidies may surpass the level of the 
spillover benefits.
The most important argument against investment incentives aimed only at for-
eign firms is the fact that spillover effects are not an automatic consequence of 
FDI, but depend on the absorption capabilities of domestic firms. The potential 
spillover will not be realized if domestic firms do not have the capacities or the 
motivation to learn from MNCs and to invest in new technology. This also im-
plies that the effectiveness of incentives aimed at spillover benefits could be inef-
ficient unless appropriately accompanied by measures to increase the learning 
capacity in domestic firms and measures aimed at strengthening competitiveness 
(Blomström, 2002; Damijan et al., 2008).
6.4 Issues and trends in investment incentives policies
Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI 
and benefit more from it: 1) financial incentives (for example, grants and loans 
at concessional interest rates), 2) fiscal incentives (for example, tax holidays and 
reduced tax rates) and 3) other incentives (for example, subsidized infrastructure 
of services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions 
from labor or environmental laws). Among the latter, industrial, technological 
and science parks are an increasingly popular form of investment incentive aimed 
at both domestic and foreign investors, providing infrastructure, services and 
even location management to potential investors (see Kelleher and Thompstone, 
2000). Incentives can be used for attracting new FDI to a particular host country 
(locational incentives) or for stimulating foreign subsidiaries to undertake func-
tions regarded as desirable such as exporting, local sourcing, R&D, and transfer 
of knowledge (behavioral incentives). Most incentives do not discriminate be-
tween domestic and foreign investors, but they sometimes implicitly target one of 
the two (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 123).
Th e use of locational incentives to attract FDI has considerably expanded both 
in volume or frequency as well as value. Th e widespread and growing incidence of 
both fi scal and fi nancial incentives is well documented (Charlton, 2003; OECD, 
2003, p. 124; UNCTAD, 1996; Moran, 1998; Oman, 2000; Blomström, 2002). In 
general, developed and transition countries frequently employ fi nancial incentives, 
while developing countries (which cannot aff ord a direct drain on the government 
budget) prefer fi scal measures (OECD 2003, p. 124). Within the EU, investment 
incentives are, as a rule, directed to domestic and foreign investors alike but there 
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can be measures within the incentives programs that are: 1) not formally, but by 
their nature more oriented towards foreign investors (individually designed con-
tractual regimes for large projects, special incentive packages for strategic investors, 
high-tech investments, regional hubs), 2) to some extent positively discriminative 
towards foreign capital, because they are trying to attract capital that would oth-
erwise not enter a country (high-tech, not available domestically). Grants linked 
to R&D investments – either by domestic or non-domestic fi rms – in particular 
have been on a rising trend in both developed and developing countries (European 
Commission, 2006; for detail see UNCTAD, 2005, chapter 7).
In creating an investment incentives policy, policymakers should tackle the 
following issues: 1) kind/type of incentives, 2) level of incentives, 3) explicit or 
implicit incentives policy, 4) performance requirements, 5) diversification of in-
vestment incentives, and 6) delivery of incentives. More aggressive investment 
incentives policies are characterized by giving more accent to financial incentives, 
the possibility of differentiated treatment of foreign investors, and a need for a 
stronger role of investment agency. Recent trends in investment incentives poli-
cies speak in favor of the following principles and practices:
– Incentives policy should not be determined solely by the desire to attract FDI; 
it should be well incorporated into the national development strategy. In other 
words, investment incentives should be considered a part of an economy’s de-
velopment strategy and policies, rather than a policy area that is only of rel-
evance to foreign investors.
– Investment incentives should be available on equal terms to all investors irre-
spective of industry and nationality of investor. The motivation for supporting 
foreign investors – including existing investors that may consider expanding 
their activities – is to equalize social and private returns to investment. The 
reason for subsidizing local firms is to strengthen their capacity to absorb for-
eign technology and skills (European Commission, 2006).
– Less general incentives and more incentives targeted at specifi c purposes, such as 
the introduction of new technologies, exports promotion, R&D activities, em-
ployment, in particular of highly skilled labor, and environment friendly projects. 
Incentives should not be of an ex ante type that is granted prior to the invest-
ment, but they should instead promote those activities that create potential for 
spillovers. In particular, these include education, training, and R&D activities 
(UNCTAD, 2005) as well as linkages between foreign and local fi rms (UNC-
TAD, 2001). An advantage of performance-based incentives is that they may 
aff ect the entire stock of investments, rather than just the fl ow of new investment.
– Also numerous experiences speak in favor of diversifi cation and improvement 
of investment incentives structure. Th is can help to reach the same goals as an 
increased level of incentives, obviously at a lower cost. Numerous incentives are 
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off ered primarily by countries, aiming at attracting export-oriented FDI. Po-
tential investors are also in favor of more diversifi ed incentive schemes, because 
they can fi nd a mix best suited for them. Th erefore, it is often the case that a 
special incentives package is created for an important project, best suited to the 
needs of a particular investor. Such a ‘case by case’ approach raises the eff ective-
ness of incentives programs and lowers their costs. A negative consequence of 
increasing diversity of incentives schemes is a decrease of their transparency.
– Within factor (financial and fiscal) incentives the share of grants and subsidies 
has been reduced, while the share of various repayable types of incentives has 
increased.
– Transition from automatic to selective/discriminatory/criteria-based award-
ing of incentives and stricter, frequently project-related monitoring of the ef-
fectiveness of incentives granting and sanctions in the case of not fulfilling the 
expected results have been increasingly applied.
To increase R&D activities of MNCs in economies in transition and to strength-
en knowledge spillovers from MNCs to local companies, Narula (2009) suggests 
several policy considerations for host countries. First, they should reduce the 
emphasis on cost advantages and increase the emphasis on specialized location-
specific assets, which implies developing and fostering specific industries and 
technological trajectories, such that the location advantages they offer are less 
‘generic’ and more specific, highly immobile and conducive to ‘locking’ mobile in-
vestments into these assets. Second, attempts should be made to create clusters 
around MNCs, requesting from host countries to focus on attracting the kinds of 
FDI projects that provide the greatest opportunity for embeddedness and link-
ages between domestic and foreign firms. Third, MNCs should be helped to cre-
ate linkages with local firms as the main driver of knowledge spillovers from FDI. 
Apart from that, he also has more general suggestions, specifically to improve op-
portunities for start-ups and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), to improve 
human resource capabilities, to build research capacities in the public sector, and 
to use all the available policy tools to promote R&D.
6.5 Eff ectiveness of investment incentives in transition countries in 
view of policy objectives, type and size of incentives and their 
delivery
Effectiveness of investment incentives is no doubt a relevant issue for transition 
countries, as FDI has been a rather important factor of the transition process, 
and the growth and development of these countries in the last two decades (see 
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for instance, Meyer, 1998; Hunya, 2000; Damijan et al., 2008). The level of for-
eign penetration in transition countries being the new member states of the EU 
is generally higher than in the old member states; in 2007, inward FDI stock to 
GDP ratio was 92.3 in Bulgaria, 78.0 in Estonia, 70.5 in Hungary, 57.7 in 
the Czech Republic, 53.6 in Slovakia, 38.3 in Lithuania, 37.5 in Latvia, 36.7 
in Romania, 33.8 in Poland and 27.7 in Slovenia (UNCTAD, 2008).
Effectiveness of investment incentives could only be assessed within their 
potential scope to attract FDI. As claimed, empirical research has shown that 
investment incentives play only a secondary role in determining the interna-
tional pattern of FDI (Blomström and Kokko, 2003). Incentives are important 
only when primary conditions of host country attractiveness – structural factors 
(market, factors of production) and investment climate – have been deemed sat-
isfactory, that is to say, when two locations are closely matched in terms of the 
primary conditions (Guisinger et al., 1985; Rojec, 1994; UNCTAD, 1998; Oman, 
2000). If the expected regulatory, business and institutional environment is not 
compatible to those in competing locations, no incentives can make a location 
attractive to FDI. Consequently, investment incentives for FDI can only be suc-
cessful in the context of a broader strategy of improving the investment climate 
in a host country, which includes the creation of investment friendly economic 
policies (OECD, 2005).
Empirical studies for transition countries broadly confirm the limited effec-
tiveness of investment incentives. Antaloczy and Sass (2001) claim that neither 
general nor econometric studies found any proof that incentives significantly im-
pacted the direction or size of FDI in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Among ten studies surveyed by Clausing and 
Dorobantu (2005), and those analyzed by Bevan and Estrin (2000), Bevan et 
al. (2004), and Garibaldi et al. (2001) only one found FDI incentives to play a 
significant role. Morriset (2003), who analyzed the functioning of 58 investment 
promotion agencies in transition and developing countries, finds that the effects 
of investment incentives without the necessary investment climate in the country 
can even be negative.
Within the limited scope of the overall impact of investment incentives on 
FDI flows and structure, there is, however, room for making incentives policy 
more or less efficient. Further on, we analyze the existing literature on incentives 
effectiveness with regards to different features of incentives policy. We put the ef-
fectiveness of incentives policy in the context of its objectives, types and structure 
of incentives, and delivery of incentives and operational capabilities of investment 
agencies.
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6.5.1 Eff ectiveness of incentives and objectives of incentives policies
Investment incentives policies have two main objectives: the quantitative objec-
tive of increasing FDI inflows or the number of new jobs created by FDI (loca-
tional incentives), and the qualitative objective, which aims to encourage certain 
behavior of foreign investors (behavioral incentives). Qualitative objectives usu-
ally focus on issues like investing in priority sectors or less developed regions, 
providing high-quality new jobs, export-oriented activity, engaging of domestic 
suppliers, transfer of technology, or R&D in foreign subsidiaries. Here, two is-
sues are especially relevant:
1 It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of an incentive program without 
taking into account its objectives. If the incentives aim at increasing the inflow 
of FDI, then the indicator of effectiveness is an increased inflow of FDI or an 
increase in employment stemming from FDI, and not export propensity or 
technology transfer.
2 In practice, governments rarely pursue only quantitative or qualitative objec-
tives. Usually, they pursue a set of different objectives, whereby the weight 
attached to various objectives is quite different in different countries. A gov-
ernment should never consider only how to increase FDI inflows, but also how 
to improve the quality of FDI and the links between foreign subsidiaries and 
domestic firms.
OECD (2003, p. 126) claims that incentives can be effective in attracting and 
influencing the location and behavior of foreign investors. But the economic de-
sirability of locational incentives is not really clear. In fact, theory tends to sug-
gest that, in principle, behavioral aspects of FDI incentives should have priority 
over the increase of FDI inflows as a policy objective (see for instance, Lall, 1996; 
Narula and Dunning, 2000). The case for incentives at the site, activity and be-
havioral level is stronger, but only when the setting is appropriate. Behavioral 
incentives are more likely to be effective in inducing benefits from FDI when 
complemented with other policy measures aimed, for example at enhancing the 
level of skills, technology and infrastructure quality.
Empirical analyses generally fail to find evidence of a positive impact of in-
vestment incentives on FDI inflows (see for instance, Morriset and Pirnia, 2000; 
Oman, 2000). Beyer (2002) employs a panel analysis of transition countries to 
find that the announcement of FDI promotion programs have little effect on 
FDI after other determinants are controlled for. An earlier study of transition 
countries by Holland and Ownes (1996) similarly only finds a marginal role for 
incentives in attracting FDI. Semihradsky and Klazar (2001) even found a nega-
tive correlation between investment incentives and FDI for the Czech Republic, 
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Hungary and Poland, which they attribute to competition for FDI amongst simi-
lar locations in Central Europe.
Mallya, Kukulka and Jensen (2004) analyze the effectiveness of the Czech 
FDI promoting policies in attracting new inflows of foreign capital, the qual-
ity of incoming FDI and the cost-benefit aspect of FDI promotion. After the 
introduction of FDI promotion policies annual inflows of FDI into the Czech 
Republic more than doubled. Mallya, Kukulka and Jensen claim that most of 
the increase cannot be attributed to the incentives schemes as only some 10 of 
additional FDI resulted from the incentives programs. Only a small number of 
investors decided on investing based on the incentives offered. A survey indicates 
that the program was successful in directing sectoral FDI as the sectoral structure 
of subsidized FDI differs greatly from those that were not subsidized. Findings 
also indicate that the incentive criteria used by Czechinvest have been successful 
in raising the quality of FDI (size, attracting greenfield projects and avoidance of 
cost-based investors).
According to Mallya, Kukulka and Jensen (2004), the Czech case points to 
a close interconnection between the inflow-increasing and behavioral objectives 
of FDI policies. If one realizes the behavioral objectives then the achievement of 
inflow-increasing objectives is less important. On the other hand, if the incen-
tives program succeed to attract additional FDI, but at the same time lead to a 
‘lower quality’ FDI, one may easily come to a conclusion about a negative cost-
benefit result of the program. The main conclusion of the Czech case is that gov-
ernments should concentrate on FDI incentives programs that would in the first 
place improve the desired behavior of foreign investors and foreign-owned firms, 
rather than to set some inflows related goals. Apart from that, the governments 
should use instruments, which would stimulate additional domestic investment 
and spillover effects.
Explicitly or implicitly, integration of foreign subsidiaries in a host economy 
should probably be the main objective of any FDI policy; the higher the integra-
tion the higher the knowledge and other spillover from foreign subsidiaries to lo-
cal firms. In the past, governments frequently attempted to ‘force’ foreign-owned 
companies into linkages with local companies by local content requirements, 
foreign equity ceilings and joint ventures, sometimes even by direct requests to 
transfer technology from abroad. This kind of approach has mostly proved to be 
unsuccessful. That is why requirements about specific behavior of foreign-owned 
companies have been mostly swapped by more flexible systems, in which foreign 
investors are offered incentives if they fulfil certain requirements about linking 
with local companies.1 In principle, investors can always decide not to take these 
requirements into considerations and, thus, not to get the incentives. With such a 
‘positive’ linking of incentives and requirements, some countries successfully pro-
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mote interlinking of foreign-owned and local companies. The most often quoted 
successful cases are Singapore’s Local Industry Upgrading Programme and Irish 
National Linkage Programme (Barry, 1999; UNCTAD, 2001, 2005).
6.5.2 Eff ectiveness of incentives with regards to their type and structure
The type and structure of investment incentives also contribute to their effective-
ness. In principle, investors are supposed to prefer financial and other incentives 
(infrastructural assistance), especially subsidies and grants because these are usu-
ally obtained in the process of investing (building process, purchase of machin-
ery) or at the start of business process. Fiscal incentives, alternatively, depend 
on the success of the project and they cannot be obtained unless the project is 
successful. On the other hand, host countries are usually more in favor of fiscal 
than financial incentives; while financial incentives are direct budget expendi-
tures, fiscal incentives are only a renouncement of a potential budget income. The 
prevailing type of incentives also indicates a more or less aggressive character of 
incentives policy. The more the incentives scheme uses financial incentives, the 
more aggressive it is. Small economies, in which FDI is an important category and 
which strive to get export-oriented FDI, usually opt for more aggressive incen-
tives schemes.
Empirical studies, especially those of a more recent date, do not really fit in the 
above theoretical predictions, at least as far as the impact on the volume of FDI 
inflows is concerned. Lower corporate profit tax rates and various tax exemp-
tions seem to have a stronger impact on inward FDI than financial and other 
incentives. Taxes have been one of the most widely discussed incentives measures 
lately. The impact of taxes on investment behavior has been confirmed by nu-
merous studies and the majority of them confirm that taxes do have a large and 
significant negative impact on investment (see for instance, Benassy-Quere, Fon-
tagne and Lahreche-Revil, 2003; Billington, 1994; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; 
Pain and Young, 1996; Stöwhase, 2005). Studies which specifically include new 
EU member states are Bellak and Leibrecht (2007) and Vandenbussche (2005). 
The conclusion is that reduction of tax rates should have a positive impact on 
FDI. For policymakers these results indicate that tax policy can impact both the 
decision to target a specific location (country) as well as the decision about the 
size of investment.
Unfortunately, empirical analyses of the effectiveness of financial and other in-
centives are quite rare; for transition countries they do not exist at all. Mayer and 
Muchinelli (1998) analyze the impact of grants, subsidies, effective corporate tax 
rate, wage subsidies and structural funds on the Japanese FDI in the EU. Their 
results neither confirm nor reject the impact of the aforementioned incentives on 
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Japanese FDI in the EU. Ferrer (1998) finds that the amount of funds from EU 
regional structural funds had a negative impact on the number of employees in 
the subsidiaries of French MNCs. The high level of government assistance was 
supposed to give a signal of ‘underdevelopment’ and thus caused the regions to 
be less attractive to investors. Hubert and Pain (2002) analyze the impact of the 
shares of gross public investment, state subsidies, structural European Regional 
Development Fund and effective corporate tax rate on FDI in EU. They find a 
positive and significant impact of public investment and corporate tax rate on the 
level of inward FDI.
6.5.3 Eff ectiveness of investment incentives with regard to delivery of 
incentives and operational capabilities of investment agencies
Selectivity in granting investment incentives has become a norm in many coun-
tries. Targeted investment support has a number of advantages in terms of mini-
mizing costs and maximizing potential benefits of attracting FDI. Still, there is 
no consensus about the use of criteria in granting incentives. EBRD (2002) and 
other international institutions believe that incentives programs have to be com-
bined with a ‘hands-off ’ approach in targeting/selecting, in order to avoid the 
attempts to pick up the winners. UNCTAD (2002; 2003), on the other hand, 
favors the targeting of qualitative benefits through attracting export-oriented 
FDI, which helps further upgrade comparative advantages of recipient countries. 
OECD encourages incentives programs on a rules-based rather than competi-
tion-based approach (Oman 2000).
Morriset (2003), who analyzed investment promotion agencies in 58 transi-
tion and developing countries, lists the following findings with respect to their 
efficiency and guidance in attracting FDI:
– Agency efficiency is related to the general investment climate in the recipient 
country. Agencies in countries with poor investment climates will not be ef-
ficient in attracting FDI.
– Agencies that devote more funds to policy advocacy are more efficient as these 
activities benefit both foreign and domestic investors. On the contrary, invest-
ment-generating and investor-targeting activities are expensive and risky spe-
cifically in countries where the investment climate is poor.
– Agencies that have clearly established reporting mechanisms with channels to 
the highest government organs are systematically more successful in attracting 
FDI. Such institutional links are the key in strengthening the government’s 
commitment, and reinforcing the credibility and visibility of the agency in the 
business community.
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Best-practice analysis of investment promotion agencies points to four principles 
crucial for efficient investment promotion and incentives policies:
1 Predictability. Predictability is required in a clear policy and legal framework 
for investment, predictable rules and regulation and their just and consistent 
application.
2 Accountability. Public officials’ accountability and efficiency can be improved 
by establishing clear standards and monitoring, which also reduces the chanc-
es of corruption.
3 Transparency. Initial contact and relations between a government and poten-
tial investors are best when necessary information is available on time, when it 
is easily attainable and when help for investors is well organized.
4 Participation. Open dialogue with the interested parties contributes to the evo-
lution of incentives policies and their implementation (UNCTAD, 2004, p.4).
6.6 Overview of knowledge-transfer related investment incentives 
in selected transition countries
Empirical studies for transition countries broadly confirm the limited effective-
ness of investment incentives. They tend to suggest that, in principle, behavioral 
aspects of FDI incentives should have priority over the increase of FDI inflows 
as a policy objective. Contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical studies, es-
pecially those of a more recent date, suggest that lower corporate profit tax rates 
and various tax exemptions seem to have stronger impact on inward FDI than 
financial and other incentives. Also, selectivity in granting investment incentives 
has become a norm in many countries. The aim of this section is to look at the 
investment incentives programs of selected transition countries – Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia – from the 
perspective of the above findings. In doing that we concentrated on behavioral in-
centives, especially those related to knowledge transfers (incentives for investing 
in high-tech and R&D activities), technology transfer, and training for industrial, 
technological and scientific parks.
6.6.1 Investing in high-tech activities, R&D activities, technology transfer, 
training
Investments in high-tech industries are promoted within the context of national-
development strategies and there is no differentiation between foreign and do-
mestic investors. Investments in these activities are promoted in the first place by 
tax incentives.
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The Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency2 focuses its sup-
port on high value-added investment projects, including a one-stop-shop service 
with a VIP treatment and comprehensive information about available subsidies 
for investment projects. For R&D developments, investors are eligible for indi-
vidual subsidies for projects of at least EUR 10 million or ten potential new job 
openings. The size of the direct subsidy is decided by the government. R&D 
projects of at least EUR 400,000 are also eligible for ‘development tax subsidy’. 
Other incentives are the same for other manufacturing projects above EUR 10 
million or 50 new jobs, which include the following options: 1) cash subsidy de-
cided individually by the Hungarian Government, 2) development tax allowance3, 
3) training subsidy4, 4) job creation subsidy5, 6.
Croatia offers investment incentives for projects in the manufacturing sector, 
technology centers and strategic business support services in the form of tax and 
employment incentives, training incentives and additional incentives for large 
projects (EUR 15 million and 100 new jobs), which also includes technological 
developments. For the projects related to technology and innovation centers a 
non-repayable grant of 5 of the actual eligible costs of investment in fixed assets 
is available. Also, in the case of the purchase of equipment for the technology and 
innovation center in question the maximum aid amount will not exceed EUR 
500,000, if the purchased equipment for the technology and innovation center 
is high-tech equipment. But the recipient of incentives ‘must retain his eligibility 
status and maintain the investment and new employment linked to the invest-
ment during a minimum period of five years which shall not be shorter than the 
period in which it makes use of the incentive measures’.7
The Czech Republic offers investment incentives for manufacturing projects 
(automotive, aerospace, electrical engineering and electronics, high-tech engi-
neering, medical devices), services (medical services, IT and software develop-
ment) and R&D. According to the 2007 Investment Act, incentives span from 
corporate tax relief in the form of full tax relief for five years for new establish-
ments and partial tax relief for expanding companies, regional incentives in the 
form of job creation grants of CZK 50,000 per employee and 35 cost refund 
for training and retraining costs in the regions most affected by unemployment. 
But the total received funds must not exceed 40 (50 in the case of medium 
enterprises, 60 in the case of small enterprises) of the investment made into 
long-term tangible and intangible assets, with the expectation of training and 
retraining funds. Eligibility of incentives depends on size of investment (CZK 
50 million in least developed regions, CZK 100 million in most), minimum 50 
coverage by own equity and minimum 60 of total investment in mechanization.8
Investments in R&D and innovations (technology centers) and business sup-
port services centers are promoted and supported through several programs and 
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are a constituent part of a strategy to support projects in progressive technolo-
gies and activities with high added value and strong export potential. In the last 
program, valid since April 2007, subsidies for training and retraining and subsi-
dies for business activity are available (estimation based on sum for wages). But 
the investment must be at least CZK 10 million and must open from 20 (Soft-
ware development centers, ICT expert and solution centers) to 100 new job posts 
(Customer contact centers). Investors must fulfill these conditions within three 
years after the support has been allocated and must keep eligibility for five years. 
International orientation of the project is also important.9
Estonia offers numerous programs and incentives schemes for different sec-
tors. All projects can apply for the general start-up support (2008 plan) which 
offers start-up and development funds to help develop various activities.10 A 
Start-Up Grant, targeted at entrepreneurs that are ready to offer a product or 
service needed by the market, but that are not oriented to rapid growth, can be 
applied for in the amount of up to EEK 50,000. The maximum share of the 
grant in the cost of the project is 75. A Development Grant, targeted at entre-
preneurs who are ready to offer a product or service needed by the market and 
that are oriented to rapid growth or who have already proven their competitive-
ness and need support for speeding up growth, can be applied in the amount of 
up to EEK 200,000. The maximum share of the grant in the cost of the project 
is 50.
For the R&D sector, Estonia attempts to provide opportunities to launch new 
or improved products and services. The program creates a premise for the ad-
vancement of business competitiveness by introducing new and improved prod-
ucts and services to the market and implementing new technologies. The govern-
ment participates by offering financial support through the program and sharing 
in the technological and marketing risks related to the projects.11 Estonia also 
offers grants for implementing applied research projects, the results of which can 
be used in the development of new or existing products, technologies or services. 
It provides up to 60 of the total costs directly related to a project, up to 75 of 
the costs directly related to a project where the project is in accordance with EU 
directives for R&D and where the project involves international cooperation be-
tween several parties, or even up to 100 of the costs directly related to a project 
if its results are available to all enterprises and individuals on an equal basis and 
where the project is implemented for industrial purposes in cooperation with 
enterprises.12
Romania provides incentives for investments in the following sectors: activi-
ties of agro-industrial processing, top sectors in the manufacturing industry, elec-
tric and thermal energy production and delivery; production of equipments for 
increasing energetic effectiveness and use of renewable energy resources, environ-
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mental quality protection and improvement, water distribution, waste manage-
ment, informatics and communications, research, development and innovation 
activities or new products development, and activities providing work force ser-
vices. Incentives are of three types: granting nonrefundable funds for purchasing 
material and immaterial assets, granting state-budget financial contributions for 
newly created jobs, granting interest discounts for contracting credits, as well 
as other types of incentives provided by the legislation in force. The eligibility 
conditions depend on the investment (regional differences, potential spillover ef-
fects, technological characteristics, R&D, environmental aspects) and the inves-
tors (business performance of firms in the past is taken into account).13
Slovakia14 offers the following types of investment assistance: investment aid 
to support initial investment and creation of jobs, which is provided in the form 
of: a subsidy for the acquisition of material assets and immaterial assets, an in-
come tax relief under a separate regulation, a contribution for created new jobs 
under a separate regulation, and the transfer of immovable property or exchange 
of immovable property at a price lower than a general asset value.15 Slovakia 
offers incentives for industrial sectors, technology centers, centers of strategic 
service and tourism. For industry, grants are available for projects between EUR 
6 million (in regions with unemployment at least 50 higher than the Slovak 
average) and EUR 24 million (in regions with unemployment lower than the 
Slovak average). Technology centers investment must be at least EUR 1.3 mil-
lion, strategic services EUR 1 million and tourism between EUR 3.2 million and 
EUR 16 million, depending on the regional development, similar to the industrial 
projects.
Slovenia16 offers fiscal, financial and other incentives to potential investors. 
Investors can reduce the corporate tax base for a certain percentage of the values 
of: investments in research and development projects, for employment of disa-
bled persons, training costs, costs of voluntary supplementary pension insur-
ance, and donations. Slovenia also offers certain financial incentives, cost-sharing 
grant schemes. Grants are available for investments in: industry, strategic services 
(Customer Contact Centers, Shared Services Centers, Logistics and Distribution 
Centers, Regional Headquarters), and R&D. The government FDI Cost-Sharing 
Grant Scheme can cover costs/expenses of the creation of new jobs, arising di-
rectly from the investment project, calculated for the period of two years (costs 
of gross salaries and compulsory contributions for social security); costs/expens-
es of material/tangible investments; costs of intangible long-term investments. 
There are also other incentives, especially those agreed individually on a regional 
basis and incentives for employing unemployed workers.
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6.6.2 Industrial, technological, and science parks
Increasing intercountry convergence of tax and fi nancial incentives for foreign in-
vestors has led to the introduction of new types of incentives. One of the most 
promising types, with no discrimination between foreign and domestic investors, 
are industrial, technological and science parks.17 Industrial parks, as a rule, include 
spatial planning with necessary road and other infrastructure. Building plots of 
diff erent sizes are available to buy or hire, and standardized industrial premises are 
also available (Kelleher and Th ompstone, 2000). Science and technological parks 
are usually closely interlinked with universities in the respective country. In the 
neighborhood of larger towns or outside big urban conglomerates the parks are 
managed by private companies, public organizations, such as local authorities (for 
example, the industrial park in Kolin, Czech Republic) or state-owned enterprises 
for the development of industrial parks (for example, IDA in Ireland). Th ese kinds 
of parks act as an incentive for foreign investors, because they enable foreign inves-
tors to begin with their activities in a rather short period of time (they can buy or 
hire the prefabricated premises immediately or, alternatively, immediately begin to 
construct premises on the land, which they buy or hire) and, at the same time, off er 
a rather pleasant working conditions/environment to the employees. Transition 
countries are quite intensively involved in these kinds of attracting foreign investors.
Hungary offers a great number of industrial parks, which typically provide 
basic infrastructure (energy, water, waste-water treatment), a wide range of qual-
ity business services, including banking, consulting, security and office services, 
as well as customs administration and assistance in the creation of a supplier 
network. The projects are very successful18: industrial parks contribute to 32 
of the Hungarian GDP, companies located in industrial parks produce 31.4 of 
industrial exports and of the 50 largest MNCs present in Hungary, more than 
half are in industrial parks.
Croatia in its 2006-2013 development strategy especially outlines the impor-
tance of developing knowledge-intensive industries as the core of future devel-
opment. Development of science and technology parks and business incubators 
are its key element. There are several technology centers and entrepreneurship 
and business incubators in Croatia. The collaboration between universities and 
businesses is also stimulated by TEMPUS supporting the formation of Entre-
preneurship and Technology transfer offices in Zagreb, Split and Rijeka. Also 
important is the Business Innovation Center in Croatia, BICRO, a governmental 
run center, which runs several programs (RAZUM, TEHCRO, VENCRO, IR-
CRO, KONCRO) focusing on funding the development of innovations and new 
technologies based on entrepreneurship, increasing local competitiveness and in-
creasing spillover absorption capacity.19
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In the Czech Republic, promotion of development of technological centers and 
supporting business services is one of the most interesting incentives schemes. 
Almost 50 science and technology parks, innovation centers and business incu-
bators are offered to investors and are at various stages of development. They 
are promoted as suitable for both larger R&D investments and small innovation 
projects. Technological centers intended for the development of innovations in 
production, centers for the development of software equipment, high-tech ser-
vice centers, call centers for the support of customers, regional headquarters, and 
related high value-added services are eligible for incentives in the amount of 50 
of the project costs in the form of investment in fixed assets and/or salaries. Do-
mestic and foreign investors are treated equally.20
Enterprise Estonia in its support measures for business, innovation and R&D 
development for 2007-2013 focuses on the development of ‘competence centers’, 
which are established in cooperation between the industry and academic sector 
and carry out the research for developing products. In 2004, five competence 
centers were established with the help of Enterprise Estonia, working in the fields 
of cancer diagnostics and treatment, nanotechnology and sensory materials, de-
signing and testing embedded systems, food and fermentation technologies, and 
healthy food products.21
Slovakia has also developed several industrial parks in the following regions: 
Banska Bystrica, Bratislava & Trnava, Košice, Nitra, Prešov, Trenčin and Žilina. 
The parks offer accounting, marketing services, loans, investments, development 
and legal advisory services. The parks also attempt to create favorable conditions 
for development of SMEs. While applying modern technologies in production 
and concentrating on the production of high-tech products, they also offer inno-
vation support, development of local scientific research activities and assistance 
with their result application in production and support export growth.22
Romania developed numerous industrial parks, which focus on a specific type 
of activity (for example, Dej park in the northwestern region of Cluj focuses on 
automotive parts, UTA2 industrial park in the western region of Arad focuses 
on logistics and light industry). The country also opened several free zones (for 
example, Curtici Arad free zone) focusing on promoting export-oriented produc-
tion. PHARE assisted in creating some industrial zones (for example, Arad Vest 
industrial zone).23
Slovenia has gone through several stages of incubator and technology parks 
development. After the initial enthusiasm in 1992-1996, the Business Incubators 
Group (BIG) opened two technology parks (Ljubljana and Maribor). Due to a 
lack of consensus on the type of SME support and lack of financing, the 1996-
2001 period was marked by a downturn in this field, but from 2001 onwards, with 
the assistance of the PHARE program, the interest for business infrastructure 
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has revived and also a law on SME support, clarifying the financial background 
for the projects, was adopted. Nowadays, Slovenia offers several technology parks 
(for example, Ljubljana, Maribor), business incubators and university incuba-
tors.24
6.7 Conclusions and policy suggestions
The focus of this chapter is on analyzing the investment incentives policies in 
transition countries from the perspective of the recent trends in investment in-
centives policies and their effectiveness in attracting more and better FDI. Spe-
cific FDI policy is only one element of the investment climate, but not the most 
important one. Even the best and the friendliest policy for foreign investors could 
not compensate for an inadequate regulatory-administrative and economic pol-
icy framework. Still, overall liberalization of FDI regimes and increasing con-
vergence among countries in many aspects of economic systems, regulatory and 
policy framework, has made FDI policy an increasingly important determinant 
of a good investment climate. Nowadays, if a country does not offer some ad-
ditional benefits, and when other primary and secondary FDI relevant factors in 
two countries are more or less equal, foreign investors may choose to invest in an-
other country with ‘similar’ basic conditions yet which offers additional benefits. 
These benefits simply become infrastructure expected by foreign investors when 
looking for a suitable investment location.
Empirical studies for transition countries broadly confirm the limited effec-
tiveness of investment incentives for inward FDI. Their finding is that, in princi-
ple, behavioral aspects of FDI incentives should have priority over the increase of 
FDI inflows as a policy objective. Contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical 
studies, especially those of a more recent date, suggest that lower corporate-profit 
tax rates and various tax exemptions seem to have a stronger impact on inward 
FDI than financial and other incentives. Selectivity in granting investment incen-
tives has become a norm in many countries.
The overall impression from a brief overview of incentives schemes of selected 
economies in transition – Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia – is that, apart from stimulating the creation of 
new jobs and investments in less developed regions, investment incentives are 
predominantly of the behavioral type, targeted to high-tech sectors, transfer of 
technology, R&D, and training. In principle, incentives are equally available for 
foreign and domestic firms, but implicitly most of them seem to target foreign 
investors. Increasing attention is also devoted to the delivery of incentives, that is 
to say, to the assurance that the incentives granted will really bring the expected 
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results. Overall, this is in line with what theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence on incentives policies would suggest.
What then, are possible policy suggestions for transition countries with a view 
to attract more and better FDI? Conceptually, FDI-related policies should mainly 
be regarded in terms of potential spillover eff ects, meaning that the increasing of 
the local fi rms’ absorption capacity is of paramount importance if FDI is really to 
become an agent of development (Damijan, Rojec, Majcen and Knell, 2008). Th e 
priority for action must be growth and stability-oriented macroeconomic frame-
works, improvement of general framework conditions (reduction of rigidities and 
barriers on labor and product markets, adequate competition policies, availability 
of locations and premises, infrastructure), plus adequate innovation, R&D, educa-
tion and related policies. Th ese are preconditions for attracting businesses and FDI. 
As far as investment incentives policy in the narrow sense is concerned, it should 
develop in the following directions: 1) to attract the right kind of FDI is more im-
portant than the amount of FDI, that is to say, there should be less general incen-
tives and more incentives targeted to specifi c purposes, such as the introduction of 
new technologies, export promotion, R&D activities, employment, in particular of 
highly skilled labor, environment-friendly projects; 2) incentives policy should be 
well incorporated into the national development strategy and policies; 3) invest-
ment incentives should be available on equal terms to all investors irrespective of 
industry and nationality of investor, but some types of incentives will be implicitly 
more targeted to foreign investors; 4) allowing of individualized treatment of ma-
jor projects and individually-tailored incentive packages which are more eff ective 
and less costly; 5) allowing investment agencies competent dealing with foreign 
investors; 6) delivery of incentives and monitoring of the results are important.
 Notes
* Th is paper was prepared within the Sixth Framework Program project Understanding the Re-
lationship between Knowledge and Competitiveness in the Enlarged European Union (U-know).
** Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, crt.kostevc@ef.uni-lj.si.
*** Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, tjasa.redek@ef.uni-lj.si.
**** Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, and Institute of Macroeconomic Anal-
ysis and Development, matija.rojec@gov.si.
 Also, efforts to better inform foreign-owned firms on potential local suppliers have been 
intensified; for instance creation of electronic data bases on local suppliers, organizing of 
events where foreign-owned firms meet potential local suppliers, and so on.
 ITD Hungary; http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=investment_incentives.
 Development tax subsidy exempts the investor from paying  of the payable corporate 
tax for ten years following the completion of the project, but it is additionally conditional 
regarding size of the project and job openings.
Scope and effectiveness of foreign direct investment
 Training subsidies granted individually by the government depend on the size of the com-
pany and type of training and can reach up to  of costs with additional bonuses for 
training of disadvantaged employees and regional bonuses.
 The incentive job creation subsidies reaching up to EUR , million are regionally based 
programs for companies that open  new jobs in less developed regions or  in the 
least developed ones. But among new employees at least  must be previously unem-





 These are: ) the acquisition of fixed assets required for implementing a business project 
(including transport and adjustment costs related to the acquisition); ) creation and 
development of a website with information about the enterprise; ) acquisition of applied 
software connected to the basic activity of the enterprise; ) activities necessary for devel-
oping industrial design solutions and trademarks, and development-related activities; ) 
acquisition of a patent, useful model, trademark or license for industrial design solution; 
) compliance assessment of the product produced by the enterprise.
 For example, Enterprise Estonia’s feasibility study grant has been designed for the pur-
pose of preparing the development of new products, technologies and services in enter-
prises. It provides up to  of the expenses of a feasibility study for applied research and 
up to  of the expenses of a feasibility study for product development (maximum EEK 








 They differ from traditional industrial zones by the very concept of organization. The 
basic difference between an industrial zone and an industrial park is that the latter is 
managed as a whole by the management who takes care of all the supporting aspects of 
relevance for the normal functioning of a park, that is to say security, cleaning, catering, 
bus transport, playground, etc. Organizational, business, spatial, environmental etc. stan-
dards in the parks are rather high. The ratio between construction and non-construction 
land is -: - for industrial parks of lower standards, and -: -, for 
industrial parks of higher standards. In the latter, there is also a greater accent on ad-
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7 Policies for attracting foreign direct investment 
and enhancing its spillovers to indigenous fi rms
 Th e case of Hungary
Katalin Antalóczy*, Magdolna Sass** and Miklós Szanyi***
7.1 Introduction
Since 1989, Hungary has been among the leading Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries in attracting foreign direct investments (FDI). It was always 
the priority of various governments to attract FDI into the country, partly be-
cause of the specificities of the country’s heritage from the socialist-communist 
period. This stance was translated into various policy measures, which were fa-
vorable – in some cases discriminatory – towards foreign investors, especially 
for those who undertook large projects in the country. This friendly approach 
to foreign investors has become a common feature of capital-lacking Central 
and Eastern European economies, with the possible exception of Lithuania, Po-
land and Slovenia. This rather descriptive chapter, after briefly describing the 
main characteristics of FDI in Hungary, presents in detail policies which tried 
to attract higher volumes of FDI and which have been aimed at increasing their 
positive impact on the domestic economy by promoting backward linkages. Two 
short company case studies, both on affiliates receiving substantial policy sup-
port, illustrate how companies may impact the domestic economy in different 
ways. A brief review of the literature provides the basis for evaluating the FDI 
policies of Hungary. In the following section, we try to extend our analysis by 
discussing the direct and indirect impacts of the global financial crisis on FDI 
and Hungary’s policy responses to this crisis. The concluding section summa-
rizes our main findings.
7.2 Foreign direct investment in Hungary
Hungary is a small open economy, which started the transition process from so-
cialism to the market economy in 1989. Compared to its neighbors it was more 
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open to foreign investments even before 1989. At the beginning of the transition, 
it had a close to USD 400 million stock of FDI (Csáki, 2001), mainly in the form 
of joint ventures ( JVs), due to the fact that the establishment of JVs was al-
lowed by law since 1972. More significant volumes of FDI started to arrive to the 
country in 1991, reaching a peak point of the decade in 1995, connected mainly to 
privatization in the profit of foreigners. Since 19951, the annual inflow fluctuated 
in the range of USD 2 to 6 billion. While up till 1998, new investments (equity) 
dominated the annual inflow, after that, additional investments of affiliates al-
ready present in Hungary in the form of reinvested earnings and other invest-
ments became more important.2
Hungary has been one of the leading countries among the East Central Eu-
ropean countries (together with the Czech Republic and Estonia) in attracting 
FDI in per capita terms. At the end of 2007, the stock of FDI in Hungary was 
USD 97.4 billion, which represents around 0.65  of the world FDI stock;3 this 
is higher than the share of the country in world trade. Hungary is host to more 
than 22 of the stock of FDI invested in countries which joined the EU in 2004, 
which is higher than the country’s share in the total population or GDP of the 
country group.
















































Policies for attracting foreign direct investment
In terms of the absolute value of stock, Poland is the leader, and Hungary – tak-
ing turns with the Czech Republic – is second, similarly to per capita terms, 
where Estonia is the leader. The annual inflow represents a relatively high share 
of annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in Hungary (on average around 
one third). The role of companies with foreign participation is high in the Hun-
garian economy, even in European comparison (for example in 2007, according 
to the data of the Hungarian Tax Authority, they accounted for 45 of gross 
value added, 46 of sales, 78 of exports, and employed around one fourth of 
workers.)
The most important foreign investor countries have been Germany, the Neth-
erlands and Austria,4 which represented more than half of the overall stock of 
FDI basically in every analyzed year. Geographical and cultural proximity ex-
plains their dominance. While besides big multinational corporations (MNCs), 
also smaller-sized German and Austrian companies invested in Hungary, Dutch, 
British and especially US investors are mainly big MNCs.
The sector composition of investments changed considerably during the two 
analyzed decades. While in the first half of the 1990s, the manufacturing sector 
was the most important target of foreign investors, after 1995, reflecting the tim-
ing and sequence of the privatization of public services and banks, these latter 
sectors started to gain shares in the overall stock of FDI. In 2007, the share of 
manufacturing FDI in total was 36, which is similar to other Visegrad coun-
tries (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia). Inside manufacturing, production 
of vehicles attracted the most FDI with its 30 share in 2007, followed by elec-
tronics (17). As an illustration, it is enough to name a few big MNCs present 
in Hungary with significant projects, such as Audi, Suzuki, Opel/GM in vehicle 
manufacturing or IBM, Flextronics, Nokia, Philips, or Samsung in electronics. 
Other important manufacturing branches are manufacture of petrol (10), food, 
beverages and tobacco (8.2) and metalworking (7.8). These reflect partly the 
relative abundance of the country in relatively cheap and relevantly skilled work-
ers (vehicles, electronics), its comparative advantages (food) and in metalworking, 
foreign-owned suppliers following their main clients.
Horizontal projects dominated in the first half of the 1990s. Starting from 
1995, more and more vertical investments appeared, mainly in manufacturing, and 
from 2000 on, vertical services FDI also appeared and gained importance, mainly 
in the form of shared service centers of big MNCs and independent business 
service vendors, such as EDS or IBM.
The regional distribution of FDI is usually determined by geographical con-
siderations, transport facilities, other elements of the infrastructure and char-
acteristics of labor endowment. Due to geographical considerations, companies 
with foreign participation are concentrated in and around Budapest,5 in the west-
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ern part of the country, along the Austrian border, and in the northwestern part 
of the country, especially in the town of Székesfehérvár. Emerging locations are 
Miskolc, Kecskemét, Debrecen and so on, in the eastern part of the country, due 
to the newly built motorways providing good connections to them and their good 
endowment with (semi-) skilled workers.
7.3 Foreign direct investment policies in Hungary
7.3.1 Th eoretical background
Government policies influence the locational advantages (‘L’ in the OLI-frame-
work of Dunning, 1993) of the given country through various channels. The 
general state of the host economy, its economic, legal and political stability, 
and its size, its geographical location and its relative factor endowment, that is 
FDI-incentives in a broader sense, are the most important factors for attract-
ing foreign investors. On the other hand, FDI-incentives in the narrow sense 
consist of those elements of the economic policy that are aimed at the improve-
ment of the return on FDI, and/or a reduction of its risks and/or costs. They 
do not include those non-discriminatory elements of policies, which provide 
for a ‘normal, usual’ business environment for investors. Incentives can be fiscal 
(tax-related), financial (grants) and other incentives (OECD, 1989). The FDI 
enhancing role of incentives in the narrow sense is widely discussed in the lit-
erature and empirical evidence is inconclusive concerning the impact of incen-
tives on FDI flows, though there is more and more evidence on the impact of 
incentives on locational choices of investors (see for example Hassett and Hub-
bard, 1997; Wells and Wint, 2000; Clark, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Hubert and Pain, 
2002; Morisset and Andrew-Johnson, 2004; Charlton and Davis, 2006; Bobo-
nis and Schatz; 2007). Incentives in the narrow sense may certainly play a role 
in choosing between locations inside a region,6 which are otherwise performing 
similarly in terms of FDI incentives in a broad sense. This consideration can be 
valid for similar locations among the East Central European countries and/or 
inside Hungary. Here we analyze the evolution of the Hungarian FDI policy 
along these lines; first of all, we present the changes in the incentive system (in 
a narrow sense) together with changes in other elements of the economic policy, 
which influenced the overall FDI environment to a great extent (especially pri-
vatization policy). We present details about the most important elements of the 
economic and policy background, which determined or at least shaped changes 
in the FDI policy.
Policies for attracting foreign direct investment
7.3.2 Foreign direct investment policies in Hungary: Increasing the volume 
of foreign direct investment
In Hungary, overall, economic policies have been favorable for foreign investors 
during the two decades of the transition period. Hungary was the first country in 
the region which made possible the establishment of companies with foreign par-
ticipation in 1972; however, ‘real’ FDI policy has been operated only since 1988. In 
this period lasting more than two decades, there were many changes introduced 
in the FDI policy of Hungary. On the basis of the content (measures), uniformity, 
and level of transparency, three periods of FDI policy can be distinguished. The 
first one started in 1988 and lasted until around the mid-1990s, the second one 
lasted until the end of 2003, and the third one until now (Antalóczy and Sass, 
2003). However, because of the financial crisis, a fourth period could be in the 
making at present.
 the first period of foreign direct investment policies, 
1989-1995
In the first period, at the beginning of the reform process, risks for foreign inves-
tors were exceedingly high, because a country started to allow the inflow of FDI, 
in which the share of state ownership was overwhelming. Moreover, the country 
could be characterized by acute lack of capital, grave problems of indebtedness, 
structural problems, institutional-regulatory ‘chaos’ and insecurity. Moreover, 
compared to other transition economies, there was less resistance to the market 
economy in Hungary both on the part of economists and on the part of the popu-
lation, partly due to previous reform steps, which were introduced starting from 
1968. In the risky environment of an underdeveloped market, instable budget, 
and high debt burden and in an era in which competition for FDI in the world 
economy became more and more acute, FDI policy evolved as follows. Hungary 
liberalized capital flows and built up the legal framework for FDI earlier in re-
gional comparison. A big change in the regulatory environment for foreign inves-
tors came in 1988, starting from when foreign investors were granted national 
treatment in all economic branches except for the financial sector. A 50 share 
could be obtained without prior permission, for shares above that, permission 
was needed. The 1988 law allowed the repatriation of all profits, granted duty free 
status for contribution in kind, and depending on foreign share, volume of invest-
ment and the sector of investment, it granted tax allowances and tax holidays. 
Thus, the most important elements of FDI policy were fiscal incentives, as in 
other less developed countries. The government gave up those incomes, which it 
did not have: future tax and duty revenues. On the other hand, in order to attract 
 Katalin Antalóczy, Magdolna Sass and Miklós Szanyi
FDI in the sharper competition, the government tried to attract big, well-known 
MNCs, granting them one-off, tailor-made and generous incentives in the form 
of substantial tax holidays (for example for ten years) and other types of incen-
tives (for example the possibility of operating in a free trade zone, see Box 7.2). 
These well-known companies, such as Suzuki, GE, General Motors and Ford, 
provided a kind of ‘green light’ for other investors. As a third element, which was 
different from the policies applied in other countries of the region, in Hungary, 
where there was an urgent need for currency for debt repayment, privatization 
policy was centered around selling state-owned companies for cash. In a country 
which was characterized by lack of capital, in most of the cases this meant privat-
Box 7.1 Privatization and FDI
Privatization and FDI are closely related in the period of transition (Kalotay and Hunya, 
2000). In Hungary, a substantial amount of FDI was connected to strategic privatization 
projects until 1998. Since the start of the process, unlike in other competitor countries in 
the region, cash sales had prevailed over other privatization methods. However, the share 
of privatization-related FDI declined substantially, 1997 was the last year when a signifi cant 
amount was registered in that respect.7 Other countries in the region started to sell state-
owned companies to foreigners later compared to Hungary. The share of privatization 
revenues in FDI became substantial only after 1995 in Poland, after 1998 in the Czech 
Republic and after 2000 in Slovakia (Chart 2).
The share of privatization related FDI in the total infl ow of FDI follows the same pattern 
in the three countries with a time lag. There are many problems in determining the 
share of privatization – related FDI in total (see for example Sass, 2005 for the list of data 
problems and the ‘underreporting’ of privatization-related FDI), but even incomplete 
data show a clear and diverging pattern for the period 1996-2002 for the three countries, 
for which data are available. Besides diff erent timing of privatization of state-owned 
companies, involvement of foreign investors in capital-intensive infrastructure projects 
and privatization of public services to foreigners also happened at diff erent times, Hungary 
being a clear forerunner in that respect.
Thus, the FDI performance of economies in transition cannot be judged without taking into 
account the share of privatization-related FDI. The large infl ows of FDI to Hungary can partly 
be attributed to privatization deals until around 1997, that is in the fi rst period of FDI policy. 
However, privatization-related FDI itself also had an impact on further infl ows, fi rst, due to 
creating a more market-like environment through its presence in the country and giving a 
good signal to other potential investors, second, because these projects attracted further 
FDI: suppliers, service providers, competitors and so on started to invest in the country, 
third, because the regulatory environment had to be adapted to the requirements of 
these companies, that is by creating and enforcing market economy laws and regulations. 
However, after 1998, privatization-related FDI has been negligible in Hungary, partly 
because the government ‘run out of’ suitable companies, while in other Visegrad countries 
their share still has been signifi cant.
Policies for attracting foreign direct investment
Figure 7.2 Share of privatization-related FDI in total FDI (%)
Source: Sass (2005)
izing to cash-rich foreigners. In some cases, even (quasi-)monopoly positions, 
(temporarily) protected markets were sold to foreign investors. As a fourth ele-
ment, FDI in certain sectors was preferred, while the regional element (trying 
to divert investments to more backward regions) was not present at all. Until 
1993, a positive discrimination towards foreign investors was introduced where 
preferences were given only to companies with foreign participation. After the 
abolishment of this discriminatory regulation in 1993, other elements of the sys-
tem of incentives (for example high minimum investment requirement) secured 
the survival of the preferential treatment of foreign investors. In 1993, the national 
institution of FDI promotion, ITDH, was established.
 the second period of foreign direct investment policies, 
1996-2003
In the second period, starting from 1996, the economic and political environment 
of FDI promotion had changed substantially. The institutional and regulatory 
background of the market economy was more or less present and functioning, 
the macroeconomic environment was much more stable. The economy grew at 
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tax to 18 resulted in a favorable environment for all the investors (domestic 
and foreign alike). Compared to other transition economies, the stock of FDI 
was already high in Hungary, and certain regional ‘hubs’ of FDI were established 
(namely in the northwestern and central parts of the country). Not only the en-
vironment changed, but also certain obligations, taken up in international or-
ganizations (mainly in the WTO), induced changes in FDI policy. Moreover, 
negative experiences connected to tailor-made incentives and concerning certain 
foreign investors also induced the government to change the system. The FDI 
policy of this period could be characterized as more transparent and more nor-
mative. It became also more active in terms of targeting: it tried to divert FDI to 
certain sectors, regions, activities, and applied more performance requirements 
as prerequisites for getting the fiscal, financial and other incentives. FDI policy 
was also used to attain other policy aims (for example, as a tool of industrial 
policy, regional policy, trade policy, R&D policy, labor policy). One of the focuses 
of FDI policy was to attract export-oriented large investments (in manufactur-
ing). Big investments were clearly preferred: it can be shown by the fact that the 
number of enterprises enjoying the greatest benefits of a 0 company tax was 
less than 50 in 1999 (Antalóczy and Sass, 2003). There was also attention paid to 
the enhancement of spillovers from companies with foreign participation to the 
local/domestic economy, because a special supplier program was launched.8 Fis-
cal elements still dominated, but financial incentives gained importance. Other 
incentives, especially industrial free trade zones (IFTZs), were also important. 
This second period of the FDI policy can be characterized as the ‘heydays’ of 
IFTZs because more than a hundred companies operated there. There was an 
important change in this second period in the neighboring countries of Hungary 
in terms of FDI policies: a kind of regional FDI competition started, when in 
1998, the Czech Republic and in 2000, Slovakia introduced very generous sys-
tems of incentives for foreign investors and privatized companies by selling them 
to foreigners. The incentives offered by these countries were in some cases more 
generous than those provided in Hungary (for example, lower minimum invest-
ment requirements), which, as these countries became more and more similar as 
investment sites, probably affected locational choices of investors (Sass, 2003).9
 the third period of foreign direct investment policies
The third period of FDI policies started in 2003, and its main content was the 
transformation and operation of FDI policies alongside EU rules. Competition 
and investment incentive policies have always been in conflict with each oth-
er in the EU regulations. During the previous enlargements, partly due to spe 
cial economic-policy circumstances, catching up of the new member states was
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Box 7.2 Industrial free trade zones
The regulation concerning IFTZs was introduced fi rst in 1982 with the objective of 
attracting export-oriented, high technology FDI to Hungary. International examples of 
similar schemes can be found in the export processing zones of developing countries, 
the customs-free zones of Ireland and the United States. At the same time, another 
objective was to integrate the companies operating in IFTZs as much as possible into 
the host economy, and eliminate the risk of a dual economy evolving. This risk is usually 
present with such regulations, for example, on the basis of the experience of developing 
countries.
The regulation of IFTZs was unique in Hungary. Any company could set up its own zone 
without geographical restrictions of any kind under license by the customs and fi nance 
authorities. IFTZs were considered as being extraterritorial for purposes of duties, foreign 
exchange and other legislation. The dutiable goods and means of production (excluding 
building and auxiliary material) were not subject to customs duties and value-added tax.
Why is that regulation especially attractive for (export-oriented) greenfi eld investors? Since 
1996, contribution-in-kind could be transferred to the country duty- and VAT-free only for 
investments realized in IFTZs. For these large-sized investments, paying the duties and 
VAT would have meant high additional costs. Another reason for the growing number 
of companies in IFTZs was that companies operating there could buy their inputs from 
the domestic economy with a special permission and up to a certain amount duty free. 
Thus, traditional suppliers following their buyers to Hungary established their affi  liates in 
an IFTZ as well. Moreover, these companies operating on an IFTZ did not face a currency 
risk, because they could keep their accounts in foreign currency. This was an extremely 
attractive regulation for assembly companies using only local labor as it enabled them to 
bring in high-value equipment free of duty for their own use.
Starting from 1990, there have been more and more IFTZs established in Hungary. First, 
a number of MNCs carried out greenfi eld investment in Hungary in an IFTZ (for example 
General Motors, Suzuki, and Philips). Later their competitors or suppliers followed them and 
established their Hungarian affi  liate in an IFTZ (Ford, Audi, IBM, Nokia, LEAR Corp., United 
Technologies, Sony, Zollner) as well as companies, which identifi ed East Central Europe as 
an attractive investment location around that time (like Benetton).
At the end of 2001, there were more than a hundred IFTZs established in Hungary. Philips 
(computer monitors, telecommunication products) operated more than one IFTZ, as well 
as the LEAR Corp. (producing car seats and other car parts). According to one estimation, 
based on company interviews, of the 115 IFTZs operating in Hungary in 2001, about 70-75 
were established through greenfi eld investment (Antalóczy and Sass, 2001). The share of 
foreign capital exceeded 90% in all the base capital of IFTZ companies.
With the EU-accession of Hungary, all companies operating in a customs-free zone became 
part of the customs territory of Hungary, thus IFTZs ceased to exist.
Source: Antalóczy and Sass (2001)
considered to be more important, thus competition policy aspects were pushed 
in the background, characterizing the last two rounds of enlargements by the 
priority of competition policy aspects concerning state aid. This can partly be 
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explained by the intenser incentive and tax competition and partly by the in-
creasing importance and incidence of relocations from Western to Eastern part 
of Europe (Hunya and Sass, 2005) and as a consequence, losses of unskilled jobs 
occurring in Western Europe. Countries joining the EU in 2004, had to change 
their incentive systems alongside EU lines. One side effect of that change has 
been that regional incentive competition became limited, by the rules which 
put a cap on aid intensity according to the level of development of the affected 
region, and there is a set of accepted forms of aid. Moreover, new member states 
had to ‘streamline’ their incentive systems, to define clear targets and priorities, 
concerning the type of activities, regions or even sectors. Those areas, where 
there is a greater maneuvering room in terms of incentives, are favorable from 
the point of view of a catching-up country aiming at higher growth rates (R&D, 
education-training, preference for less developed regions), however, they limit 
the possibilities for an active industrial policy. On the other hand, those ele-
ments of the FDI policy in a broader sense are allowed, which try to improve 
the overall business environment, such as lower taxes, infrastructure develop-
ments, establishment of industrial parks. As a consequence of the change of 
the incentive system, emphasis is put on financial and other incentives, and 
fiscal incentives are less important. In the Hungarian case, preference is given 
to big ( job-creating) projects, to export-oriented service sector investments, 
and (both Hungarian and foreign) investments realized in preferred sectors. 
Exceptionally big investments creating a high number of jobs in less developed 
regions can receive a ten-year tax holiday. Financial incentives are confined to 
education, training and job creation. Special financial incentives can be offered 
to big (above EUR 10 million) investments, which create a high number of jobs. 
Companies can apply for financial support in the framework of EU co-financed 
operative programs (shared service centers, R&D, tourism and so on). As far 
as other incentives are concerned, ITDH provides institutional support, there 
are industrial parks and accredited clusters, infrastructure developments, and 
special incentives can be offered by local municipalities (for example, tax reduc-
tions or holidays from local taxes).
7.3.3 Programs for enhancing the local impact of foreign direct investment: 
Supplier programs
As was already mentioned, starting from the second period of FDI policies, spe-
cial attention was paid to enhance local spillovers of FDI in terms of backward 
linkages. Here we present the related programs in detail since Hungary was the 
first to introduce this kind of program among the East Central European coun-
tries.
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Already in the second period of FDI policies, the majority of Hungarian manu-
facturing production capacities became foreign-owned. A high level of productiv-
ity was achieved through the application of state-of-the-art production systems 
and a high level of specialization. Most Hungarian affiliates were integrated in 
international production networks. However, this kind of specialization, as well 
as the sudden and effective technological upgrading of production equipments 
did not favor Hungarian-owned companies to join as equal or even as lower-level 
suppliers. Hungarian firms largely remained outside of the international produc-
tion networks, since they were small, technologically and financially weak, and 
in this early phase they also lacked sufficient managerial expertise in organizing 
their work according to the tight rules and delivery schedules of large MNCs. An 
important split of the economy evolved, namely an ownership-specific duality 
(see for example, Pavlinek, 2004; Antalóczy and Sass, 2005; Fink, 2006; Ellison, 
2007;). Due to inherited financial, technological and managerial bottlenecks but 
also because most medium-sized or large companies were sold to foreign inves-
tors, Hungarian-owned firms were simply too small, weak and inexperienced to 
become partners. Another main reason was, however, that typical activity areas 
of Hungarian and foreign firms were largely different. They could not become 
partners simply because they were in different businesses. As is described by sev-
eral studies (for example ITDH, 2002; Szanyi, 2002) main local suppliers of large 
MNCs in the automotive or electronics sectors were usually facility management, 
catering, cleaning and other services firms. These companies were of course not 
linked to the MNCs technologically; they did not participate in the actual pro-
duction process.
The first explicit supplier-promotion policies were aimed at strengthening 
Hungarian firms and enabling them to become production partners of large 
MNCs. Efforts were also made at carrying out competence mapping among po-
tential Hungarian suppliers, and government agencies started to carry out match-
making between local and foreign-owned firms. MNCs’ needs were registered, 
but even more important was gathering information about their supplier selec-
tion policies and practices. Government agencies provided information about the 
types of products, technical requirements and parameters of deliveries that large 
firms were looking for. This information was completed with practical guidelines 
about how these needs were actually fulfilled and how potential suppliers could 
successfully apply.
Starting in 1998 a number of explicit supplier-promotion policies were applied 
by Hungarian governments. Later these policy tools were inserted into broader 
development policy projects, and the special promotion agencies were also amal-
gamated into other enterprise promotion agencies like the Regional Develop-
ment Plc. and International Trade Development Agency. The explicit focus on 
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supplier development vanished however; this topic became a long-term prefer-
ence of many Hungarian development programs instead, including the National 
Development Plan.
 the supplier target program of 1998
The Supplier Target Program (STP) recognized that the major bottleneck of 
increasing Hungarian contributions was weaknesses of local small- and medium-
sized companies (SMEs). It aimed at the creation of direct links between foreign 
investments enterprises (FIEs) and Hungarian firms in selected industries: auto-
mobile, electronics and rubber and plastics. In doing so it focused on providing 
information and matchmaking, as well as training and consulting to SMEs, the 
would-be suppliers. Hungarian firms, especially SMEs, were set in the center of 
the program. It wished to support preparations of SMEs to fulfill requirements. 
Main partners of the program were the local chambers of commerce, the Hungar-
ian investment promotion agency (ITD Hungary), the Hungarian Foundation of 
Enterprise Development (HFED) with regional networks and the STP Program 
Office. HFED and the chambers organized training programs for SMEs to learn 
in general what MNCs looked for and how to cooperate with them. They also 
provided advisory support and supported the audit of SMEs’ books. ITD Hun-
gary managed a large-scale database with files of some 250,000 entrepreneurs 
(many of them quasi-entrepreneurs) and provided information for matchmaking. 
The main forum for matchmaking was a series of business meetings and suppliers’ 
fairs, where the two parties were to meet where SMEs were expected to receive 
specific information about requirements. State mediators of the program wished 
to support SMEs’ specific needs in the preparation process for the qualification.
These focuses did not prove to be efficient. The program did not take into 
account two important factors: first, FIEs had differing interests; second, there 
already were Hungarian mediators (first-tier suppliers) present in the market. 
A very critical evaluation of the STP from 2000 deemed the program a failure 
(MVKHT, 2000). Almost all the activities carried out in the program failed to 
bring the expected results. Most striking was the fact that a full-scale question-
naire survey reported only a couple of dozen of new contracts resulting from 
the program. Deepening of the pool for contracting was not successful either. 
Only relatively few SMEs could sufficiently improve activities to succeed in the 
program. On the other hand, the program was not able to attract the interest of 
FIEs either. This was partly because sourcing decisions in FIEs were not taken 
locally and the contacts of FIEs sourcing personnel needed higher level involve-
ment (Út-Eurocon, 2001; Réthi, 2001; GM, 2001).
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 the supplier integrator target program of 2000
The Supplier Target Program was reconsidered in 2000, and the new Integrator 
Supplier Target Program (ISTP) was launched the same year. The new Program 
focused on existing supplier networks in the targeted industrial branches. In the 
center of these was the core company, the Integrator. The Integrator firm was 
the primary partner of the state agent. The first chosen Integrators were Suzuki, 
General Electric, Audi, Opel and Rába. The Integrators actively contributed to 
the planning and creation of a cooperation network, a business cluster. Cluster 
meant in the concept the cooperation of suppliers, innovative companies, R&D 
centers and local development agencies. The development of business clusters 
was also supported by the Széchenyi Plan (the predecessor of the National De-
velopment Plan). The state partner of the Integrators was the local office of the 
Regional Development Corporation (RDC). The RDC’s activity was expanded 
with the management of both the ISTP funds, and the cluster development funds 
of the Széchenyi Plan. Beside RDCs, new Supplier Agencies were to be estab-
lished based partly on the network of the Hungarian Enterprise Development 
Foundation, but also other local institutions (chambers of commerce, offices of 
ITD Hungary, and so on) applied for the status.
The basic idea of the new Program was that existing supplier networks could 
be further developed as a nucleus of a bigger and complex cooperation network, 
a local cluster. It changed the direction of the promotion activity to the opposite: 
it started with the needs and requirements of FIEs and other integrator firms. 
The primary purpose of the program was to increase local suppliers’ share from 
the actual estimated 10-20 to 30-40 of MNCs’ value added. Matchmaking 
events were continuously organized, and there were plans to update the estab-
lished database and even expand it to 4,000-5,000 records. Training and advising 
SMEs still remained on the agenda, qualification and auditing of supplier mem-
bers of the program were also foreseen (with financial support from the program 
sources). Long-term finance for necessary investments in supplier firms was also 
planned by the new Program. This should have included both loans and equity 
participation (venture capital function). Support of quality insurance programs 
also remained in place. A new state support agency regularly monitored the sys-
tem and kept continuous contact with the participants.
The new program’s main contradiction was its conflict with general economic 
policy. While it was aimed at decentralizing supplier promotion, simultaneously 
strong centralization efforts in economic policy were done by the government. 
Many of the tasks of ministries and development agencies were reallocated to 
the Prime Minister’s Cabinet. Support of industrial clusters and innovation, as 
well as the general framework of the Széchenyi Development Plan were all allo-
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cated to the Cabinet. Supplier promotion was more and more integrated in more 
general policy programs, thus the decentralized institutional structure soon lost 
influence (Szanyi, 2002). Centralization tendencies remained strong until 2007, 
when a new shift in policy focus occurred that strengthened the role of regional 
development agencies.
 the supplier program of 2005
Supplier network promotion remained top priority of the Hungarian develop-
ment policy, and the government decided to give new impetus to this policy. 
Basic principles and institutions of decentralized organization (based on re-
gional development agencies), ITDH’s role as matchmaker and data provider 
remained. Focus also remained on the strengthening of existing supplier linkag-
es, rather than creating new ones. As a new element of the program, the govern-
ment re-established a separate financial support scheme for supplier network 
development. While other development projects remained open for the task, 
HUF 25 billion (around EUR 90 million) was allocated in the framework of 
the ‘Successful Hungary’ Credit Program to be used by Hungarian SMEs for 
technology up-grading and product development necessary for becoming FIEs’ 
suppliers.
In 2002 RDC established a new financial institution, the Supplier Investment 
Co. This institution worked as a venture capital fund concentrating on invest-
ments in some government priority business areas like biotechnology, waste man-
agement and logistics. This fund was charged in 2005 with the task of extend-
ing the supplier development credits. The credit was provided by the Hungarian 
Development Bank. Other tasks of the Supplier Program were the establishment 
of operating forums with the participation of suppliers and FIEs, extension of 
the database of ITD Hungary, and the creation of supplier competence centers 
that would deal with training and advising of potential suppliers. These tasks 
were by no means new. Their incorporation in another development project can 
be regarded as a strong criticism of the previous approach. Promotion of local 
cooperation networks need local coordination and platforms. Centralized policy 
tools could not efficiently promote this task. The new Supplier Program intended 
to rely very much on the experiences of the so called ‘Suzuki pilot project’, which 
was launched at the start of the Program in June 2005. Suzuki has always been 
one of the most interested FIEs’ in local supplier networks. This is due to the lo-
cal content requirements of the EU towards overseas companies. In this project 
18 Suzuki suppliers (later 29) were monitored for their bottlenecks and devel-
opment needs to improve or increase supplies. Suzuki evaluated the companies 
and organized on-site training in Japan. ITD Hungary drew conclusions after 
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completing the project asking participants in a questionnaire about their experi-
ences. The follow-up study reported that supplier capabilities were substantially 
improved. Firms carried out new investments (HUF 6.38 billion) and created 
533 new jobs in the following two years. The new capacities were mainly used for 
supplies to Suzuki.
Using the experiences of the Suzuki pilot project, ITDH and the government 
decided to approach further integrator firms with the aim of launching similar 
supplier development programs. In a 2007 paper ITDH estimated the number 
of OEMs and final assemblers present in Hungary to reach 600. They may rely 
on the supplies of some 8,000 potential suppliers (ITDH, 2007). As a second 
step ITD Hungary wanted to repeat the Suzuki project with five to ten further 
main integrator FIEs each year. Negotiations were started with FAG, Claas, Na-
tional Instruments, DANA, Electrolux and Bosch. The third leg of the Supplier 
Program is the Services Module which includes basically the same services that 
also previous projects performed: consulting, training, auditing, supplier infor-
mation platforms, and database. These are coordinated and in many cases also 
performed by ITD Hungary’s staff. As a new element, a supplier e-market and 
supplier competence center is to be developed, and a nationwide supplier forum 
is to be organized.
7.4 How effi  cient are foreign direct investment policies? 
Overview of the empirical literature
There are no studies and calculations available on the effectiveness of Hungarian 
FDI policies. These are lacking in other East Central European countries as well, 
and even if they exist, they are burdened with many methodological problems. 
The existing empirical analyses in most of the cases examine the impact of (effec-
tive) tax rates, that is, of only one element of FDI policies. Bellak et al. (2005), for 
example, summarizes the results of papers dealing with the link between tax rates 
and FDI in the analyzed region, which could not find a link between these two. 
However, the above-mentioned authors put into question these results, calling at-
tention to methodological problems in terms of using nominal instead of effective 
tax rates and the differing impact of these tax rates on the three components of 
FDI inflows. Lipsey (2006) also calls the attention to methodological problems 
of these analyses, and he suggests that instead of FDI inflows, output, sales or 
employment data should be used as dependent variables.
Specifically for Hungary, a questionnaire-based study shows that exceedingly 
big FDI projects in Hungary received generous government support at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, which played an important role for the investors in choosing 
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Hungary over other CEE locations10 (Antalóczy and Sass, 2003). Similar cases 
are cited in another article on the basis of case studies of FDI choosing locations 
in Poland, the Czech Republic or in Slovakia (Mah and Tamulaitis, 2000, pp. 
236-237).
Empirical evidence is similarly inconclusive for the (positive) impact of FDI 
on the local economy in a group of or individual CEE countries (see for example 
Knell, 2000; Damijan et al., 2000; 2003; Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; Javorcik, 
2004; Javorcik and Sparateanu, 2003; Kosová, 2005; Gorodnichenko, Svejnar 
and Terrell, 2007). Results are similarly inconclusive for Hungary (see for ex-
ample Bosco, 2001; Schoors and van der Tol, 2002; Novák, 2003; Halpern and 
Muraközy, 2007). There are no specific analyses on the effectiveness of supplier 
programs in terms of raising the level of local value added or raising the number 
of local (domestic) suppliers. Understandably, there are no analyses on the cost 
effectiveness of FDI policy and supplier programs in terms of weighing the costs 
of incentives and programs against the benefits accrued.
7.5 Two company case studies
Empirical studies could give only a hint of the efficiency of Hungarian FDI poli-
cies. In this section, we present in detail two company case studies. Both are 
affiliates of well known MNCs, establishing a substantial capacity in Hungary, 
receiving significant government support (financial, fiscal and other incentives) 
and following completely different strategies in terms of their contacts with the 
local economy, which can partly be explained by the specificities of the products 
and partly by the differences in the strategy and organizational structure of the 
MNCs. With these two case studies we would like to illustrate that FDI incen-
tive government policies favoring foreign investors may have completely different 
outcomes in terms of benefits for the host economy.11
7.5.1 Electrolux-Lehel
The Lehel Company was established in 1952. It employed 4,600 workers in 1991 
in Jászberény, and produced 470,000 refrigerators, of which 300,000 were sold 
on Western markets – though under the brand names of Western companies 
(HVG, 19 October, 1991, p. 87). It was privatized by the Swedish Electrolux in 
March 1991. The Swedish company paid USD 83 million for the Hungarian com-
pany (HVG, 5 October 1991, p. 79). However, because the surroundings of the 
company plants were contaminated by dangerous wastes, as part of the privatiza-
tion deal, the Swedish Electrolux took up the responsibility of cleaning up the 
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area, though they could deduce the related costs from the price paid for the com-
pany. According to HVG, in October 1992, the magnitude of related cleaning 
costs was determined as close to half of the total price paid for the Hungarian 
company (Páczi and Eörsi, 1993).
Further investments were carried out later by the company, when – after 
restructuring the acquired company – they extended the production capaci-
ties, and established new capacities (for example, for the production of vacuum 
cleaners or freezers) on the original site in Jászberény and established a new 
plant in Nyíregyháza. These investments, however, were connected to the offset 
contract of Grippen fighters, so they can not be taken as results of ‘independent’ 
business decisions. Altogether, between 1991 and 2007, the company invested 
around HUF 75 billion (around EUR 300 million) in Hungary, employing at 
the end of 2007, 4,800 workers.12 The company belonged to the group of top 
companies in Hungary: it was the 18th biggest employer in 2006, 35th accord-
ing to its annual sales, and the 19th biggest exporter (based on data of HVG,
5 January 2008, pp. 52-71).
The information is very scarce about fiscal, financial and other incentives of-
fered to Electrolux Lehel. The following information could be collected in this 
regard. For building the Nyíregyháza factory in the industrial park, the company 
received a two-year holiday from local tax and reduction in the following two 
years. While information is not available, it is probable, that for its investments 
and research and development activities, the company could receive reductions 
from the profit tax. Information is available from a previous study (Antalóczy 
and Sass, 2002), in which we collected incentives given to companies in Hungary 
for one year (1999), comparing pre-tax and after-tax profits. According to that 
list, the Electrolux Lehel Company was among those receiving a significant tax 
reduction.
Impacts on the local economy can take many forms, as is obvious from the 
literature. Due to the lack of information, here we concentrate on three channels 
through which the company has significant impact on the host economy, and for 
which some data are available.
One of these channels can be its impact on the performance of the acquired 
company. Productivity in the domestic affiliate of Electrolux grew at a very high 
pace, sales especially, although exports also grew very quickly. Expansion of ca-
pacities and further investments were financed partly by the parent company, 
and partly from reinvestments of profits of the affiliate. Number of employees 
has been gradually reduced from 4,500 in 1991 to 3,500-3,600 by 2005. However, 
through employment in suppliers, an additional 2,500 workers’ employment is 
provided by Electrolux Lehel.13 Moreover, due to further investments, the overall 
number of employees jumped back to 4,500 by 2007.14
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As Caves (2007) puts it ‘The gains that host countries enjoy from taxing for-
eign investment have been sorely neglected in debates over MNEs.’ The second 
channel through which the local economy can be impacted upon is payment of 
taxes. The Electrolux Lehel Company is a key taxpayer. The company is among 
the top taxpayers in the Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county, and its largest company 
based on net sales and own capital (Herőcziné, 2006). In 2007, it paid more than 
HUF 6 billion (more than EUR 24 million) in taxes, of which HUF 870 million 
(approximately EUR 3.5 million) were local taxes.15
A third channel, through which the company’s impact on the local economy 
could be traced, is the ‘use’ of local suppliers. The Electrolux Lehel Company 
operates a large network of domestic suppliers, and partly due to that, reached 
an exceedingly high share of local value added. In the case of certain goods, for 
example vacuum cleaners, more than 70 of the total value of the final product 
is produced by local suppliers, and overall, the share of local suppliers is between 
40-50. This share is among the highest in Hungary (Bakács, Czakó and Sass, 
2006). The reason for this high share of local suppliers lies in many, in some 
cases interrelated, factors. At the time of privatization, most of the parts and 
components were produced inside the company, and there was a relatively limited 
network of suppliers. A few years after privatization, starting from 1996-1997, 
the production of certain parts and components, not belonging to core activities, 
started to be outsourced to local suppliers. Because of the technological char-
acteristics of the sector (high specific transport costs for the majority of parts 
and components), the management looked for local suppliers. This outsourcing 
process provided the base for the establishment of a large local supplier network. 
The process itself was well timed from the point of view of local companies: for-
eign suppliers did not move to Hungary at that time to carry out these activities, 
which can be proven by the fact that the number of foreign-owned local suppliers 
is very low. The process was helped by the strong local tradition in machinery, 
metalworking and plastics industry, and related to these, the presence of strong 
local human and physical capacities. Because the affiliate was relatively independ-
ent in selecting its suppliers, and because of sector specificities (high specific 
transport costs, seasonality, need of quick reactions to changes in demand and 
tastes, and the need to reduce warehousing costs), this resulted in a relatively 
large number of local suppliers.
Indigenous firms may benefit from the presence of a foreign-owned firm in 
many ways. Thus, becoming a supplier of an affiliate of a MNC for a domestic 
company means not only the ‘simple’ possibility of selling products to another 
company, but there may be additional advantages. Through vertical linkages 
MNCs may increase the productivity of their domestic suppliers, for example 
by providing technical assistance to enable suppliers to raise the quality of the 
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required spare part or component, or provide high quality standards for local 
inputs and thus induce technology upgrading in the indigenous company (Görg 
and Greenaway, 2004). According to Lall (1980), local affiliates of MNCs can 
contribute to raising the productivity and efficiency of local companies in less 
developed countries in many ways: by helping prospective suppliers to set up 
their own production facilities, by providing technical assistance and/or advice 
on raising the quality of products, on organizing and managing production, by 
reducing the price or increasing the availability of raw materials and intermediary 
products for production by helping the suppliers in buying them (for example, by 
organizing common purchase of inputs for a group of suppliers), and by helping 
suppliers to find other customers.16 In the case of Electrolux Lehel, (potential) 
suppliers are, for example, helped by technical advise, by common purchase of 
inputs (thus attaining lower prices), by selling the machinery of the company to 
(potential) suppliers during the outsourcing process, by carrying out common de-
velopment and adaptation activities with the suppliers. This latter even elevates 
the relationship between Electrolux-Lehel and its suppliers to a higher level. It 
also helps from the point of view of networking and clustering, that Electrolux 
Lehel requires its suppliers to rely on more than one source, namely, the share of 
Electrolux Lehel can not dominate in total sales of a supplier. On the other hand, 
in the supplier strategy of Electrolux Lehel, there must be at least two suppliers 
of a certain component or part. However, an element of instability is introduced 
from the point of view of the suppliers due to the fact that Electrolux Lehel con-
cludes supplier contracts for relatively short time periods. There were also cases 
when the Electrolux Lehel Company got rid off established local suppliers from 
one year to another, causing big losses to the affected SMEs.
7.5.2 Nokia Komárom Ltd.
Nokia Komárom Ltd. was established in 1999 through a greenfield investment by 
the Finnish corporation Nokia, which is the biggest producer of mobile phones 
and mobile network appliances in the world. The most important location fac-
tors were the following: geographical proximity to the main European markets, 
good experiences with the country (previous production plant), and competitive 
wages. The city of Komárom itself competed with other Hungarian towns, and it 
was chosen on the basis of logistics aspects (on the Budapest-Vienna motorway 
and railway, closeness to the border with Slovakia), large stock of suitably skilled 
workers and closeness to universities. Up till now, Nokia invested around EUR 
250 million in Komárom.
The Hungarian affiliate is one of the centers of mass production of mobile 
phones. At the end of 2008, there were ten affiliates in nine countries. On the 
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basis of production capacities, the Hungarian affiliate can be the third biggest 
after the Indian and Finnish ones.17 According to our estimation, the Hungarian 
affiliate represented around one tenth of the global revenues of Nokia Corpora-
tion (based on Nokia Corporation Annual Report and HVG TOP 500, 3 January 
2009). On the basis of its net sales and exports, the Nokia Komárom company 
has become the third largest company of Hungary starting from around 2005 
(HVG TOP 200, 2008, 5 January 2008 and TOP 500 2009, 3 January 2009). Its 
exports represented more than 7 of total Hungarian exports in 2007. It has a 
high export intensity; its export/sales ratio is 98 (own calculations based on 
HVG TOP 500, 3 January 2009). Its main export markets are Europe, the Far 
East and Africa. The company employed more than 3,000 workers in 2008. To-
gether with ‘rented’ employment and service providers, this number is more than 
6,000. 90 of workers are employed in production and 10 carries out manage-
ment and engineering activities.
The company received substantial incentives from the government – similar 
to other big projects. At the end of the 1990s, as we saw, Hungarian FDI promo-
tion was not EU-conform, though it was transparent and normative. Incentives 
were connected to the volume of the investment, number of employees, and the 
location of the plant. Nokia received a ten-year tax holiday from profit tax and a 
five-year tax holiday from local tax. In the Industrial Park of Komárom, the local 
government provided the area and infrastructure free of charge for the invest-
ment. In the framework of various incentive schemes, the company received an 
additional state aid of HUF 200 million.
Nokia was the first investor in the Industrial Park of Komárom, and it was 
followed by various suppliers of the company. Part of them was encouraged by 
Nokia, others by the prospects of selling parts and components to Nokia. This 
allowed Nokia to reduce logistics risks to the minimum and to ‘manage’ sup-
plies. There are 11 suppliers, all of them in foreign ownership (Finnish, Japanese, 
US, Swedish, Korean and Taiwanese), which altogether employ almost 10,000 
additional workers. They are all global partners of Nokia, fulfilling very strict 
quality requirements. The increasingly intense competition induces Nokia to 
cooperate more closely with suppliers and to ask for ever greater production, 
technology and transport flexibility from them. However, in certain cases Nokia 
provides them with technical help, advice and support for technology develop-
ment plans.
The investment of Nokia changed the economic landscape of the city and the 
county. It became the leading location in FDI attraction, industrial output, in-
vestment and exports. It changed the structure of employment in the region, the 
wealth of locals and local governments. The unemployment rate went down from 
17.5 in 1993 to below 6 (pre-crisis). Its employment impact affected a larger re-
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Table 7.1 Foreign investments in manufacturing in Komárom, mid-2008
Name of 
company
Activity Nationality Year of 
establish-
ment
Entry mode and 
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telecom part and 
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Finnish 2000 Greenfi eld, 
100%
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electronic products




































Taiwanese 2003 Greenfi eld, 
100%
Yes
ICHIA Ltd. Production 
of electronic 
components

















Production of plastic 
products
















Finnish n.d. Greenfi eld, 
100%
Yes
Source: Local government of Komárom
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gion: not only the city and the county, but even the neighboring parts of Slovakia, 
from where employees are commuting daily (about 35 of the employees come 
from Slovakia).
In terms of taxes, the ten-year profit tax holiday expired in 2009. On the other 
hand, local taxes have been paid by the company in the last four years, and accord-
ing to the representative of the local government, Nokia is the biggest taxpayer 
of the city. Understandably, during its operations, the company paid all other (for 
example, wage related) taxes. Overall, in terms of tax payments, the contribu-
tion of the company is quite limited, compared to the Lehel Electrolux case, for 
example.
As far as the spillover effects of the investment are concerned, one of its most 
important channels is the use of local supplies. In that respect Nokia Hungary 
represents a case when the greenfield foreign investment ‘attracts’ its traditional 
suppliers to the new site. The first tier suppliers are partners of Nokia on the 
basis of global agreements, all around the world. Thus the Komárom Industrial 
Park is basically a closed ‘network’ of companies, which operates as an island in 
the area. No Hungarian company could get into this system or network as a first 
or second tier supplier.18 Nokia started to organize the entry of its second tier 
suppliers in the mid-2000s, into a new industrial park close to Komárom. Besides 
its suppliers in Komárom Industrial Park, another ten suppliers are operating in 
Hungary, among these there are a few Hungarian companies which supply Nokia 
with less complex products (like batteries). Besides these, services provided in 
the industrial park by Hungarian-owned companies (including catering, waste 
management, transport of persons, gardening, and security) are used by Nokia. It 
indirectly impacted upon the development of its larger surroundings. In the city 
of Komárom for example, since around 2002, a quicker development of services 
can be experienced, and due to the growth in purchasing power, a large supermar-
ket is opened. Nokia has concluded cooperation agreements with universities and 
secondary schools with the aim of ensuring future employment. Due to the rela-
tively large employment from the other side of the border, cooperation between 
the two local governments has improved; they center their common development 
strategy plan on the activities of the local Nokia affiliate.
However, besides the positive impacts, it is still true that companies in the 
industrial park function as an island, separated to a great extent from the local 
economy. There is little information about the company and the power of the 
MNC and the local government cannot be compared. Locals feel defenseless at 
the mercy of a big MNC.
The two case studies indicate different types of local impacts of the supported 
companies. In Electrolux’s case, followers’ FDI (in terms of traditional suppli-
ers investing in Hungary) is negligible, follow-up investments by the company 
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are significant (besides capacity extensions, establishing a completely new plant 
in Nyíregyháza). Moreover, there is a substantial increase in the number of lo-
cal suppliers and local value added, reaching a high level even in international 
comparison. In the case of Nokia, while the volume of FDI is increased through 
investments by traditional suppliers and by additional investments of Nokia, 
in terms of local contacts, this project remains an ‘island’ in the local economy. 
While their direct impact for example in terms of tax generation, increased pro-
ductivity and export is similar, their indirect impact on the local economy differs 
quite substantially. FDI policies seem to influence the local impact only to a very 
limited extent, sector specificities including ‘networkedness’ (the degree of value 
chain integration) play a determining role. Our illustration calls the attention to 
a paradox: attracting state of the art technology usually goes together with the 
globally integrated nature of the new affiliate which may result in a very low level 
of local linkages. On the other hand, ‘less high-tech’ affiliates may be more prone 
to create (or maintain) local linkages and may become more embedded in the lo-
cal economy.
7.6 Th e impact of the crisis
Completely new circumstances have emerged for the Hungarian (and other coun-
tries’) FDI policies starting from the second half of 2008. Strikingly low invested 
amounts and high repatriations show the lack of ‘free’ capital, available for direct 
investments in the region. While the focus of the Hungarian economic policy still 
seems to be on FDI, responses and reactions of the government do not reflect the 
new realities. They still try to attract investments in the same (pre-crisis) sectors, 
with the same tools and mechanisms.
As we saw, Hungary is very ‘dependent’, even in international comparison, on 
the performance of FIEs. Moreover, links of these companies with the domes-
tic sector remains below the expectations, thus they could not act as a kind of 
‘pulling’ factor for domestic enterprises for various reasons. Moreover, FDI in 
Hungary is concentrated in those manufacturing sectors, which are especially 
hard hit by the crisis: automotive and electronics. Some companies close down 
their operations in Hungary completely; many of them reduce their operating 
capacities. Moreover, they tend to repatriate more profits, according to the lat-
est balance of payments information, in order to compensate their home/parent 
companies’ losses. Fiscal stimulus programs of developed countries, one (explicit) 
aim of which is to keep investments and production at home, are also not fa-
vorable for affiliates producing in Hungary. Hungary’s special situation, where 
domestic economic policy mistakes and postponement of restructuring of the 
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fiscal system deepen the impacts of worldwide recession, act also as a deterrent to 
FDI. On top of that, lack of investable capital induces more acute competition for 
resources, including a sharper incentive competition, in which Hungary’s means, 
compared to its most important competitors, are very limited. In these circum-
stances, a complete reappraisal and restructuring of FDI (and overall economic) 
policy would be needed. In the absence of that, we see only the competitiveness 
of the country gradually decreasing.
7.7 Conclusion
Hungary was the first to open up to FDI in the EEC region, forced partly to do 
so by its heritage from the socialist period and by economic and political circum-
stances. The country started to establish the legal framework already in the 1970s, 
the regulatory framework at the end of the 1980s. It was the first to start to pri-
vatize by selling companies to foreigners on a large scale. In Hungary, the domes-
tic accumulation of capital was minimal, thus the main engine behind economic 
changes and growth was FDI. The country operated an FDI policy, which became 
increasingly transparent and normative and gradually gave equal treatment to 
all investors, foreign and domestic alike. The incentive policy became growingly 
complex, and reflected to a growing extent the priorities of the government. It 
tried to target investors, which establish more complex activities in Hungary. 
Recognition soon dawned of the lower than expected linkages and connections 
of affiliates with the local economy, which hindered the realization of the poten-
tial beneficiary impacts of MNCs on the local economy. Hungarian FDI policy 
very early tried to address this problem with various supplier programs. While in 
volume terms, Hungarian FDI policy can be evaluated as successful; in terms of 
the level of local embeddedness of affiliates it could not reach its aim.
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 Data complying with the OECD/IMF recommendations are available for the year  
and onwards, and data on reinvested earnings have been published since .
 Some years are exceptions due to larger privatization-related inflow.
 Based on the data presented in UNCTAD, .
Policies for attracting foreign direct investment
 However, registered countries of origin do not always correspond to the country of the 
parent of the multinational company because in many cases foreign affiliates realize the 
investments due to tax, strategic, geographical or cultural reasons. This is the case for 
some important Hungarian investments (for example German Siemens invested through 
its Austrian subsidiary, the US GM and IBM through its German and the Italian Feruzzi 
through its Belgian or French affiliate). Accordingly, official statistics may underestimate 
the share of those countries, which are registered homes of big multinationals, especially 
that of the US (and maybe German) investors.
 Data are somehow distorted, because many companies have their headquarters registered 
in Budapest, and conduct (production) operations in plant(s) in the countryside (see for 
example Antalóczy and Sass, ).
 A region can be a group of countries, a country or inside a country; it is the geographic 
area inside of which the multinational wants to invest.
 After a five-year break, in  the privatization process has been restarted, putting up for 
sale state-owned banks and companies. However, the share of privatization-related FDI 
in total FDOI has never again reached the pre- level.
 Details of the program will be presented in the next section.
 Company cases, for example IBM’s choice of the Czech Republic over Hungary due to 
more generous incentives are presented in Antalóczy and Sass ().
 Usually companies deny even the limited role of incentives in influencing their investment 
decisions. The reason why in this questionnaire survey companies ‘admitted’ that incen-
tives are important for them, was that it was taken in a historical moment: before the EU 
accession of the country, when it seemed like these companies would be ‘ripped off ’ of the 
incentives.
 The choice of these two companies can be explained by the availability of data and infor-






 The empirical literature is lacking of inconclusive evidence for the existence of this kind of 
spillovers, partly due to methodological and data shortcomings. (Girma, Görg and Pisu, 
) However, there are a few papers that indicate the importance of vertical (rather 
than horizontal) linkages, see for example Javorcik ().
 Annual Report , www.nokia.com.
 See Table .
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8 Policies and institutions on multinational 
corporation-small and medium enterprise 
linkages
 Th e Brazilian case
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8.1 Introduction
What can host countries expect from foreign corporations entering their mar-
ket? Effects such as increased employment and exports certainly are important, 
but the development of domestic industries through the potential positive spill-
overs of multinational corporations’ (MNCs) activities, notably via the avenues 
of transfer of technological and management expertise and sustained economic 
growth, are among the foremost expectations. Social and economic development 
depends on several factors, such as investments from the private and public sec-
tor in education, health, safety, infrastructure, and technological innovation, 
and private companies. MNCs as well as local Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) have a crucial role to play in this regard. However, having companies 
set up in a given area in itself is not a guarantee for fostering development. A 
MNC, for instance, may be attracted to a developing country due to tax incen-
tives, lower labor costs and easy access to natural resources only, whilst import-
ing qualified labor and buying from foreign suppliers and barely contributing to 
local development.
One important source of development and technology in-flow in develop-
ing economies is related to the externalities resulting from the Business Link-
ages (BL) that local suppliers can forge with the foreign affiliates of MNCs. BLs 
between MNCs and SMEs can allow small local producers to benefit from an 
exchange of relevant information and technical knowledge, promote production 
efficiency, productivity growth and market diversification, among other benefits. 
Also, there is evidence (UNCTAD, 2005) that the more MNCs are intertwined 
with local companies through supplier or other linkages the more likely they are 
to maintain their operations in the country in the long term.While MNCs have 
strategic interests in forging links with domestic suppliers, public policies and 
institutions (such as Investment Promotion Agencies – IPAs), can play a crucial 
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role in promoting such linkages (UNCTAD, 2001). Assuming that the promo-
tion of linkages is part of the industrial policy framework, and that they can be 
promoted by IPAs on the federal as well as on the state level, the aim of this 
chapter is to evaluate the current situation of such policies and programs of BL in 
Brazil, the largest recipient and source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Lat-
in America. The chapter aims to: 1) analyze actions and programs developed by 
public and private institutions to foster BL in Brazil; 2) identify the participants’ 
benefits from such actions and programs; and 3) highlight the opportunities for 
the public sector in promoting BLs.Our empirical analysis is based on several 
research trips and more than forty semi-structured interviews with experts from 
different organizations in Brazil and in Europe. The units of analysis in this 
chapter refer to the programs that foster BLs in Brazil, and key representatives 
of the following organizations were interviewed from May 2007 to July 2008: 
IPAs, to comprehend how the development funding agencies work and the ex-
tent of their relationship with the public authorities; institutions that promote 
BLs, including industry associations of eight states in Brazil, representatives of 
Projeto Vínculos (states of Pernambuco, Bahia, Ceará, Amazonas and São Paulo), 
consulting firms, representatives of Supplier Development Programs (SDPs) in 
four states; representatives of the state and federal government, including the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) and the Bra-
zilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX); and managers from 
MNCs and SMEs acting in different sectors (chemical, electronics and mining) 
involved in linkage programs for at least three years. Our research was motivated 
by the growing attention in the literature (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2004) given to 
the relation between economic development levels and the ability of companies 
and countries to absorb and disseminate competencies. As BLs may promote 
local development, they may be of interest in the perspective of the state gov-
ernment, as of an economic regulation agent and social development supporter, 
especially when suppliers from well-developed areas or from overseas take over 
the role of local ones.
The chapter is structured as follows: this introduction presents the purposes, 
relevance and method of the empirical work. We move on to present the theo-
retical background to the research emphasizing the buyer-supplier relationship. 
Then we describe the Brazilian investment and SME environment and efforts to 
develop companies by implementing public policy programs. The chapter con-
cludes by discussing the implications of our results for public policy and develop-
ment, especially in emerging markets.
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8.2 Conceptual framework of business linkages
Linkages are defined as non-equity based relationships between foreign affili-
ates and domestic firms that have the potential for spillovers (Kennel, 2007). 
They may be horizontal, occurring through competition effects; collaborative, 
with domestic partners for strategic, technological or managerial purposes or 
vertical, with domestic suppliers, agents or customers, licensees or franchises. 
Horizontal linkages create the competition effect that can prompt innovation, 
efficiency and technical improvements in domestic firms. Collaborative linkages 
involve affiliate-domestic firm alliance and other non-equity agreements involv-
ing an ongoing collaboration between firms. Vertical linkages generate demand 
for, and add to the supply of, locally produced goods and services. Foreign af-
filiates may contribute to raising the capabilities of domestic suppliers or cus-
tomers by improving quality standards and efficiency of production, as well as 
providing assistance and resources relating to procurement, design, quality con-
trol, training, or market information. Those vertical linkages may be backward 
(with suppliers and subcontractors), which is the focus of this chapter, forward 
(with customers and agents) or contractual (with domestic franchisees and li-
censees) in nature (Kennel, 2007). Different types of affiliates can, via different 
linkage combinations, have different impacts on domestic firms. Typologies of 
BLs also include symmetry of linkages, considering that companies involved in 
linkages differ in terms of power resources (power relationships can be more or 
less symmetric, for example, depending on the size of suppliers and buyers). BLs 
are not only understood as business transactions among companies, but also 
include collective efforts by groups of companies aiming at creating competitive 
advantage, such as in the case of cluster initiatives (geographic concentrations of 
interconnected businesses, suppliers, and associated institutions in a particular 
field).
Some factors may explain the effort to develop backward linkages in host 
economies from a MNC perspective:
– The sector in which the foreign firms operate: foreign affiliates making stan-
dardized products with mature, non-proprietary technologies have many 
suppliers to choose from, and it is not necessary to develop special capa-
bilities in any supplier. Where products are specialized and technologically 
advanced, on the other hand, affiliates tend to prefer in-house production or 
to retain relationships with a few selected strategic suppliers (UNCTAD, 
2001).
– The firms’ characteristics, such as 1) selected entry mode: FDI taking the form 
of a joint venture leads to more local linkages than FDI in the form of a wholly 
owned subsidiary because investors that intend to spend more resources on 
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building local relationships are more likely to choose a joint venture over a 
wholly owned subsidiary (although fully owned subsidiaries still need lo-
cal linkages to operate in the local environment); 2) ownership form: local 
firms acquired by foreign MNCs, rather than subsidiaries or branches es-
tablished as greenfield sites by the MNCs, tend to be more integrated into 
the local economy; 3) age of the plant, which may explain the embeddedness 
into the local economy; 4) autonomy of the affiliate: the greater, the more 
likely the affiliate is to try and identify local suppliers and to create relation-
ships with them; size of the affiliate may also affect sourcing and linkages 
(UNCTAD, 2001; Giroud, 2006); 5) relationship between country of origin 
of the affiliate and local linkage formation, as proposed by Kennel (2007). 
In particular when MNCs are purely market-seeking, rather than aiming at 
exporting their products, they need a strong link with local companies to be 
able to adapt their products and eventually their research and development 
(R&D) activities to the local conditions. Efficiency seeking firms normally 
have less incentive to form local linkages (although when they do they tend 
to be deeper).
Linkages may generate possible spillovers, such as externalities that arise when 
the entry or presence of foreign affiliates leads to improvements in the capac-
ity, productivity or efficiency of domestic firms. Spillovers from FDI are typi-
cally classified into two categories according to their direction: horizontal (intra-
industry spillovers), and vertical (interindustry spillovers) (Kneller and Pisu, 
2007). Those spillovers are seen as having indirect development impact on host 
economies that can be attributed to the local industry as a result of the foreign 
affiliates’ activities, so they are less documented in the linkage’s literature. On the 
other hand, the direct developmental impact of MNCs in developing economies 
is well documented (UNCTAD, 2005), and includes tax revenues, exports, R&D 
and employment generated by their affiliates. Even relatively very small compa-
nies with limited technological capabilities may in some cases benefit enormously 
from contracts with MNC or large buyers.
Giroud (2006) lists three key groups of factors conditioning the choice be-
tween host country and foreign sourcing. These are related to the MNCs’ overall 
strategy and characteristics (as explained above), but also the host country policy 
framework and economic climate. Economic growth and the investment climate 
are important, as well as the quality of infrastructure, the capabilities and the size 
of local components industry.
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8.3 Supplier development programs
The buyer-supplier relationship is the subject of many discussions in business 
administration, such as in the areas of supply and value chains, operations and 
marketing. Industrial marketing, for example, seeks to understand how compa-
nies relate with one another when it comes to purchase and sale of products and 
which are the best strategies to make business ties profitable to both buyers and 
suppliers (Coviello and Brodie, 1998). The ‘value chain’ is a fundamental concept 
in this chapter, since it refers to the set of activities performed by an organiza-
tion, from the relationship with suppliers, through the production and sale cycles, 
to the final distribution phase (Bornstein, 2003). According to the value chain 
theory, and from the perspective of buyer companies, improvements to the chain 
performance are expected to be possible only when long-term commitments are 
set with their key suppliers (Krause, 2007).While cluster initiatives, defined as 
concentrations of firms of a given sub-branch of industry within a delimited re-
gion in search for competitive advantage (Meyer-Stamer and Seibel, 2002), tend 
to have a local focus, the value chain concept tends to look at bigger spatial aggre-
gates. Producers, and local clusters of producers, are usually part of a bigger value 
chain that encompasses the various transformation activities that ultimately lead 
to a final product. Therefore, an effort to connect local producers in developing 
economies to global markets often needs to involve lead firms in global value 
chains. MNCs generally have highly demanding consumers when it comes to 
quality and process control, acting in the world’s most competitive environments 
(Shen, 2008). Such companies aim at reducing the number of suppliers and in-
creasing their efficiency, and many SMEs are not always equipped to meet their 
demands. Therefore, many MNCs provide their own suppliers with managerial 
and technical training, developing programs to improve their overall capabilities 
in the value chain context. Such supplier development programs (SDPs) may 
allow companies to change a conflicting buyer-supplier relationship, based on 
power and bargain, into a partnership based on trust and cooperation (Langfield-
Smith and Greenwood, 1998). The transfer of organizational abilities from the 
buyer to its supplier entails not only funds and resources, but also a dedicated 
organizational and governance structure to promote knowledge accumulation in 
the long run (Sako, 2004). Technology transfer not only includes the technical 
support and training activities, but also means informing and educating suppliers 
regarding product and process standards, and possibly assisting them in obtain-
ing certification to meet global standards.
There are many studies on the buyer-supplier relationship in developing 
economies. Kumar and Bergstrom (2008), for instance, have analyzed a pattern 
of a long-term buyer-supplier relationship in South Africa, India, and Pakistan, 
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concluding that the more developed the buying market was, the better the local 
supplier was treated by the MNC, and the stronger the relationship was between 
both. Jeppesen and Hansen (2004) depict the standards of management technol-
ogy transfers from MNCs to their suppliers in developing economies, divided 
into three main patterns: 1) identification of standards; 2) control and monitor-
ing; and 3) technical collaboration. Such patterns portray a continuum ranging 
from low (determination of standards) to high (technical collaboration) interac-
tion between companies. Client companies require products certified by inter-
nationally recognized authorities when determining standards, forcing suppliers’ 
technological development. Control and monitoring fall under client-imposed 
standards, bringing several control mechanisms, such as the ‘Michelin Certifi-
cate’ provided to distributors that meet the quality standards required by such 
companies in Brazil. Technical collaboration occurs when large companies offer 
technical support to their suppliers so that they reach the standards required by 
the former, usually featuring the visit of specialized technical staff to the supplier 
to tighten the relationship between these two companies.
Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004) have also investigated the technology transfer in 
emerging markets, obtaining the following results: 1) technology transfer is essen-
tially based on BL, especially in the manufacturing sector (rather than in R&D); 
2) the assistance was not the same for each supplier the MNC supported, which 
proves that such benefits depend on suppliers’ initial technological capacity, and 
their ability to learn and absorb technology; 3) long-term relationships based on 
trust are important to the collaboration and learning between companies, bring-
ing benefits to suppliers, even in short-term relationships, while improving their 
technological capacity and exploring prospective markets.
While, in general, in developing economies the public sector is responsible for 
creating and developing SDPs and BLs, in developed ones the private sector is 
the most important promoter (Shen, 2008). But in Brazil there are examples of 
MNCs forging and investing in strategic linkages with suppliers: 1) the French 
retailer Carrefour developed the program ‘Guarantee of Origin’, a product cer-
tification introduced in Brazil in 1999. The certificate ensures that products are 
produced and processed according to the company’s global standards of quality, 
environmental and social responsibility at all stages. Since ‘Guarantee of Origin’ 
was introduced in the north of Brazil in 2005, many products that were formerly 
imported from richer states such as São Paulo are now produced locally with the 
same level of quality, and available at lower prices due to lower costs of distribu-
tion; 2) Bosch’s Fit for Global Approach (FFGA) used to identify Brazilian sup-
pliers and to bring them up to international standards in terms of product quality, 
delivery fidelity, management practice and client relations. The FFGA approach 
has been extended to Bosch’s operations in China.
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8.4 Public policies and the Brazilian eff ort to develop companies
In Latin America, the state government has played an important role in the as-
surance of attracting FDI, refl ected also in the recent nationalization processes of 
MNCs in Bolivia in 2006 (oil and gas fi elds) and in Venezuela in 2007 and 2008 (ce-
ment and telecommunications), that have reduced the companies’ trust in investing 
in countries with greater commercial instability and/or high political risk. MNCs 
are important sources of income and development, but their employment generation 
potential is not proportional to their size. In 2008, although 420 MNCs out of the 
world’s top 500 had affi  liates in Brazil, they accounted for only 2 of the jobs (Ob-
servatório Social, 2005). However, SMEs accounted for 17.2 million legal Brazilian 
jobs, compared to 8.8 million from large-sized companies (companies with over 500 
employees in the industry sector or 100 employees in the service sector) (Brazilian 
Micro and Small Business Support Service, 2008). Hence, it is not only a matter of 
attracting investment through the attraction of MNCs, but taking advantages of 
their role in the overall productive system.Most countries have national or local IPAs 
not only to attract more foreign investors, but also to focus on creating jobs, exports, 
and technological transfers related to the fl ow of investments. Some Brazilian IPAs 
include APEX (at the federal level), INDI (Minas Gerais Institute of Integrated 
Development) and INVESTE-São Paulo (Agency for Investments and Competi-
tion Promotion of the state of São Paulo). Brazilian governmental actions to attract 
investments started late in the 1980s and early in the 1990s. Th e country’s structure 
to promote investments is complex, including federal institutions, IPAs from state 
development banks, IPAs arising from partnerships between government and pri-
vate organizations, and nonprofi t private organizations, as shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Examples of investments promotions agencies (IPAs) in Brazil (or development 
institutions with investment promotion roles)
Federal institutions
–  Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion 
Agency (APEX)
–  System for the Promotion of Investments 
and Transfer of Technology to Companies 
(SIPRI)
IPAs from state development banks
–  Goiás Development Funding Agency 
(GoiásFomento)
–  Rio Grande do Norte Development 
Funding Agency (AGN)
IPAs arising from partnerships between 
government and private organizations
–  Pernambuco Economic Development 
Agency (AD Diper)
–  Minas Gerais Industrial Development 
Institute (INDI)
Non-profi t private organizations
–  Rio Grande do Sul Development Agency 
(Pólo-RS)
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MDIC is in charge of coordinating business promotion policies, a mandate that 
got reconfirmed in 2007 with the reinforcement of the Permanent Forum of Mi-
cro and Small Companies (created in 2000), through the Brazilian Statute for 
Micro and Small Companies. The Brazilian Constitution provides a differenti-
ated treatment to those companies, enforceable by law, with actions applying to 
administrative, tax, social security and labor matters. Brazil has also the Micro 
and Small Company General Act to join the federal, state and municipal taxes 
levied on SMEs, reducing the tax rates in most cases. It also enables an easier 
registration of companies, access to credit and technology. In 2007, the Brazilian 
government enacted the first policy for the single payment of taxes from the three 
government levels (federal, state and municipal). In the country there is no dif-
ference in treatment of foreign companies, from a legal standpoint, in all matters 
relating to tax, labor rights, social security, or civil and commercial law, which 
helps to improve the investment climate. The regulation in place ensures the FDI 
access to the market and practically unrestricted national treatment in the area of 
goods. Such national treatment is firmly entrenched in administrative and legal 
practice. More than 13,000 MNCs have established affiliates in the country.
There are numerous Brazilian institutions that seek to foster the improvement 
of the business environment and, indirectly, to promote BLs. Two important ones 
are: Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and Brazilian Micro and Small 
Business Support Service (SEBRAE). SEBRAE was created in 1972 as a non-
profit private entity aimed at fostering competitiveness and sustainable develop-
ment of micro and SMEs. Its main income source is the mandatory contribution 
made by the private sector to the Brazilian Institute of Social Security (INSS).
Development programs and IPAs, as potential sources of BL, are more efficient 
than the activities related to only providing financial incentives, and large com-
panies’ demand is not enough to set sustainable BLs, since building them also 
requires commitment from the relevant companies and the participation of all 
stakeholders: governments, IPAs, chambers of commerce, development funding 
banks, business associations, non-governmental organizations, media, universi-
ties, and research institutes.
The Brazilian overall scenario seems to create opportunities for BLs: the coun-
try has a great number of micro and small companies (in 2008 they were 99.2 
of the total number of officially registered companies), and the Brazilian environ-
ment has been attractive to international companies as well: the last decade has 
been a period of unprecedented economic stability, when compared to the two 
previous decades, with inward FDI reaching USD 45.1 billion in 2008, the high-
est amount since Brazil began keeping records in 1947 (Brazilian Central Bank, 
2009).
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8.5 Policy orientation for small and medium enterprises in Brazil
The policy type to promote micro and small companies in Brazil is law. The first 
legal measure that established special treatment for micro and small enterprises 
was defined in 1984 by Law 7.256/84. It institutionalized the ‘Estatuto da Micro-
empresa’, concerning the administrative, fiscal and social security system and labor 
rights. The General Law for Micro and Small Enterprises, starting in 2007, is the 
first national public policy (valid for all states in Brazil) that determines the uni-
fied payment of federal, state and municipal taxes. Nine different taxes are com-
bined in a single payment, whose value is determined based on total revenues and 
activity sector. Also, other benefits are included: micro and small businesses have 
a preference on government bids up to R$ 80,000 (approximately USD 40,000) 
and do not have to pay export taxes. With this law in practice, it is expected that 
the time to open a new company decreases from 152 days to 15 days on average, as 
already is happening in some regions.
MDIC has the main responsibility in the country to coordinate the competi-
tiveness policies to assist companies in general, although in practice other min-
istries, such as those of finance, science and technology and national integration, 
share such duties. The Permanent Forum of Microenterprises and Small Busi-
nesses, created in 2000 and strengthened in 2007 with the Estatuto Nacional da 
Microempresa e da Empresa de Pequeno Porte, is coordinated by MDIC, and its 
role is to guide and assist the formulation and coordination of the national poli-
cies that promote development for micro and small businesses. 48 institutions 
from the government and 47 entities that represent the interests of small business 
in Brazil participate in the forum.
The government fosters technological and scientific development through the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, although it is not yet experienced in promot-
ing micro and SMEs (MSMEs)’ technological capacity, given the few instruments 
created for such purposes. Th e main types of support to technological diff usion of 
MSMEs are the availability of information and technological assistance through 
articulations between enterprises and research institutions. Other initiatives are 
towards the development of companies of technological basis, through incentives 
to start incubators, to support feasibility studies or venture capital.Th e Brazil-
ian government established a new policy for competitiveness in 2004, the Política 
Industrial, Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior – PITCE. Th e lines of directions in-
volve both horizontal policies (for all sectors of the economy) and vertical ones (for 
four specifi c sectors considered strategic for the development of the economy and 
international insertion of the country: pharmaceutical, software, capital goods and 
semiconductors). Th ose are capital-intensive sectors structured by large enterpris-
es, rather than labor-force sectors (which is the case of SMEs). Th e instruments 
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of PITCE include mechanisms of credit access and investment attraction. Th us 
far this policy resulted in a broad array of initiatives, in various stages of plan-
ning and implementation. One of the actions PITCE has is the Local Productive 
Arrangements Program (Programa de Arranjos Produtivos Locais), in which there 
is the Program of Industrial Export Extension (Programa de Extensão Industrial 
Exportadora – PEIEx), driven to clusters of SMEs in any sector and value chain. 
Th e government provides consultants to companies based on local productive ar-
rangements to help them solve management and technical challenges. In general, 
the PITCE programs targeting SMEs have as principal goals:
1 to improve the firm’s access to credit lines, through the introduction of new 
regulations to make feasible the financing with lower interest rates and ad-
ditional charges; besides the creation or reinforcement of guarantee funds, for 
the financing of production capacity.
2 to increase the SMEs’ participation in the national exporting, through sec-
tored actions mainly related to segments of low technological intensity, aiming 
at their modernization, increasing product values, penetration in new markets 
and foreign market training.
8.6 Analysis
8.6.1 Ongoing business linkages projects and programs in Brazil
Th e BL project called Projeto Vínculos was created in 2004 as the result of collabora-
tion between the German Cooperation for Development (GTZ), United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Ethos Institute, Fundação 
Dom Cabral and SEBRAE. It comprises a steering committee aimed at getting com-
panies, professional associations, and organizations capable of building sustainable 
BLs mainly in the north and northeastern regions of Brazil. We analyzed, after 
semi-structured interviews with key respondents (from MNCs, SMEs and the rep-
resentative of the project), three Projeto Vínculos subprograms: a supplier training 
program in Bahia, Projeto Vínculos Pernambuco and Projeto Vínculos Ceará. Th e Sup-
plier training program is funded by large companies (MNCs) and suppliers, with 
monthly contributions, at a ratio of around 50 and 30, respectively, while the 
remainder is covered by the public partner institutions, such as SEBRAE. To focus 
on suppliers’ development, each MNC designated target suppliers, some already 
supplying, while others with a strong potential, but still with weaknesses. In 2008 
Projeto Vinculos had some 180 SMEs comprising about 2,500 employees participat-
ing in its qualifi cation programs. Not only SMEs but also the participating MNCs 
have observed the positive impact of the project: they have been assuming greater 
responsibility for their local suppliers as they have been recognizing the benefi ts of 
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strengthening SMEs, as this in turn strengthens their supplier base. Most of the 
current supplier development programs (SDP) existing in Brazil were created from 
the partnership of companies, public authorities and specialized consultancies. Th e 
work model was fi rst applied in 1995, in the state of Espírito Santo, by request of 
some MNCs. Several relevant sectors from Espírito Santo were brought together 
at that moment, such as the Trade Union of Companies from the civil construction 
and metallurgy industry. A similar program was developed in the state of Minas 
Gerais and was later deployed to other states. Today, there are three SDPs in the 
states of Espírito Santo, Maranhão and Pará, as really structured programs.SDPs 
such as Projeto Vínculos have as their main objective to train suppliers to better serve 
large companies based on their requirements, and thus strengthen the local indus-
try, especially the SME sector. Moreover, such programs bring together profession-
al associations and business development service providers, such as SEBRAE and 
SENAI (National Industrial Training Service). While many SDPs have a struc-
tural focus connected to the base industry and open to every sort of SMEs willing 
to participate, Projeto Vínculos focuses on large companies’ requirements and their 
supply needs. Th is in turn is expected to generate the appropriate knowledge and 
technology transfer to the SMEs involved. Most suppliers in both SDPs and Projeto 
Vínculos are service providers, and the goal of procurement divisions in MNCs is 
not only to obtain high-quality end-services, but also to certify that they were pro-
duced according to high-quality process, as mentioned by an MNC’s manager: ‘... 
SMEs suppliers provide state-of-the-art services, but may fail to pay the employees’ 
social security mandatory taxes. We do not want this scenario... a state-of-the-art 
work would not be possible if part of the workforce had occupational health prob-
lems. So, this is the purpose of the training program.’
The typology proposed by Gereffi et al. (2005) was employed to analyze the 
relationship between companies, classifying the purchase and sale relationship 
standards on three dimensions: 1) information complexity levels (information re-
quired throughout the value chain, especially concerning product process specifi-
cations); 2) codification ability: whether the information on a specific transaction 
can be coded, decoded, and transmitted, at low costs (depending not only on the 
information complexity, but also on the companies’ effort to code such informa-
tion); 3) suppliers’ capacity (whether suppliers are able to meet the requirements 
dictated by MNCs in their transactions).
8.6.2 Training and technology transfer
As far as company relationship and technology transfer standards are concerned, 
information was proven to be of low complexity, as most transactions refer to 
routine and maintenance operations. The interviews reveal a low technological 
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complexity environment of goods manufacturing and service provision in serving 
MNCs, although specific technical knowledge and strict safety standards are re-
quired. The reliability of information from the programs analyzed may be ranked 
as both high and low, as some companies already have such ability, while oth-
ers are less developed. The codification of products and procedures adopted by 
companies participating in the programs does not involve cutting-edge technol-
ogy. We observed high capacity to perform technical activities, but low manage-
rial ability, which is exactly the main point to be developed according to Projeto 
Vínculos’ and SDPs’ goals.As the complexity of transactions is product specific, 
complex transactions will only take place in existing companies as new types of 
transactions are developed. In view of the nature of the goods offered, partner-
ships in training, management and certifications offered, suppliers are very likely 
to reach high levels of codification ability.
Th e technology transfer standards ( Jeppesen and Hansen, 2004) in the pro-
grams analyzed were primarily concerned with improvements to management 
practices and adjustment of minimum management quality requirements, not 
reaching the production technology frontier level. Th e programs did not present 
examples of MNCs’ technicians working closely with suppliers. Instead, third-
party organizations were subcontracted for suppliers in in-company training: ‘... 
all training programs are outsourced; we work with SENAI for environmental 
aff airs; and SEBRAE assists us in business quality and management. As soon as a 
new supplier joins the program, it is assessed, and the company undergoes a train-
ing process, where it is evaluated under criteria based on the MNC requirements.’
With respect to the BL fostering programs, suppliers have reaped the follow-
ing benefi ts: acquisition of management practices and techniques, knowledge on 
applicable law and later compliance with them, increase in business volume, easier 
access to professional associations, strengthening of business ties with neighbor-
ing clients and internal training at low costs. SMEs in general are hardly aware of 
the current law and certifi cation requirements. Environmental license certifi cates, 
which are essential to do business with export companies, were, in some cases, un-
known or ignored. Th e programs are an opportunity to provide such knowledge so 
that these companies meet legal requirements. Th e benefi ts of BLs mentioned by 
MNCs were: increased supplier reliability; long-term supply maintenance (avoid-
ing the constant change of suppliers); relationship that makes suppliers more 
knowledgeable about MNCs’ requirements and needs; assurance of relationship 
continuity, and making MNCs more confi dent about supply stability.
Spillovers, considered as direct and indirect benefi ts from BLs to local economy, 
were observed in the programs evaluated, although the literature (Girma et al., 
2008) is inconclusive on how to identify them and whether the benefi ts are re-
lated to BLs or are a consequence of other exogenous variables. Another benefi t 
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observed, for example, was the creation of supplier forums, where SMEs suppliers 
meet on a regular basis to discuss common issues and encourage interaction, which 
generates new business opportunities. Suppliers’ admission to the program is not 
always easy or automatic, although they reap benefi ts and get training to improve 
their performance in the market. Companies have cultural factors that infl uence 
such admission. In Projeto Vínculos, companies join the program after a phase called 
‘engagement’. MNCs are fi rst engaged, and, subsequently: ‘... the lessons learned in 
the projects point out that engagement meetings should be held in the MNCs 
premises, with their [suppliers] own invitation, as these meetings make clear that it 
is an opportunity for suppliers to be qualifi ed and meet specifi c requirements from 
MNCs that generate business. Engaging SMEs in large companies is diff erent from 
doing so in Industry Associations, or in SEBRAE, for example.’
Realizing that information should be shared in several ways is a challenge in 
the engagement phase. Suppliers may fear the loss of business autonomy, besides 
having their main internal weaknesses exposed to important business partners. 
As a preliminary status evaluation is performed at the beginning of the linkage, 
such weaknesses may be an initial barrier imposed by MNCs. That can be used 
as a weak point in the state’s role as a direct leader in BL programs, since SMEs’ 
weaknesses may represent evidence for punitive actions, such as fines. Therefore, 
one of the main aspects for BL programs to succeed is trust, both in the program 
as a whole, and among participating organizations.
8.6.3 Th e role of the state government
Most interviewees in BL programs were asked about the state role as a promoter 
of BL. SDPs had a number of actions jointly taken by institutions and public au-
thorities, ranging from institutional and financial support to public-sector coor-
dination (in SDP-Maranhão), where Projeto Vinculos has formal agreements with 
BDS institutions and certain departments of MDIC. We tried to identify suc-
cessful practices or association opportunities between government and programs. 
One challenge we observed is the bad image the state has when it comes to its 
capacity of effectively managing private sector issues and programs. For example, 
when a supplier was asked about the government performance in the BL program, 
the following answer was given: ‘... government has the role of improving the over-
all business environment, but it is not skilled to directly manage a program like 
this, because they lack managerial capabilities.’ The possibility of using the pro-
gram for political purposes, and the consequent shift in focus, is another negative 
aspect observed concerning the role of the state: ‘... one of the main grounds of 
this program is the apolitical aspect, benefiting companies and communities for 
their overall development, and not benefiting few people for political purposes.’
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However, good examples of close relationship with the government were also 
observed: ‘... the municipal government is one of our partners because our com-
pany is installed in the city industrial area, and we have a program for using local 
labor, bringing suppliers, and we somehow receive tax incentives. There is also 
an internal training, paid by the company, in partnership with universities and 
federal, state and municipal institutions.’ Another positive example of the state 
came from the interview with SDP-Maranhão. As the MNC was privatized dur-
ing the process, the business environment was impacted, and many suppliers were 
not prepared to face this new reality. After that, companies from other states, 
especially from the south and southeastern Brazil, with a greater degree of com-
petitive edges, could be set up there. That was enough awareness that a supplier 
training program had to be created. Then, the state was the promoter of a process 
joining the interest of companies, suppliers and buyers, professional associations 
(created to support and maintain the companies) and the state: ‘We released the 
program, identified the demands from these large-sized companies and realized 
that we had to attack the management issue, with partnerships with the Labor 
Department, SENAI and so on.’
Upon the creation of SDP-Espírito Santo, institutional support was more im-
portant than financial. It is presently administered by the Industry and Trade 
State Department, which delegates important decisions to a managing commit-
tee, where the government participates with the program partner companies.
8.7 Conclusion
Local suppliers’ development can be supported by special programs, but their 
competitiveness is also dependent on a favorable enabling environment compris-
ing broader policy, economic, social and cultural aspects. Therefore, the overall 
government policy of the country matters, not only industrial policy. Brazil seems 
to work on fostering micro and SMEs, but it still lacks public policies specifically 
focused on fostering BLs. A study by Almeida et al. (2007) mapping the status 
of BL-related activities in the country did not find any federal public policy spe-
cific to them, although policies and programs with other purposes could contrib-
ute somehow to generate BLs. Our field study also confirmed their conclusions. 
Generally, linkages between the domestic economy and foreign investors seem 
to be largely corporate-driven and not part of a national policy. Nevertheless, 
the country has a number of policies that exhibit great potential to contribute to 
strengthened BLs, such as the recent SME Law.The strength of the analyzed pro-
grams lies in the synergy among companies (MNCs and SMEs), public authori-
ties (such as state development departments), third-sector organizations (such 
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as non-governmental organizations), professional associations (such as industry 
associations), business development service providers (such as SEBRAE) and 
investment promotion agencies (such as APEX).No specific federal policies in-
tended to forge BLs were identified in this research, occurring only at state level, 
such as in some SDPs. The programs developed in partnership with local govern-
ments worked properly, which means that while the state is not a key player in 
BL programs, its participation may bring broader benefits, as well as deeper and 
more structured impacts in local communities or in society itself. The public sec-
tor, therefore, can develop public policies and programs to foster BL, but should 
consider the following remarks, as identified in our analysis:
1 Complementary policies should be targeted at creating linkages to strengthen 
local or regional industrial policies. The state of Maranhão, for example, in 
an attempt to strengthen its industrial basis, made use of more than tax in-
centives to attract companies. Complementing the industrial policy, a BL-
strengthening program was conducted, since without high-qualified suppli-
ers production costs would increase and business environment would be less 
attractive for MNCs. Also, by attracting business to a region, the government 
must make sure it provides minimum operating conditions, such as a strong 
base industry and basic service provision. Instead of restrictive policies (such 
as creating criteria to compel large companies to buy from local suppliers), 
there are alternatives that may encourage companies to participate in BL pro-
grams, such as incentives for workforce training and managerial development 
of suppliers.
2 Educational policy and capacity building is also part of the promotion of BLs. 
When a BL program is developed, it is possible to identify common problems 
within companies and form specific groups to target them, besides promot-
ing the exchange of experience and knowledge among the several participat-
ing companies, which delivers economies of scale in training and qualification. 
The extent to which the local SME sector will benefit from technology and 
knowledge transfer will also depend on the SMEs’ absorptive capacity.
3 MNCs are key players in technology transfer, and the state is capable of at-
tracting them through its investment attraction policy. Such technology trans-
fer may occur upon, for example, the outsourcing of MNCs production phases 
with local SMEs. The participation of research institutions and universities 
may also be promoted, intensifying the technology development and transfer 
to local companies.
4 The business environment should be developed, since bringing companies to-
gether may generate new business opportunities. Even though the programs 
were mainly intended to foster buyer-supplier linkages, supplier-supplier busi-
nesses were boosted. This is because SMEs are in different stages of produc-
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tion and some may supply goods and services to the others, and then to large 
companies or MNCs. Therefore, the state should encourage local dynamics, 
promoting forums for companies to discuss problems and deliver solutions.
Conflicts of interests may drive governments away from leading BL programs, 
as unveiling a company to governmental institutions may be seen with skepti-
cism by the private sector, especially for companies with some kind of irregular 
status, which may not be uncommon for a micro or small company in less devel-
oped areas. A third institution is more reliable to intermediate companies’ and 
government’s interests: business development services providers may have more 
legitimacy to lead and operate a BL program. Also, although MNCs have tech-
nological know-how and administrative capacity, technological and managerial 
training are generally beyond their core business. BL policies may be important 
complements to local industrial and development policies. For the states shel-
tering the most qualified companies, BL may be forged with a special focus on 
technology transfer, together with the industrial policy. Successful policy and 
regulatory reform to improve the business environment require that the Govern-
ment collaborates closely with the private sector. The success of SEBRAE and 
IPAs, such as INDI and Pólo-RS, may be attributable also to their constitution 
and participation of the private sector. Moreover, the Government should be 
aware that BLs can only be effective when companies recognize a vested interest 
in forging them.
Projects like Projeto Vínculos are seen by some MNCs to have great potential 
of rendering SMEs more concerned about environmental and safety issues. IPAs 
may help to provide such consciousness of new requirements, such as the green 
procurement concept and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) 
Directive (in manufacturing electronic and electrical equipments). Awareness is 
important since the majority of SMEs still understand those requirements as an 
obligation, and not as a competitive advantage. Their sustainability depends also 
on their insertion in new markets, and not on the dependence on one or some 
MNCs. Management skills are also needed, mainly in the areas of environmental 
and quality management. MNCs are not prepared to provide training for those 
SMEs, except for very specific issues, so this may be the role of IPAs, BDS pro-
viders such as SEBRAE, or business associations, such as ‘Federação das Indús-
trias’. Training mechanisms are also available in the market, but many SMEs lack 
this information and resources. Many capacity-building programs fail because 
they lack maintenance and evaluation. It is necessary to keep reviewing the ra-
tionale and mechanisms of a linkage program to ensure that it remains relevant 
and effective. Most linkage programs evolve over time in order to meet changing 
market conditions.
Policies and institutions
To conclude, the creation of MNC-SME linkages is, in fact, neither easy nor 
automatic. The existing levels of host country technological and structural devel-
opment will determine what types of linkages will be the most appropriate. So, 
emerging markets need to identify the types of investments that are most likely 
to form the types of linkages best suited to the country’s stage of development, 
and ensure that barriers to those types of linkages are minimized. Indeed, linkage 
programs are never the same, and local conditions are distinct, which demands a 
comprehensive investigation of the specific situation. The linkage programs are 
designed to meet specific region needs and, consequently, to promote develop-
ment. This calls for a regional and subregional approach for a country the size of 
Brazil.
 Notes
* EAESP-FGV, São Paulo, Brazil.
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9 Is attracting foreign direct investment the only 
route to industrial development in an era of 
globalization?
 Th e case of the clothing and textiles sector in South Africa
Soeren Jeppesen and Justin Barnes*
9.1 Introduction
Staying competitive in the global economy in the present era is highly challeng-
ing. While some nations, industries and firms successfully manage this, others 
struggle; still others have difficulties in competing at all. The South African gov-
ernment is ranked as a leader in Africa, capable and well resourced, with in- and 
outbound levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) among the highest on the con-
tinent. The South African textiles and clothing industry is also well established, 
diverse and experienced. Nevertheless, both government and industry have been 
struggling to meet the challenges of global competition since the coming of de-
mocracy in South Africa in 1994, and FDI into the industry has been far behind 
the levels of other African countries (Lesotho, Mauritius, Kenya), not to mention 
Asian countries such as China and India. Major changes in the external environ-
ment have taken place since 1994 which have clearly had an impact on the indus-
try’s development. Asian firms, and particularly those operating in China, have 
become dominant over the last 10-15 years, aggravated by the termination of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), and as such, the Multi-Fibre Agree-
ment (MFA), which until its discontinuation had ensured a system of quotas 
among textiles and clothing producing countries until the end of 2004. Finally, in 
2000 the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) allowed among other 
things, preferential access to African clothing producers entering the US market. 
This was, however, subject to certain conditions, resulting in South African firms 
struggling to take advantage of this agreement.
The South African state, both prior to and after 1994, has had an active and 
rather controlling role in the industrial development of the sector. While the state 
played a major role in building the textiles and clothing industry from the 1930s 
to its peak in the 1980s, it has also been party to the downturn it has experienced 
since. The South African textiles and clothing industry had grown to a consid-
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erable size by the mid-1980s, employing approximately 300,000 persons ( Joffe 
et al., 1995). Since then, the South African firms have been on a steep learning 
curve, having been forced to reconsider their business strategies and embark on 
development trajectories quite distinct from those traversed previously. All in 
all, the closure and downsizing of a substantial number of firms has led to a loss 
of thousands of jobs and today the industry ‘only’ employs about 127,000 per-
sons (Barnes, 2008; 2009). The (new) South African government and its Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry (DTI) have similarly faced difficulties with regard to 
the design and implementation of national programmes and policies since 1994. 
While attraction of FDI has been prolific in the automobile industry, the govern-
ment has been inclined to rely on an export-oriented strategy for the domestic 
textiles and clothing manufacturers that is de-linked from FDI.
Among the many studies which have addressed the complexity of formulating 
and implementing industrial strategies and policies for the clothing and textile 
industry, three related factors have been emphasized over the last decade. Firstly, 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that existed previously as part of the Washington 
Consensus has been consistently criticized. Schulpen and Gibbon (2002), for ex-
ample, have argued in favor of assessing the (real) private sector when formulat-
ing industrial policies. They emphasize the importance of understanding the dy-
namics of a particular country and how its private sector is uniquely configured. 
Secondly, in contrast to this static perspective embodied by the Washington Con-
sensus, Rodrik (2004) has argued that industrial policies are about the process: 
the ability to adjust over time according to the changes taking place. He further 
suggests that while earlier viewpoints proposed the superiority of either the state 
or the private sector, more recent focus has been given to ensuring government-
to-business collaboration. Thirdly, Schmitz (2007) highlights the importance of 
formulating and implementing industrial policy in accordance with the strengths 
and weaknesses of a particular industry, with particular attention to the con-
figuration of the key segments of the industry. That is while attraction of FDI 
might be appropriate for one industry in one situation, focus on export orienta-
tion might be appropriate for another industry in a different situation.
This chapter assesses the case of the textiles and clothing industrial policy of 
South Africa, vis-à-vis the perspective as outlined by Schmitz (2007). As such, 
it examines the feasibility of implementing strategies that emphasize the impor-
tance of either FDI, the pursuance of export strategies and linking to Global 
Value Chains, acquiring licences or using Joint Ventures, to achieve global com-
petitiveness in the present era.
In light of these profound global shifts and with a focus on the cut-make-trim 
(CMT) and clothing manufacturing subsectors of the industry, we assess two 
questions:
the only route to industrial development?
1 Although theory suggests that the best option would have been to attract FDI 
and to facilitate its spillovers on indigenous (South African) firms, the South 
African government chose to follow a strategy of export orientation without 
FDI. What were the motivations for this (also seen in light of the South Afri-
can government choosing to attract FDI in the automotive industry)?
2 What can we learn from this case in terms of policy recommendations for 
governments in other developing countries?
The chapter draws on primary and secondary data to complement its theoretical 
foundations. The primary data consists of information from the benchmarking 
programs of the Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Clothing and Textiles Clusters; two 
industry development initiatives receiving support from provincial and local gov-
ernment in South Africa. The firms belonging to these two programs constitute 
approximately 25 of the total South African clothing and textile industry’s out-
put and employment. The Clusters have been in place since 2004 and 2005 re-
spectively, and the performance of participating manufacturers has been assessed 
annually during this period. This provides us with detailed information on recent 
developments in the industry, as well as the ability of the firms to adjust to the 
changing competitive environment and the challenges faced.
Secondary, data inputs are based on information from key stakeholders (gov-
ernment, trade associations, researchers) obtained through interviews conducted 
by the authors. A range of materials (articles and reports) on the industrial de-
velopment of the country, on government policies, and on the textiles and cloth-
ing industry (domestically and globally) constitute another information source. 
Lastly, reference is made to academic assessments of development trends pertain-
ing to the South African automotive industry.
The structure is as follows. This introduction to the chapter is followed by a 
discussion of the theoretical approaches outlining industrial policy implementa-
tion in developing countries, focusing on Schmitz’s framework (2007). An in-
depth assessment of the case of South Africa is then undertaken, and the sit-
uation with regard to government and industrial initiatives in the textiles and 
clothing industry from the mid-1990s until present day is outlined. Two key is-
sues – concerning the absence of FDI in the South African textiles and clothing 
industry, as well as current industry weaknesses – are raised herein. The govern-
ment focus on export strategies – rather than one focusing on the attraction of 
FDI – is then discussed from an analytical viewpoint that favors the latter over 
the former. The reason for the failure of this industrial policy, which has plunged 
the industry into dire straits today, is therefore examined. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing the potential opportunities and weaknesses of a FDI-focused strat-
egy, and outline a set of potential policy recommendations for the South African 
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government, as well as other developing country governments and policymakers 
facing a similar scenario.
9.2 Industrial development and policy: Th eoretical positions
Numerous and contradictory perspectives have been formulated on how to pur-
sue industrial development in developing countries. The dominant industrial de-
velopment theories of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s argued for developing countries 
to pursue a state-based development trajectory, coined as an import-substituting-
industrial (ISI) strategy. The neo-liberal revival in the late 1970s and 1980s modi-
fied this argument in favor of more open economic policy; an export-orientated-
industrial (EOI) strategy; and a less pronounced role for the state. Today it is 
evident that industrial development is not about the adoption of one approach 
over the other, but rather about how both states and private firms (domestic and 
foreign) interact in order to support industry. In the best case scenario, public 
and private spheres interact with other actors such as unions, researchers, con-
sultants, NGOs and civil society representatives. Pursuing national industrial 
strategies, devising appropriate policies, and implementing beneficiary programs 
successfully have become a complex and challenging matter facing developing 
economies. However, these remain important interventions, given the limited 
economic development and persisting issues of poverty and inequality that such 
countries have experienced over the last 40-50 years.
In addition, global (capitalist) economic conditions have provided ever-chang-
ing opportunities and challenges that complicate the pursuit of industrial de-
velopment for developing country governments and industries. While the suc-
cess of the Asian new industrialised countries (NICs) in the 1970s and 1980s 
has been linked to the pursuit of EOI-strategies, the same opportunities have 
not been open to countries that followed development paths later on (Rodrik, 
2004; Schmitz, 2007). Presently, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), 
and other emerging economies like Malaysia and South Africa, seem able to lev-
erage the necessary capabilities required to exploit certain development options. 
However, the situation will most likely be different for other developing countries 
that attempt to do so in the near future.
As it has become clear that the pace and state of development differs among 
developing countries, and terms like ‘middle income’, ‘low middle income’ and 
‘less/least developed’ have been employed to describe such countries in various 
stages of development, there has been a movement from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ ap-
proach towards a recognition of diversity among developing countries. The em-
phasis that theory places on the role of the developing country government in 
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markets and in terms of industrial development has changed over time, as has the 
view of the role of the private sector. With regard to the main means of promot-
ing industrial development, a set of options, policies and supporting arguments 
has been proposed:
– Export orientation as a means of providing the local industry with better mar-
ket access, exposing it to competition.
– Attract FDI and Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), where the neo-liberal/
classical arguments in favor of foreign capital injections into the local industry 
promote the benefits of acquired capital, improved technology and hence sup-
port to the local industry in terms of knowledge and technical spillovers, as are 
associated with FDI (Lall, 1989; Blomström and Kokko, 2000).
– Promote and support cluster initiatives in order to upgrade local firms (Mc-
Cormick and Pedersen, 1996; Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994).
– Enable local firms to link up with Global Value Chains (Gereffi, 1994; 1999; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002) in order to facilitate access to markets, human 
and technological upgrading, skills development and learning.
– Support linkages between local firms (specifically SMEs) and MNEs, as FDI 
does not ensure the linkages for upgrading will necessarily occur: this implies 
intensive, long-term collaboration (Altenburg, 2002; UNCTAD, 2001; Gir-
oud and Scott-Kennel, 2006).
This suggests an array of strategies and policy instruments which developing 
country governments can utilize in their efforts to enhance industrial develop-
ment and, in particular, build and enhance developing country firms. In addition, 
Wad and Jeppesen (2006) argue that four generic, private sector strategies have, 
and can be, pursued by developing country governments in the quest for indus-
trial development:
1 State-led strategizing aimed at protecting and promoting indigenous indus-
tries and enforcing linkages between foreign investors and domestic compa-
nies.
2 Targeting strategies that emphasize clustering of foreign and domestic firms, 
as well as promotion of linkages in strategic industries and sectors, based on 
the stage of economic development of the relevant country or industry.
3 Open-door strategies in which advanced factors of production (for example 
education, business competencies) and supporting sectors (for example re-
search and development) are promoted by the state while abstaining from di-
rect and select interventions in favor of specific industries and sectors.
4 Passive, laissez-faire strategies in favor of market forces (Wad and Jeppesen, 
2006, pp. 314-315).
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The above-mentioned industrial strategic and policy instruments are generic in 
nature, and are applicable to all sectors and firms, recognizing the specificities of 
the individual industry (Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002; Rodrik, 2004).1 As men-
tioned above, several authors have argued in favour of founding industrial policy 
based on the particularities of each country, in contrast to the tendency of the 
Washington Consensus to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (Mkandawire, 2001). The 
indication is that a major element in ensuring successful industrial development 
is a nuanced view of the actors involved, and in particular, of the ‘real private sec-
tor’ in a given developing country context. Instead of formulating policies on the 
backdrop of the normative position of how industries ‘ideally’ should be config-
ured, Schulpen and Gibbon point out that a realistic assessment of the situation 
(strengths, weaknesses, structure and concentration) in a given private sector is 
more relevant (2002).
Rodrik has taken the ‘developmental state’ approach developed by Amsden 
(1989), Evans (1998) and Mathews (2006) a step further by arguing that, not only 
is it important to have active participation of the state, but it is as important to 
have close communication and interaction between the state and the private sec-
tor (or ‘business community’ as he terms it). Th is interaction is crucial in terms 
of ensuring that the right policies and programs are pursued, that undesirable or 
ineff ective outcomes are avoided, and that constant adjustments and changes are 
undertaken to suit the changing needs of the industry. Rodrik argues that devis-
ing the right policy is less of an issue than ensuring that a process is in place by 
which continuous revision and adjustment happens (Rodrik, 2004, pp. 3, 16-19). 
Rodrik makes the additional points that industrial policy should be time-bound 
and focused on ‘incentives to promote new activities’ (Rodrik, 2004, p. 21), where 
‘new’ products or technologies may assist in diversifying the economy and support 
the generation of new areas of comparative advantage (Rodrik, 2004, p. 21). As the 
surrounding environment and industry change, policies should be revised in order 
to reduce the risk of bureaucratic rent-seeking in outdated and irrelevant policies.
In line with Schulpen and Gibbon and Rodrik, Schmitz argues that the ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach is insufficient if industrial policies are to be effectively im-
plemented. He proposes that industrial policies need to be accommodative of 
two key issues, namely the technology and the marketing gaps that developing 
country sectors often experience. The average developing country firm lacks the 
appropriate technology: often they are out of touch with the most recent sources 
of technology, they have difficulty accessing technology as a result of copyright 
clauses, and/or they are in an environment with little national support for in-
novation (Schmitz, 2007, p. 420). Furthermore, they lack knowledge of interna-
tional markets and customer requirements given their distance from markets and 
a lack of the financial resources to establish brands (ibid).
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Schmitz argues that these gaps imply four strategic paths forward: 1) attrac-
tion of FDI; 2) integration into global value chains; 3) licensing and Joint Venture 
agreements, and; 4) export of own-designed products, as shown in Table 9.1.
In agreement with Rodrik, Schmitz highlights that the process should necessarily 
occur in each industry supported by in-depth – or at least, sufficient – knowl-
edge regarding the industry in order to devise the relevant programs and support 
initiatives applicable to the situation at hand. He further argues that this should 
occur at the subsector level, in line with Gibbon and Schulpen’s perspective re-
garding the nuanced view of the actors in private sector groups of firms in a given 
industry (Schmitz, 2007, p. 422, 426).
Assessing the role of developing country governments in formulating and im-
plementing industrial policies and programs is now a far cry from the ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach that dominated in the 1960s through to the early 1980s. Instead, 
successful formulation and implementation of industrial policy require the abil-
ity of government to engage with the private sector, set a process in motion, and 
devise targeted, time-bound, and hence highly diverse and locally adapted ap-
proaches to targeted problems. Based on Schmitz’s framework and the four stra-
tegic options outlined above, we will investigate a scenario inherent to the South 
African textile and clothing industry. The relevance of this case is 1) the apparent 
capability of the government in terms of designing and implementing industrial 
policies, 2) the changing competitive environment constantly challenging a well-
established industry, and 3) sufficiently detailed data, which allows for a thor-
ough assessment of the development over the last 15-20 years and of the extent to 
which the propositions of Schmitz have or have not been followed.
Table 9.1 Four strategies of integrating in the global economy
Technology gap




Access to technology and markets 
are both severe challenges for local 
fi rms. Foreign Direct Investment is 
preferred strategy.
Challenge is not technology, but 
marketing. Integration into value 
chains co-ordinated by global 
buyers is most applicable.
Challenge is not marketing, but 
technology. Acquiring technology 
through licensing seems best 
option. Alternatively, pursue Joint 
Venture.
Technology and marketing gaps 
are narrow. Local fi rms can export 
own-designed, complete products 
directly.
Source: Schmitz, 2007, p. 422
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9.3 Th e South African case: Th e situation in the textiles and 
clothing industry
The Republic of South Africa (hereafter South Africa) spans a geographical area 
of 1,2 million square km at the Southern tip of the African continent and has a 
population of approximately 48 million people, divided into four major popula-
tion groups (Black African, White, Coloured and Asian/Indian). It is the largest 
economy in Africa, equivalent to a GDP per capita of USD 2,500 in 2008, and 
ranks as a middle-income developing country that has a developed industrial base 
compared to many other developing countries. However, South Africa also has 
a high level of unemployment ranging from 25-30 depending on source, as well 
as one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. South Africa has the larg-
est stock of inward-flowing FDI in Africa and had the highest level of outward-
flowing FDI among African countries, given that it is the third largest investor in 
Africa in 2008, behind the UK and US (UNCTAD, 2008).
While minerals constitute an important part of the economy (10 of GDP) – 
and are perceived to be the funding base of modern industrial development in the 
country – manufacturing and, increasingly, the services sectors are well developed 
sectors of the economy, constituting 20 and 70 of GDP respectively (Fine and 
Rustomjee, 1995; Marais, 2001). Among the mature and important manufactur-
ing industries are the textiles and clothing industry and the automotive industry. 
The South African textile and clothing industry is a labor intensive industry em-
ploying a considerable percentage of the total manufacturing workforce, while the 
industry’s contribution to the total GDP is relatively modest. The automotive in-
dustry is much more capital intensive, is also a major employer, and makes a more 
substantial contribution to GDP. However, while FDI has been a key element in 
the transformation of the automotive industry, it has been of minor importance 
to the development and recent changes in the textiles and clothing industry. Be-
fore we address the limited role of FDI since 1994, we briefly characterize the 
textiles and clothing industry and its strengths and weaknesses. Schmitz’s point 
of departure is that we first take stock of the situation in a given industry with 
regard to whether ‘technology gaps’, or ‘marketing gaps’ or both exist. Then we can 
assess the appropriate strategy of integrating in the global economy.
 the textile and clothing industry in south africa by 
1995
The industry developed in a protectionist environment aimed at ‘self-reliance’, 
where an ISI- strategy reined. This was further exacerbated by the isolation that 
was the result of international sanctions during the 1980s. The limited foreign 
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ownership in the industry diminished as a range of MNEs disinvested. Still, by 
the mid-1990s, the South African textile and clothing industry was nonetheless 
diverse, of significant size and of major importance employment-wise, and was 
accordingly of central importance from an industrial development perspective.
The industry included the full range of firm operations – from very basic, 
non-diversified producers of raw material inputs, to yarn and textiles mills, cut-
make-trim firms and clothing manufacturers – of both low-end and high-end 
quality garments, and finally a wide range of independent retailers. The indus-
try employed slightly less than the 300,000 persons at its peak in the 1980s and 
contributed around 11 of manufacturing output and 2 to 3 of total GDP 
(Statistics South Africa).
Approximately 3,000 firms were active in the sector, with approximately 10-
15 being large and 85-90 being SMEs. Geographically, the industry was con-
centrated in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces, where many firms 
were located in so-called ‘homelands’ (Bantustans), due to lower labor costs and 
generous governement incentives in the area. In South Africa the industry was 
highly formalized: almost all firms were registered and most employees (more 
than 200,000) were members of one or another union.3 CMT companies and 
clothing manufacturers mainly supplied to the domestic market (more than 90 
of total output), while the remaining 10 was exported: the value of clothing 
exports ZAR 490 million in 1995. The main supplies came from other South Af-
rican firms, though imports were increasing. The main customers were six major 
domestic retailers (constuting 75) and small independent shops.
While numerous firms were members of employers’ associations (such as the 
Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association, and the Natal Clothing Manufactur-
ers Association) and the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), little 
organized collaboration took place among textiles mills, CMTs, clothing manu-
facturers and retailers. On the contrary, needs and demands differed vastly along 
the value chain in accordance with a participant’s particular position. To this ex-
tent, much contention regarding government policies and the relevant measures 
to assist the industry regularly arose. While the textiles and clothing industry was 
a mature and well established, domestically-owned and domestically-oriented in-
dustry, it also had a number of weaknesses, given the new competitive environ-
ment which it had entered as a result of the liberalization of the economy that 
took place from 1994, and the lowering of tariffs and other trade barriers that 
accompanied this move. The isolated nature of the Apartheid economy and the 
almost total absence of FDI and hence of inputs from the global industry had led 
to an industry with a number of idiosyncratic features. The absence of external 
competition and of foreign MNEs, along with an inherent dependence on the do-
mestic value chain, led to a ‘South African style of relations in the industry’. Often 
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orders were ‘guaranteed’ and with ‘only’ South African inspiration on style and 
fashion, limited design and innovation capacity existed. The level of investment 
had been low for many years and accordingly the technology used was outdated. 
Hardly any emphasis had been given to training and skills development among 
employees and management. The cocktail of outdated technology, a particular 
type of ‘hierarchical’ organization, and low skills level meant that productivity 
was low, too ( Joff e et al., 1995; Hirschsohn et al., 2000). As such, the textiles and 
clothing industry faced a situation in which it experienced a ‘marketing gap’ in 
terms of lack of knowledge of foreign markets (both regarding customer/buyer re-
quirements and fashion trends among end consumers) while being focused on the 
home market – in its own ‘homegrown style’, and a ‘technology gap’ operating with 
old and outdated technology compared to the global industry, due to the lack of 
investments (domestic and foreign), and a lack of skills development among man-
agers and employees. In comparison with Schmitz’s framework, the South African 
example therefore represents a rather clear situation in which the industrial policy 
should have focused on attracting FDI. What happened and why?
9.4 Government responses and policy developments
We start with a brief contextualization outlining the overall industrial develop-
ment strategy of the government and then turn to the policies in the textiles and 
clothing industry. Then we outline what the situation is in the industry today.
9.4.1 Content of industrial development strategies and textiles and clothing 
policies
Following international sanctions of the 1980s, South Africa had become fairly 
isolated prior to the advent of democracy in 1994 and the issue of how to reinte-
grate into the global economy was therefore a pertinent issue to the new govern-
ment of national unity. While the industrial development strategy of South Afri-
ca during the Apartheid period 1948-1994 (and prior) resembled an ISI-strategy, 
the post-Apartheid period sought a new approach. Instead, an EOI-strategy was 
implemented through liberalization of imports and exports via the lowering of 
tariffs, along with growing deregulation and privatization of state-owned enter-
prises and public utility companies, for example in the water sector (similar to 
the Washington Consensus). While government lowered tariffs on imports to 
22 on textiles (apparel) and to 40 on clothing, the main incentive for textiles 
and clothing firms was the introduction of an export subsidy, the Duty Certifi-
cate Credit Scheme (DCCS), which was targeted at providing exporters with 
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duty certificates that allowed them to import fabrics and garments at significantly 
lower tariff rates.
The first overall development strategy (the Reconstruction and Development 
Program – RDP) initiated in 1994 contained substantial poverty reduction and 
redistributional elements (Government of South Africa, 1994). The redistribu-
tional elements were, however, downsized, when the government commenced 
a subsequent program; the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy in 1996 (Department of Finance, 1996). The neo-liberal inspiration was 
much more dominant compared to its predecessor, with export-orientation and 
macroeconomic stability seen as key objectives, following additional liberaliza-
tion and privatization (Marais, 2001; Padayachee, 2008).4 On the other hand, the 
alliance among the government, headed by the ruling party ANC, the political 
left-wing and the trade unions, meant that the South African government was 
less inclined to deregulate the labor market and to pursue a fast-tracked privati-
zation process. The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (AS-
GISA) followed the GEAR strategy in 2006 and mainly reinforced the GEAR 
strategy emphasis on macroeconomic stability, continuation and prioritization of 
certain key sectors (business-process-engineering, like call centers, and biotech-
nology) (The Presidency, 2007). However, the ASGISA strategy also envisaged 
major governmental infrastructure projects and other investments aimed at gen-
erating employment in order to boost economic growth over time.
As important as the policies themselves are the capacity and power of the bu-
reaucracy in implementing the strategies and policies. In contrast to most other 
African countries, the South African state administration was both powerful and 
well capacitated by the mid-1990s. The key ministries were the Department of 
Finance, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Minerals 
and Energy (DME), Department of Labor (DoL) and the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWF). The main center of influence rested with the Department of 
Finance, which set up the EOI and managed macroeconomic factors of the econ-
omy, as well as to some extent with the DTI as it was in charge of policy formu-
lation and implementation. However, the DME, DoL and DWF also had their 
respective shares of influence in the pricing of main inputs like electricity, labor 
and water. Overall, the new South African government continued to have a strong 
hand in industrial development affairs as during the Apartheid period. For exam-
ple, the government controlled substantial investments through its development 
agency, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which continued to play 
a major investment role in manufacturing. Within the overall EOI-type of strat-
egy and the emphasis on macroeconomic stability by the Ministry of Finance, a 
number of sector-oriented policies and programs have been implemented by the 
DTI. The more successful ones have been within the automotive industry (see 
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Barnes and Morris, 2008). From official sources, the South African government 
has frequently – at latest with the ‘Rescue Plan’ (DTI, 2009) – indicated that it 
is not prepared to see the demise of the South African Textiles and Clothing in-
dustry due to its importance as a job creator and the benefits the economy secures 
from its existing skills base. According to the DTI, the industry plays a vital role 
in ASGISA planning, as an important job creator for unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers (DTI, 2007, p. 20).
Following ASGISA, a so-called National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) 
was initiated in January 2007. The NIPF defines the government’s approach to 
the aspects of industrialization under the ASGISA strategy. The NIPF includes 
strategies with an increased focus on export-oriented sectors and labor-intensive, 
job-creating industries, including the textiles and clothing industry (DTI, 2007, 
p. 2).
Furthermore, an Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) was developed and im-
plemented by the DTI in July 2007. The focus of the IPAP was to operational-
ize the industrial policies formulated under ASGISA and refined in the NIPF, 
by setting concrete action plans and time frames for the implementation of the 
strategies. The IPAP combines a set of general plans for the different South Af-
rican industries and proposes a range of industry-specific strategies and activities 
in order to build and improve sustainable competitive advantages, among others 
in the textiles and clothing industry (see Appendix 1). A key component to the 
textiles and clothing industry is the Customized Sector Program (CSP). The 
CSP was originally completed in June 2005. It was designed to modernize and 
develop the textile and clothing industry, enabling the rapid advancement of its 
competitiveness. Phrased differently, it was aimed at closing the technology gap 
which the industry experienced. However, the CSP was then delayed and revised 
– see section 5 below – before facing a similar fate to other DTI programs and 
proposals: either not having any effect on the industry or not having been im-
plemented.Therefore, the main activities related to protecting the industry have 
partly rested on the aforementioned DCCS5, giving manufacturing exporters of 
clothes and textiles possibilities of certain levels of duty free imports, depending 
on their level of export (ITAC, 2004) and partly on imposing import restrictions 
on clothes and textiles from China (ITAC, 2006 – see section 5).
The national government has introduced various initiatives to support the re-
generation of the industry’s skills base. Regarding workers the support has been 
through the establishment of the Clothing, Textiles, Footwear and Leather Sec-
tor Education and Training Authority (CTFL-SETA), and also by supporting 
new investments in the industry through the Clothing and Textiles Desk of the 
IDC. Regarding management – based on the successful clustering models devel-
oped to support the South African automotive components industry – limited 
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funds for cluster initiatives were secured from provincial and local government 
from 2004 leading to the establishment of the mentioned Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal Clothing and Textiles Clusters.6
Finally, in an industry where price competition is central, the cost/price level 
of key inputs (water, electricity and wages) is highly important for competitive-
ness. The South African government has affected the industry in different ways, 
both in terms of the level of wages (where the lead ministry is DoL) and the 
price of water (lead ministry DWF) that have been relatively high, while elec-
tricity (lead ministry DME) has been relatively cheap, but recently problematic 
due to load shedding, supply problems and annual price increases of well over 
25. Probably even more important has been the inability of the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) to control the borders of the country, allowing illegal 
and undervalued imports to impact heavily on certain industries, including the 
textiles and clothing industry.
In a rapidly changing global environment, the government has seemingly tried 
to implement different policies with a variety of instruments aimed at 1) promot-
ing exports through the DCCS, 2) imposing quotas on Asian/Chinese imports, 
3) renewing technology (through the CSP), 4) enhancing skill levels (the CTFL-
SETA), and 5) supporting clusters, among other initiatives. And yet the industry 
has continued to experience a substantial decline with thousands of firms closing 
and more than 150,000 jobs being lost. If we assess this development in the con-
text of the analytical approach by Schmitz outlined earlier, what picture emerges?
9.4.2 Th e situation in the South African textiles and clothing industry: 
Technology and marketing gaps
Today, the South African textile and clothing industry continues to be an impor-
tant industry in South Africa; it is still relatively7 labor intensive and a large em-
ployer of semi-skilled and unskilled labour. However, its relative importance has 
diminished dramatically as the industry today employs approximately 127,000 
people (or 11) of the total manufacturing workforce. The sector’s contribution 
to the total GDP has dropped too, to only around 0.6.
As highlighted earlier, the strengths of the South African textiles and cloth-
ing industry were – and continue to be – the level of experience, in that it is well 
established, and by now aware of the ‘new’ competitive situation. In contrast to 
many African countries, the industry also has different opportunities; that is, 
a sizeable and growing domestic market, particularly since 2005. This provides 
the industry locational advantages and the possibility of serving their domestic 
customers quicker than foreign competitors, given an ability to meet the require-
ments of improved speed and reliability by the domestic retailers (the customers). 
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The basic challenge for the South African textile and clothing manufacturers is 
to achieve global competitiveness in order to be able to compete, not only in the 
global market, but predominantly in the – main – domestic market, which is 
no longer protected to the same degree as in earlier periods. In other words, the 
South African textile and clothing manufacturers need to enhance their world 
class manufacturing standards (Barnes, 2008) – in particular leading to a closure 
of the technology gap, but also of the marketing gap. Social and environmental 
compliance play a more important role for end consumers both on the world 
market and increasingly the domestic market as well. This has made the retailers 
focus more on quality measurements, and securing product quality and working 
conditions for workers employed at the factories supplying the retailers.
Clearly, the industry as a whole has not so far been able to confront the chal-
lenges of reducing production costs, improving quality, efficiency and flexibil-
ity and furthermore encouraging specialization. Financial data shows that the 
turnover of the domestic manufacturers fell by 18 in the period from 2005-2008, 
while a comparative set of foreign manufacturers experienced growth of 26 over 
the same period (Barnes, 2008). Despite years of only limited investment, the 
ROI secured by South African clothing manufacturers was moreover only 10 in 
2008, revealing its poor performance.
A closer look at the development in sales volumes among major segments of 
the industry along with production and employment patterns since the mid-1990s 
tells key parts of the story. The domestic industry continues to be concentrated 
primarily in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) regions, although 
some outlying activity also exists in the Gauteng area. An estimated 1,035 firms 
are evenly distributed across the formal and informal sectors, of which 33.5 op-
erate out of KwaZulu-Natal, and 29.1 exist in the Western Cape (IDC, 2009, p. 
4). The domestic textile industry is characterized by plants of varying technical 
ability, and while few regional differences exist, the greatest proportion of value 
added is purportedly concentrated in KZN (Barnes et al., 2007, p. 14). The KZN 
profile of firms is predominantly comprised of CMT firms, and is concentrated 
on mass market production of garment basics, relative to a Western Cape focus 
on larger operations servicing a more design-intensive and niche-market focus.
In 1998, seasonally adjusted real values of sales of textiles and textile products, 
knitted or crocheted products and wearing apparel amounted to ZAR 42.9 bil-
lion. 10 years later, this figure was a mere ZAR 34 billion in real terms (Statis-
tics South Africa, 2009 (www.statssa.gov.za)). If we turn to the major customers, 
the local production of clothing is concentrated on high-quality items for the 
middle and high ends of the domestic market, with major retail chains (such as 
Truworths, Woolworths, Foschini and Edcon) commanding 70 of this share. 
Likewise, indexed production in volume has declined, as indicated in Figure 9.1. 
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In addition, the increase in imports from 1996 to 2006 of which China’s share 
went from 21.58 to 78.49, highlights that South African producers were un-
able to retain their domestic market share, while imported apparel goods from 
China and other low-cost producers have moved in strongly on the South African 
market.
Figure 9.1 Production performance of the South African industry since 1998
Source: Statistics South Africa (www.statssa.gov.za)8
Textiles production experienced a significant decline over the 10-year period, 
from a real value of ZAR 877 million in 1998 to ZAR 568 million in 2008 (see 
Figure 9.2). This has been less so for other textile products, which have actually 
experienced a slight increase in value from ZAR 804 million to ZAR 833.5 million 
in real terms over the same time span (see Table B in the Appendix). The clothing 
industry in South Africa contributes 7.2 of total manufacturing employment 
in the economy. Over the 2003-2008 period, clothing and textile employment 
decreased by annual averages of 4.8 and 3.5, respectively (IDC, 2009). From 
2000 to 2006 the workforce employed in the clothing industry has fallen from 
136,767 to 80,576 (Barnes, 2008), and as of June 2008, to approximately 68,708 
people.9 In addition, employment in the textile industry has fallen from 55,081 in 
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Figure 9.2 Production performance of South African textiles and clothing segments in 
real sales values, 1998-2008
Data source: Statistics South Africa (www.statssa.gov.za)11
As another sign of the lack of ability to adjust to the present competitive situa-
tion (and reduce the marketing gap), the main customers – the domestic retailers 
– are generally unsatisfied with the performance of the domestic manufacturers 
and are therefore shifting to importing from international manufacturers. The 
main areas of dissatisfaction are; delivery reliability, as well as price and quality of 
the product. Therefore areas for improvement do exist. The problem is that the 
manufacturers are not operating on the levels that they should be and are not im-
proving at the speed required to compete and catch up with international manu-
facturers. This places the industry in a vicious circle of decreased capabilities and 
lack of investments in the industry, compared to foreign competitors. The South 
African manufacturers and CMTs have invested an equivalent of less that 2 of 
total sales. This is far lower than the foreign manufacturers’ average of 5.4. This 
means that the industry is using outdated technology and does not spend suf-
ficiently on capability building among the staff. This leads to decreased competi-
tiveness of domestic companies relative to their foreign-based competitors, both 
on the South African market and abroad. So, in spite of the EOI-policy, the value 
of exports in 2007 was ZAR 688.5 million, falling 17.5 from 2006 and to about 
a third of that in 2003 (ZAR 2 billion).12 The industry is clearly in dire straits.
Seen from both the domestic and foreign customers’ side (and being the other 
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ence among retailers to ‘fast fashion’, lean retailing and manufacturers with short 
delivery time to the markets, and retailers are thereby heavily dependent on 
South African manufacturers’ ability to deliver on this. Due to the fierce compe-
tition in the textile and clothing industry there is a focus on moving into niche-
market production, and to be able to focus on higher value-added products. This 
change has made research and development key to achieve the new goals and 
the demands of the retailing sector. While the clothing and textile industry has 
been changed by transformations in the IT sector and the increased bargaining 
power of large global retailers, the change process in the South African industry 
has been held back by the low level of investment, effecting both technology and 
skills.
We now turn to the South African government’s industrial policy and take a 
look at the structure of relevant policies, why they failed, and why the South Afri-
can government chose to focus on export-orientation rather than FDI (or one of 
the other options in Schmitz’s framework) considering the large technology and 
marketing gaps that the industry experienced in the mid-1990s.
9.5 Th e mismatch between government policies and the realities 
in the industry: Why did the South African government follow 
export orientation and not pursue foreign direct investment?
We address five issues, 1) the emphasis of government on the EOI-type of 
strategy and on macroeconomic policies (lowering of tariffs, free-floating ex-
change rate), 2) the quality of the industry-targeted policies, including the 
DCCS, and the late protection of local industry through quotas on import, 
3) the impact of the input prices (electricity, water, wages) on production, and 
SARS’ inability to control the borders, 4) the issues of coherence in govern-
ment policies, the level of capacity in the DTI, and finally, 5) government-in-
dustry collaboration.
9.5.1 An emphasis on EOI, lowering of tariff s, free-fl oating exchange rate 
and macroeconomic stability
From an industrial development perspective, an EOI-strategy carries merit in 
aiming to enhance the effectiveness and competitiveness of a local industry. How-
ever, being able to make the transition from a closed, domestically-oriented econ-
omy to an open, globally-oriented competitive one rests on certain preconditions. 
Schmitz emphasizes that the local industry needs to have reached both a certain 
technological level of advancement and a good knowledge of foreign markets (of 
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buyers and of end consumers), which the South African textiles and clothing 
industry did not have by 1995 (see above). The ambitions of achieving macroeco-
nomic stability has been fulfilled which was part of the success in attracting FDI 
in industries like the automotive sector.
In a transition phase, various support measures and barriers to external com-
petitors need to be in place, as they were in the successful East Asian countries 
during their transition – and as permitted by the WTO (Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2008). However, while lowering tariffs is part of the macroeconomic stability 
package – which South Africa also has followed – the government decided to de-
crease the tariffs faster than needed, also within a WTO framework and accord-
ingly limiting the breathing space of the industry. Furthermore, the government 
abstained from taking any additional measures, one of which might have been 
implementing a mechanism to assist the clothing exporters handle the impact 
of the fluctuation in the exchange rate. As a part of the macroeconomic package, 
the rand has been allowed to float freely against other currencies, which has led 
to considerable fluctuations and volatility. This is not unusual and numerous ex-
amples exist on how to bolster local industries against this effect. However, the 
South African government has not undertaken any of such initiatives, which in 
turn have had major implications on the industry, as the rand has moved from its 
lowest exchange rate of ZAR 5,50 to USD 1, to over ZAR 11 at its highest point 
of trading. This has created highly unpredictable conditions for the industry, in-
cluding substantial upturns – and downturns.
Finally, the government has rejected a number of proposals by the industry 
(see also the following section). For example, national government was unwilling 
to lobby for adjustment in AGOA requirements. Clotrade had highlighted the 
possibility of improving export performance by allowing local manufacturers to 
source fabric inputs from third-world countries and still be able to export to the 
US and the EU under the same conditions as other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries. But the South African clothing manufacturers have had to comply 
with an additional, three-stage conversion rule in order to access the US market, 
in addition to the normal conditions stipulated for exporters from other SSA 
countries, thus limiting AGOA-based exports.
In sum, the South African government chose to follow the Washington Con-
sensus approach to industrial development rather strictly (focusing on macro-
economic stability and lower tariffs (even more than needed) and letting the cur-
rency float freely), while refraining from introducing WTO-approved supporting 
measures.
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9.5.2 Th e quality of industry’s targeted policies, including the Duty 
Certifi cate Credit Scheme and protection of local industry through 
quotas on imports
The key policy instruments and the quality of policies targeting the textiles and 
clothing industry, as well as the goal of the EOI, present a picture of good inten-
tions, but limited success in terms of implementation. In relation to Schmitz’s ap-
proach and with regard to addressing the technology gap and the marketing gap 
as he suggests, a variety of alternate options appear to have been viable. On the 
technology side, if the option of offering incentives to provide FDI were consid-
ered too limited, support to local firms in acquiring license agreements and new 
technology with foreign firms could easily have been established. For instance, 
investment finance in textile mills is important given the capital-intensive nature 
of the process, and while this has happened in Swaziland since 2000, no invest-
ment has been made in South Africa for a very long period of time.
On the marketing side, the industry has clearly been scarred by the protec-
tionist era of ISI-policies, the sanctions in the 1980s, and the dominance of large 
retailers in the domestic market. However, concerted efforts to promote South 
African products in the EU and the US have not been attempted, and sensitizing 
the industry to the needs and demands of the same markets has not been tried 
either. Another option – of seeking to improve the sector’s limited design capac-
ity – has not been pursued in full, either. Building capacity at technical schools 
and/or setting up distinctive design schools has not been attempted.
While the DCCS has been a major instrument in the development of the 
industry and agreement has been reached on the need to reform/improve it, it 
should be highlighted that it is hard to have reforms of the DCCS because it is 
applied across the entire SACU region and is not South Africa-specific. Further-
more, Clotrade (the export council for the clothing industry) and the DTI could 
not and do not agree on how to reform the DCCS (see below).
Import quotas on fabrics from China were supposed to be another supporting 
instrument, but it has had a potentially counterproductive effect on the industry. 
While the value of imported clothing to the South African market fell by 8.7 
in the period from 2006 to 2007, from ZAR 6.9 billion to ZAR 6.3 billion, as 
the government hoped, the decline was more technical than real. In reality this 
decline in imports is not due to an overall decline in imports, but is the outcome 
of an amount of forward-buying at the end of 2006 in anticipation of the imple-
mentation of the quota system being enforced in the beginning of 2007, thus in-
flating the imports for 2006 higher than under normal conditions and reflecting a 
larger deflation of imports for 2007 than would have actually occurred (Clotrade, 
2008a). If we were to take a slightly longer time perspective, the value of imports 
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of clothing has increased more than 300 from 2000 to 2007 (Barnes, 2008). In 
spite of the quotas, China remained the main country of origin for imports into 
the domestic market in 2008, while the other main countries of import were In-
dia, Hong Kong and Mauritius. The figures indicate that the policy seems to have 
forced local producers down the value chain, competing with low price countries 
instead of focusing on core competencies, optimizing their competitive advantage 
of localization and ability to manufacture with shorter lead times to market and 
greater flexibility. The government-imposed industry strategies have therefore 
proved largely counterproductive to the local industry.
Therefore, since 1994 the major instrument of policy intervention has been 
the DCCS, and while other, minor support schemes have been in place, only the 
late introduction of quotas on Chinese apparel carries some weight. The inten-
tions listed above (and in the Appendix) are extensive, but are marked by a lack of 
implementation. And again, the striking feature is the lead time associated with 
launching any such program, as has more recently been the case with the pro-
posed establishment of a Government Rescue Package for the industry in 2009.
9.5.3 Eff ects of input prices (electricity, water, and raw materials) and 
wages
While levels of tariffs, quotas and the exchange rate constitute a sizeable portion 
of the competitiveness of the industry, other factors are of importance too. In a 
price-sensitive industry, clearly, relatively high wages (and relatively low produc-
tivity compared to other countries) matters, similarly the prices of other inputs 
like electricity, water and raw materials (in particular if coming in at undervalued 
prices due to illegal and/or undervalued imports) are of absolute importance, too.
South Africa has been renowned for its low electricity prices (Van Horen, 
1997) both during the previous regime and under the current government. How-
ever, during the last couple of years, load shedding and uncertainty of electricity 
supply have occurred, creating problems and adding to levels of uncertainty in the 
industry in general. Similarly, water rates have been low in the past, but have risen 
due to the general scarcity of water (Bethlehem and Goldblatt, 1997). Ensuring 
that public water remains at an affordable level is obviously of concern, and while 
increasing prices can act as a means to encourage industry to switch to more 
efficient/’cleaner’ technologies, it is important to have either a scheme in place to 
facilitate this (for example, favorable loans to the firms that undertake such in-
vestments) or to subsidize firms in vulnerable industries according to the loss of 
competitiveness that the firms might experience vis-à-vis main foreign competi-
tors. None of these supportive measures have been pursued by the government.
Prices of raw materials have been lowered with the reduction of tariffs, par-
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ticularly in the case of yarn and fabrics, as opposed to clothes. This is another 
part of the EOI-package and in theory appropriate in pushing the industry to a 
transition, given that appropriate, time-bound measures are in place to assist the 
industry in overcoming the difficulties of a new and changing competitiveness en-
vironment. As mentioned, this has not been the case. And while the South Afri-
can government lowered tariffs quicker than it was required by the WTO, SARS 
did not ramp up policing and control of illegal imports at the borders sufficiently. 
The consequences have been massive illegal imports of fabrics and garments, as 
well as massive import of inputs that have been undervalued. While this might 
be seen as an advantage for the part of the industry that is using the input, this 
has been devastating to the part of the industry producing the inputs leading to 
their closure. This has in turn lead to both a case of thinned competencies in the 
domestic manufacturing base – resulting in the industry eventually not being able 
to utilize the imposition of quotas (as explained above) – and the development of 
a new informal sector in the industry (based on the illegal imports).
While numerous elements of the South African government’s macroeconomic 
stability initiatives resembled those of the Washington Consensus, few changes 
regarding wage rates and the labor market took place. In a globalized economy, 
this approach is by no means necessarily as problematic as, for example, the Nor-
dic, German and/or Dutch model(s) show. However, if an economy’s wages are 
relatively high, than they need to be compensated with higher levels of productiv-
ity, which can be secured from skills development, training and new technology 
and so on. The Sectoral Educational and Training Agencies (SETAs) established 
by the South African government are one such example, targeting the skills (hu-
man resource) gaps that many pointed out by the mid-1990s ( Joffe et al., 1995). 
However it was only in the late 1990s that the national system was established, 
and only within the last couple of years that it has gained any momentum, for 
example, with the working of the CFTL-SETA. While this very relevant activ-
ity might assist the industry in terms of technology and marketing issues, it has 
taken a long time to come into force and with limited resources when it eventually 
did. As this is a major component of the Rescue Package of 2009, it seems to add 
to a picture of the government assistance being ‘too little, too late’.
In terms of addressing the need to upgrade the skills of management, these 
have been part of the cluster initiatives started in 2004 and 2005. Interestingly 
though, the CCTC and the KZN-CTC have been funded at the provincial and 
local government level, not by national government institutions as mentioned 
above. Instead of being a part of a national DTI scheme, the two ‘local’ govern-
ment levels have had to initiate their own scheme. Again, though a highly relevant 
and important initiative aimed at addressing the ‘homegrown’ features of the in-
dustry, these are examples of initiatives coming rather late.
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9.5.4 Coherence in government policies and the level of capacity in 
government
The various policies have not been coherent as the discussions above demon-
strate. While the Ministry of Finance has pursued the EOI-type of industrial 
development through the GEAR, and later the ASGISA strategy, the DTI has 
been both unsettled and indecisive regarding specific policies for the textiles and 
clothing industry. We will return to the reasons for this indecisiveness; however 
the result has been that the DTI has failed to commit to longer-term policy ho-
rizons and has delayed extensions of the DCCS and other important initiatives 
(like the quotas and Rescue Package).
Finally, the policies – in particular pricing policies – employed by the DME 
and DWF have only partly been aligned with the EOI and the DTI textiles and 
clothing policies, as only DME and the local electricity prices have been of sup-
port to the industry. More importantly – or rather, devastatingly over time – has 
been the inability of SARS to control the influx of imports and underinvoicing 
at border posts, which has only led to a more uneven playing field for the South 
African manufacturers. Given the historical situation with tight control of the 
borders and the later history of SARS being highly successful in collecting per-
sonal income tax revenues, it raises the question of the will of the government 
to address the well-known problem and hence to support the industry through 
ensuring a ‘fair competitive environment’.
The lack of coherence both relates to increasing tensions between the Ministry 
of Finance and the DTI, while in addition, the level of capacity in government has 
decreased over time, in particular with the DTI. We will return to the issue of 
tensions below. From being a strong and capacitated Ministry in the mid-1990s, 
frequent changes in staff,13 and drainage of qualified staff, have left the ministry 
much weaker than it had been 15 years earlier. Furthermore, whether for reasons 
of diminishing capacity or for political motivations, the DTI has been aligned 
with the trade unions, which have had a considerable impact on its policies. Nu-
merous examples of fruitful interaction between government, industry and un-
ions exist – although this has not been the case in the South African experience – 
which in turn has been part of the problematic development since the mid-1990s 
(see below).
9.5.5 Government-industry collaboration
Rodrik and others have argued that it is of key importance that the relationship 
between government and industry is close and constructive. In the South African 
case this collaboration seems to have changed from good to bad and has been con-
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strained in various ways as the example of the imposed quotas show.14 While the 
collaboration between government and industry followed the ‘prescription’ until 
1994 (for particular reasons, due to the close links between a white government 
and the white business people running the South African private sector)15, this 
situation changed after 1994.
As the new ANC-led government took office, the relationship cooled off. To 
the new government and its alliance partners, the predominantly white business 
class was seen as a co-conspirator with the Apartheid government and the previ-
ous regime. The South African government started to listen more to foreign advi-
sors compared to industry representatives, so the level of engagement between 
government and industry decreased, as well as the ability to reach compromises 
on which policies to agree on. The lack of mediating measures following the im-
plementation of the EOI/GEAR strategy is the first example of this. The power 
resting with the Ministry of Finance in contrast to the DTI and the lack of will-
ingness to allow any industry supportive measure is another – very important 
– example.
Another example is the lack of implementation of Clothing and Textile CSP, 
which was a program intended to address the technology gap (and hence an in-
direct acknowledgement that a gap existed). While industry was in support of 
the first original proposal, the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (SACTWU) rejected it and instead demanded that labor market issues be 
included (to guarantee its hegemonic position in all government interventions), 
along with substantial financial commitments from South African retailers. 
Then the retailing sector withdrew its support for the ‘new’ CSP as proposed by 
SACTWU, resulting in the effective freezing of the initiative.16
A final, recent example took place in 2007, in which the South African govern-
ment proposed the above mentioned quotas on imports from China to protect 
the domestic industry and give it time to restructure and become globally com-
petitive (see ITAC, 2006). The objective of the South African government was 
to force the local retailers to source from local manufacturers and CMTs, and 
thereby regain the jobs lost over the last few years. However, while the logic ap-
peared correct, the timing was wrong as many factories had already been closed or 
scaled down, making it impossible to supply the quantities of low cost products 
demanded by retailers in the domestic market (Clotrade, 2008b). Accordingly, 
implementation was enforced against the wishes of South African retailers and 
clothing manufacturers, who argued that the quotas were imposed too late and 
would not therefore have the desired effects: because many local producers used 
fabrics and finished garments sourced from China in their production. The re-
sult was that imports of textiles and clothing sourced from China increased in 
2006 and then fell in 2007 (as mentioned above), but primarily because retailers 
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had started to source low-priced clothing and textiles from other low-cost des-
tinations, such as Mauritius, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, with no import 
quotas and efficient clothing and textile industries (Morris and Reed, 2008). So, 
instead of assisting local manufacturers, quotas first led retailers to push forward 
supplies and then, in the light of increased uncertainty about the future situation 
of China, some retailers started to source from other low-wage countries. All 
in all, the quotas came too late and had little or no effect in terms of boosting 
industry performance. Had the quotas been in place earlier – for example, from 
1994 onwards – along with a concerted effort to control the borders against illegal 
and/or underpriced imports as well as a better assessment of the situation in the 
industry paired with the types of ‘world class standard initiatives’ that have been 
undertaken now, the chances of a different development seem fair.
The view from the government, in particular the DTI, has been that apart 
from these governmental actions taken to improve the conditions for the textile 
and clothing sector, further improvements need to be undertaken by the private 
sector and the industry itself, if the sector is to recover. We fully concur with this 
and have no doubt that the ability of the industry to change has been constrained, 
the speed of change has been low and internal issues concerning alignment of in-
terest and industry collaboration have had an impact on the outcome. Difficulties 
in aligning the industry and establishing collaboration among all involved parties 
of the local value chain because of an inability to overcome opposing interests 
have certainly slowed the pace of change. However, from the industrial develop-
ment point of view the Asian developmental states and the ability of these gov-
ernments to undertake such changes, the record of the South African government 
is rather disappointing. Given the responsibility of the government to undertake 
economic development and secure employment and income for the population, 
it is difficult to defend not having a stake in the decline in employment from 
approx. 300,000 to 120,000 persons over 15-20 years. The irony here is that the 
aggregated and sustained impact on the industry lately has made it obvious to the 
DTI that the downturn in number of employees, number of closures etc, has been 
too high. This finally led to the promulgation of the ‘Rescue Package’ in early 
2009, including a large number of initiatives that earlier were not considered, or 
alternatively were considered likely to only have a limited impact (like the skills 
development issues).
In relation to Rodrik’s views, and as noted in the main part of this chapter, the 
collaboration between the government (the DTI) and the industry has neither 
been close, constructive nor of mutual benefit. On the contrary, it has deterio-
rated over time and probably constitutes a major part of the explanation as to 
why the development has been as outlined above. The political relations have led 
the relations between government and its alliance partners, including the trade 
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unions, to override the economic, industrial conditions. Instead of a constructive 
tripartite relationship, government and unions have sided against the industry. 
The losers have – ironically – been the employees and their families, as approxi-
mately 150,000 persons have lost their jobs and many of the currently employed 
are now working in poor conditions in informal businesses.
The South African textiles and clothing industry has experienced internal and 
external challenges since the mid-1990s, leading to a drop in employment levels 
to less than half of that in the mid-1980s. While generally being slow to react and 
having difficulties in aligning with the involved industry parties, some companies 
have fully adapted to the new competitive environment. Others are still attempt-
ing to make the transition, whilst many more have unfortunately been forced to 
close. Starting out as a formalized, coherent industry in the mid-1990s, the pre-
sent situation of the industry is marked by a high level of value chain fragmenta-
tion and informalization. It is a development that has been affected by the signifi-
cant changes in the external competitive environment where China has emerged 
as the textiles and clothing producer of the world. And numerous changes have 
taken place within international trade policies and frameworks with the GATT 
being phased out, the WTO being phased in, the ATC/MFA being phased out 
in 2004 and the AGOA being established in the late 1990s.
To a new and inexperienced government this raised numerous challenges, 
which the government has not been very successful in handling. Key issues have 
included a lack of coherence of policies aimed at remedying market failures (at 
the national government and industry level). Furthermore, while some policies 
at the national government level (like the EOI with emphasis on macroeconomic 
stability and so on) carry merit, the lack of understanding of the situation in the 
industry and accordingly, the unability to implement relevant supporting, time-
bound measures has been profound. In addition, an increasing lack of govern-
ment and industry collaboration has compounded the situation. In competition 
with Asian countries where the governments have gone to lengths to assist the 
industry (or even as is the case of the aforementioned South African automotive 
industry), it poses severe challenges for the policies of the government that their 
decisions to a high degree have been taken without input from industry inform-
ants of the textile and clothing industry. The advantage of having the unions in-
volved in the policymaking, as part of a well-functioning tripartite system has not 
materialized, as the political situation along with the DTI’s decreasing capacity 
has led to a kind of capture of the DTI from the union’s side. Or phrased differ-
ently: ‘the unions won the policy battle, but South Africa lost the industry’ – or at 
least a considerable amount of the employment.17
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9.6 Concluding remarks and implications for industrial policy
If we assume that the issue is the alignment of government policies to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the textiles and clothing industry, relative to Schmitz’s frame-
work of ‘technology and marketing gaps’ (see above), the findings reveal a picture 
of inadequacy in terms of formulating and implementing appropriate indus-
trial policies. Comparing Schmitz’s proposals with the situation in the industry 
(where both technology and marketing are lacking), it appears government focus 
would have been better directed in terms of attracting FDI (as in the case of the 
automotive industry). If we accept the ‘gap’ to be only related to technology or 
marketing, then either a focus on securing licensing agreements, joint ventures or 
integration into global value chains would be the recommended policy. However, 
the fourth option, an export-oriented strategy, which was followed in the case of 
the South African industry, is the only option one would not go for – following 
the logic sequence as laid out by Schmitz (2007). As we outlined above, the South 
African government has, at face value, actively supported the textile and cloth-
ing industry. A closer assessment of this statement however, reveals a number of 
flaws. The government policies have been based on the basic structure established 
by the mid-1990s at the macroeconomic level (for example, EOI-strategies and 
macroeconomic stability), but the policies have not been stringent at the textiles 
and clothing industry level, failing to address the technology and marketing gaps, 
and have lacked a sufficient time horizon, often being implemented too late. Us-
ing Wad and Jeppesen’s typology, the strategy of the South African government 
mostly resembles a ‘laissez-faire strategy’.
While the historical and domestic reasons have been outlined, we also need to 
assess whether FDI is the magic solution. It has surely been of key importance to 
the transformation of the South African automotive industry (see for example, 
Barnes and Morris, 2008), however, other experiences tell us that FDI is not a 
guarantee for spillovers to domestic firms. And given the situation in the industry, 
what merits do the other two options carry?
In relation to Schmitz (and Schulpen and Gibbon), a key problem has been 
the lack of acknowledgment by the government of the size of and historical reli-
ance on the domestic market. The domestic market could and should have been 
focused on as key to the survival of the textiles and clothing industry in the 
mid-1990s. In the very least, a greater level of foresight would have identified 
the domestic market as a base on which to rely while changing the focus of the 
industry and allowing FDI to enter and assist in upgrading, as the situation in 
the South African automotive industry showed. The domestic market continues 
to operate as such, as it is still the key market constituting more than 95 of the 
industry’s total turnover today. A domestic market, which moreover has grown 
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since 2005, and thereby provides extra opportunities for local manufacturers (see 
below). In addition, the challenges that the textiles and clothing industry faced 
technological-wise and marketing-wise should have pointed the South African 
government to any of the policy solutions other than the EOI-strategy adopted. 
If the EOI was of benefit to other major parts of the South African industry, 
mediating measures should then have been in place to assist the domestic textiles 
and clothing industry.
Important to note, though, is that not just any type of FDI would have ben-
efited the South African textiles and clothing industry. As critics of the neo-
classical and neo-liberal assumptions of FDI are quick to point out, it is crucial 
that FDI inflows are linked to the domestic industry in order to be of benefit to 
the local industry (Sumner, 2005, Rugraff et al., 2009). Positive spillovers do not 
happen by themselves: they are the result of conscious efforts by the government 
seeking to link MNEs and local companies, ensuring deep, intensive and long-
term types of collaboration (as Altenburg, 2002; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2006 
also have argued). Most of the FDI that has entered South Africa since 1994 has 
not been of such a kind, but on the contrary ‘enclave’ investments by Asian firms 
seeking to exploit the investment incentives provided by the government and low 
wages. The outcome has been temporary investments; capital that tends to leave 
as quickly when incentives cease to be offered (to neighboring Lesotho, Swazi-
land or Namibia or Asian countries like Vietnam and Cambodia), focusing on 
the bottom rungs of the industry, with no linkages as the government has carried 
out its ‘laissez-faire type of policy’. The government has not even ensured proper 
enforcement of local legislations (see Bezuidenhout et al., forthcoming).
Similarly, the other policy options argued by Schmitz (either linking up to 
global value chains if marketing is the issue or promoting joint ventures between 
local firms and MNEs) entail the development of a proper framework if they 
are to lead to a positive outcome for the industry. Entering a global value chain 
requires investigation of which chains – and markets – are considered relevant 
or needed in terms of supporting the industry with appropriate measures. Skills 
development is one such form of support, if the local industry needs to improve 
its ability to add particular features to the products produced or is in need of de-
sign capabilities in order to respond to the trends in the foreign markets. Without 
such government initiatives, any effort will have been wasted, as the local com-
panies risk being locked into global value chains with few options to alter their 
position. The story regarding the joint venture option resembles the FDI with 
additional demands attached. The bottom line being that the developing country 
government needs to have a well thought, flexible policy in place with a long-term 
vision which it concurrently assesses and adjusts as the industry (and the govern-
ment) learns from experience.
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If we take the point of departure in Schmitz’s framework, what are then the 
learning points for a developing country’s  government from the assessment of the 
development in the South African textiles and clothing industry? We find three 
learning points: 1) time of adjustment to global competition; 2) the obstacles for 
collaboration between government and industry, and: 3) the importance of the 
capacity of government. The three points are related, but we will treat them sepa-
rately for the sake of clarity.
First, a key observation is that the time of adjustment of an industry used to 
a protected competitive environment to ‘global competition’ is longer than an-
ticipated (particularly if well formulated supply-side support is missing). This 
means that there is a need for ‘protectionist/supportive policies’ for longer than 
often anticipated. Government is required to respond quickly to industry needs 
with relevant policies and initiatives. A dividing line is whether the industry is 
well established and diverse (as the South African textiles and clothing indus-
try was by the mid-1990s) or relatively young, inexperienced and unfocused (as 
evident in respect of the clothing industry in a number of African countries 
since 2000 and the initiation of AGOA). If the industry is diverse, then clearly 
the government will have to make a choice in terms of which party to support. 
As highlighted by Kaplinsky and Morris, liberalization and free market policies 
(such as EOI-strategies) are too limited in their scope to provide developing 
countries looking to sustain their textiles and clothing industries with support 
(2008).
On the other hand, given the new rules of the game, in particular the competi-
tion from China and other Asian countries, the question is whether the technol-
ogy and marketing gaps have become too large making it nearly impossible for a 
‘solely’ indigenous industry to survive the global competition. Accordingly, how 
can a developing country government capably attract FDI in a manner that not 
simply wipes out the domestic industry, but actually brings MNEs in and fa-
cilitates linkages, upgrading and so on? This similarly applies to other upgrading 
routes, whether in the form of a licensing agreement, building on joint ventures 
(and local content requirements) and/or the linking up to and learning from 
global value chains.
Secondly, the importance – and difficulty – of government-business collab-
oration is to be noticed. While the theoretical approaches and the East Asian 
experiences which, for example, Rodrik refers to, highlight the success of such 
collaboration, the South African experiences show that this is difficult to achieve. 
Different historical, political and cultural factors contribute to these difficulties. 
In particular, various types of mistrust may exist between the government and 
the business sector, as indicated in the situation in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, 
to name but a few examples. While developing country governments are the ones 
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that decide whether and how to collaborate with the business sectors, including 
which parts of the business sector, and need to assess the pros and cons of engag-
ing with business, the importance of this collaboration to economic development, 
employment and income generation is high.
The third and final point relates to the fact that one cannot underestimate 
the importance of capacity in government. Yet, the South African approach to 
this dilemma has been limited to only indirectly providing skills upgrading op-
portunities in this field. It is an example of diminishing capacity, which – on 
top of the constrained relationship between government and business – impacts 
negatively on the ability of government to formulate and implement sufficient 
policies. Capacity of government includes a thorough understanding of the situ-
ation in the industry and an ability to focus on what the industry’s development 
potential is. As mentioned under the first point, a major problem has been the 
lack of recognition of level of experience of the textiles and clothing industry and 
its domestic base. Unfortunately, similar developments have taken place in many 
African countries over the last 20-25 years (Mkandawire, 2001) probably with the 
same outcome. This points to a future, continued emphasis on building and/or 
developing capacity of developing country governments, particularly if the suc-
cesses from Asia are to be repeated.
On an endnote, while the story of the South African textiles and clothing 
industry since the mid-1990s has mostly been a story of downturns, and the in-
dustry is clearly facing a crisis point at present, there is the possibility of an up-
turn going forward. In the South African case, the present situation is one which 
requires the resolving of the fracture point that exists between domestic retailers 
and producers, as well as substantial upgrading of both textiles and clothing capa-
bilities with assistance from government and its ability to successfully implement 
appropriate policies.
However, in order to compete with Chinese imports, especially in the domes-
tic market, it is essential that South African clothing manufacturers and CMTs 
are able to differentiate themselves and provide something that the Chinese com-
petitors cannot. The recent emergence of ‘lean manufacturing’ and ‘fast fashion’ 
principles as two such innovations in the industry give the South African manu-
facturers and CMTs an opportunity to provide the local retailers with short lead 
times on orders, in-season tradability and other tenets of clothing and textiles 
manufacturing best practices (Morris and Reed, 2008). There is a need for adap-
tation to domestic retailer strategies of supplying ‘fast fashion’, a need to be able to 
counterbalance the increased uncertainty regarding the Chinese manufacturers 
and suppliers to the local retailers, and to be able to meet consumer demands for 
increased fashion variety and increased efficiencies in the manufacturing value 
chain. That is why it is important to develop a closer link between technology and 
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marketing, in order to meet the increasing demand of the retailers. Furthermore, 
the use of information technology should enable a close alignment of manufac-
turers’ and retailers’ value chains (Barnes, 2008).
Making industrial policies work is a challenge, but it is not impossible. Wheth-
er the South African case develops into an upturn in the years to come or con-
tinues on its downturn will be dependent on numerous factors. The future will 
tell. Still, it is not too late to make a transformation, which puts more emphasis 
on the alternatives to the present route, whether FDI, license and joint venture or 
linking up to global value chains.
 Notes
* B&M Analysts and School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
 This includes the industrial policies which are promoted via ODA, and the fact that do-
nors (bi- and multilateral) often play an important role in LDCs. This is where industrial 
strategies increasingly tend to be formulated along the lines of ‘private sector development 
strategies’ (PSDPs) and/or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), with reference 
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)). However, we focus on the interplay 
between the (developing country) state and the private sector.
 Interview with Etienne Vlok, SACTWU, October , Cape Town.
 See for example DTI () ‘South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment’, October, Johannesburg, South Africa.
 The DCCS benefit is effectively a  to  export incentive for the South African 
clothing and textiles industry – depending on where firms source their fabrics. If sourced 
in South Africa the benefit is , but if imported then the benefit reduces on the basis 
of duties payable on imported fabrics.
 The benchmarking program undertaken in the two mentioned clusters in Western Cape 
(consisting of  manufacturers and  retailers) and Kwazulu-Natal (consisting of  
manufacturers and  retailers) have included focus on: ) Cost control (for example, 
Stock control), ) Quality (for example, measured in customers product return and 
internal defect rate), ) Value chain flexibility (for example, Logistics capabilities), ) 
Value chain reliability, ) Human resource development, and ) Product innovation (see 
Barnes, ).
 See Barnes ; . 
 Figures are found in appendix A.
 To put the decline into a firm perspective,  clothing firms have shut down in the last 
three years, mainly due to increased import penetration of Chinese products, while illegal 
imports have served to exacerbate the problem. 
 The associated socioeconomic effects for the country if employment levels are allowed 
to continue their decline are substantial, with this percentage decline equating an an-
nual loss of over , jobs from the textiles and clothing industry since  (IDC, 
).
 Figures are found in appendix B.
 Jack Kipling, Executive Director, Clotrade,  Oct .
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 For example, - different persons being in charge of the textiles and clothing desk, ac-
cording to Jack Kipling, Executive Director of Clotrade,  November .
 The information that we have acquired on this topic is somewhat limited, as several of the 
stakeholders have refrained from commenting. However, on the other hand, others like 
the trade unions and Clotrade have been straightforward and outspoken.
 One of the downsides of this was the poor conditions that the workers faced (poor work-
ing conditions, low wages, poor treatment from management and little space to voice 
critique).
 Eventually, only the activities concerning the Country of Origin labelling and the preface 
of the Replacement for the DCCS have been undertaken. And the latter, still not decided.
 To paraphrase the former president of the Danish National Labor Organisation (LO) Mr. 
Thomas Nielsen, when he concluded the achievements of the National Labor Movements 
and stepped down as president.
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 Soeren Jeppesen and Justin Barnes
Table A Production performance of the South African industries since 1998 (index 
2000 = 100)
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Textiles 104.7 99.1 100.0 102.0 110.4 93.1 92.7 81.3 80.6 80.0 73.5
Other textile 
products




113.2 111.6 100.0 103.4 111.2 99.2 100.3 77.4 80.7 82.6 86.7
Wearing 
apparel
104.4 105.9 100.0 94.4 100.5 99.2 104.8 103.9 106.7 113.8 114.9
Total averaged 
index 
104.3 103.2 100.0 101.0 108.9 98.4 101.9 94.9 97.1 99.0 97.9
CPI-adjusted 184.9 174.0 160.0 152.9 151.1 129.0 131.6 118.6 116.0 110.3 97.9
Source: Statistics South Africa data, adjusted for infl ation (www.statssa.gov.za)
Table B Actual and real sales values (ZAR thousands)
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Apparel 1494525 1655359 1366077 1447041 1426186 1387066 1602035 1324474 1357786 1476142 1275054








252431 274061 214776 252666 331112 224894 189521 194016 187939 163283 171451
Total (CPI-
adjusted) 
447572.4 462159.7 343641.6 382247.6 459240.4 294749.46 244858.7 242520.31 224538.91 182032. 
5152
171451
Source: Textiles Sector Prospects, IDC, 2009
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